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PREFACE

This thesis assesses the manner in which India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has
emerged as the political face of Hindutva, or Hindu ethno-cultural nationalism. The
insights of scholars like Christophe Jaffrelot, Ashish Nandy, Thomas Blom Hansen,
Ram Puniyani, Badri Narayan, and Chetan Bhatt have been instrumental in furthering
my understanding of the manifold elements of Hindutva ideology. I am grateful to
Anil Padmanabhan, co-editor of Mint newspaper in New Delhi, whose guidance
during my summer internship in 2009 exposed me to the predominant debates on
Hindu nationalism. I appreciate the inputs of Kimberly Franklin at the Honnold-Mudd
library of the Claremont Colleges. Our numerous meetings pointed me to a range of
authors and online sources.
I thank Professor Gastón Espinosa, whose class, Religion, Politics, and Global
Violence, introduced me to the inextricable connections between faith and political
power. His enthusiasm is infectious. Working with him on this thesis helped me wade
through the seemingly endless writing process. I am indebted to Professor Roderic
Camp, whose feedback and encouragement during the past year was invaluable in
defining the scope and direction of this analysis. He has been truly wonderful as a
reader, and even more so as a mentor.
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TIMELINE
Landmarks in Indian History

1526-1858
Mughal rule in India
1858-1947
India under British rule
1947-89
August 15, 1947: Indian independence from British rule
January 26, 1950: Indian Constitution enforced
1967: Congress Party defeated in nine states
1969: Congress splits into two: Indian National Congress (Congress I) and Congress
Organization (Congress O)
•
•

Radical turn in Congress-bank nationalization
Garibi hato (end poverty) policy

1971: Bangladesh attains independence from Pakistan. India sends troops to assist
Bangladesh.
1974: Total Revolution, a movement initiated in the state of Bihar by Gandhian
leader Jay Prakash Narayan, spreads across north India.
•

Allahabad High Court judgment on corrupt electoral practices of Indira
Gandhi-led Congress government leads to National Emergency.

1975-77: Government declares Emergency
1977-79: Congress defeated. Janata Party government assumes power.
•

Democracy restored after Emergency

•

July 1979- Janata government collapses
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1980-88: Decade of turbulence because of separatist movements in Punjab and the
northeast
•

1980- Indira Gandhi inaugurates another decade of Congress rule.

•

June 1984- Operation Blue Star launched by Congress. Indian army moves into
Golden Temple in Amritsar, Punjab, to flush out terrorists. Involves gun battle
and attack on the Sikh place of worship. Leaves 550 dead.

•

October 1984- Congress-sponsored massacre of Sikhs. Indira Gandhi
assassinated by Sikh bodyguards.

•

December 1984- Congress wins parliamentary elections due to “sympathy
vote” after Indira Gandhi’s death. Rajiv Gandhi becomes Prime Minister.

•

1986- Government passes Muslim Women Protection of Rights on Divorce
Act. Overturns Supreme Court judgment on Shah Bano case.

•

1987- India deploys the Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka

1989-2010
1989: Congress defeated following widespread allegations of corruption.
•

National Front government under V.P. Singh wins elections with BJP support

1990: Mandal Commission Report implemented. Indian troops withdrawn from Sri
Lanka.
1991: National Front government falls as BJP withdraws support following the first
major attempt to demolish the Babri mosque. Congress returns to power.
•

Rajiv Gandhi assassinated by Tamil suicide bomber

•

Structural Adjustment Program initiated under International Monetary Fund
(IMF)

1992: Babri mosque demolished due to Hindu right-wing mobilization.
1996: Congress defeated in national elections. BJP emerges as single largest party in
Parliament. Is unable to garner support of other parties to form a coalition.
Congress-led United Front government supported by leftists takes over.
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1998: BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) takes power at the Center (union
level). India detonates three nuclear bombs. South Asian arms race begins.
2002: Godra train attack on February 27, 2002 causes riots in the north western state
of Gujarat. 2,000 Muslims perish. 100,000 women and children are displaced.
2004: BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition loses to Congress-led
United Progressive Alliance (UPA)
2008: Mumbai terrorist attacks leave 175 persons dead
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INTRODUCTION

On May 16, 1998, under the directives of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP)-led coalition, the Indian government detonated three nuclear bombs in the
Rajasthan desert, near a site called Pokhran.1 If the name of India’s inter-ballistic
missile, Agni, the god of fire in the Vedic tradition, is inscribed in antiquity, its
symbolism in 1998 was entirely new, reflecting the rise of a political party that
emblematizes a chauvinistic, majoritarian stance.2
To celebrate India’s accomplishment, the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), a
sister organization of the BJP, ordered the construction of a temple dedicated to
Shakti, the goddess of strength, some fifty kilometers away from the testing site.3 The
decision is an apt example of Hindutva ideologues’ use of the feminine metaphor of
“innate strength” to legitimize aggression against external forces. Shortly after the
nuclear tests, Bal Thackerey, the chairman of the Shiv Sena, a Mumbai-based Hindu
nationalist ally of the BJP, declared that Hindus were no longer eunuchs—a notion
that traces its roots back to the Mughal period which spanned three centuries.4
Thackerey’s statement ironically subverted the idea of female power and reiterated the
masculinist theme that has animated Hindu nationalism since its inception in the

1

Chetan Bhatt, “Introduction,” in Hindu Nationalism: Origins, Ideologies and Modern Myths (Oxford:
Berg Publishers, 2001), 1-2.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
The Mughal period in India lasted from 1526 AD to 1858 AD. See footnote 15 for citation.
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1920s. Hindutva’s sacralization of aggression had an anticipated consequence:
Pakistan retaliated by exploding five nuclear bombs on May 28, 1998.5
The names of both countries’ missiles, Agni, the Vedic god of fire, and Ghauri,
the famous Muslim conqueror,6 make real the monumental conflict between
primordial Hinduism and medieval Islam that votaries of Hindu nationalism consider
central to their political agenda.7
The Partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 reinstated the animosity between
Islam and Hinduism, giving a new lease of life to the Hindutva cause.8 In
contemporary India, where Hindus constitute about 80.5 percent of the total
population, followed by Muslims (13.4 percent), Christians (2.3 percent), Sikhs (1.9
percent), Buddhists (0.8 percent), Jains (0.4 percent), and others (0.7 percent),9 this
legacy is encapsulated in the struggle between the dominant Hindu majority and a
comparatively belittled Islamic community. In its capacity as the second most
powerful national party with a voter base of about twenty-five percent of India’s
population, the BJP has emerged as the most powerful organization for promoting the
Hindu nationalist voice.10
This study aims at assessing the dynamics of Hindutva, or Hindu ethnocultural nationalism, in the politics of the BJP from 1990 to 2010. It analyzes the inter5

Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, 1-2.
The name Ghauri comes from the famous Afghan ruler Muhammad Ghauri, known to have invaded
India seventeen times between the 11th and 12th centuries. The missile is also referred to as Hatf V,
which was the sword used by Prophet Muhammad. See footnote 1 for citation.
7
Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, 3.
8
Ibid.
9
For citation and further information, see table 1, pie chart 1, and map 3 in appendix.
10
As of 2010, the BJP possesses 116 of 552 seats in the Lok Sabha (lower house of Indian Parliament),
and 55 of 250 seats in the Rajya Sabha (upper house of Indian Parliament). For more information, see
table 2 and map 1 in appendix. See footnote 1 for citation.
6
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linkages between Hindu nationalism and extremism by evaluating the role of Hindutva
rhetoric in inciting communal violence against India’s 138 million Muslims.11
Through its investigation of the interplay between rhetoric and patterns of violence,
the analysis will address three essential questions. How has the BJP used Hindutva
ideology as an instrument of political mobilization? How has BJP-led communal
violence impacted Indian society and politics? What role will Hindutva play in the
future political agenda of the BJP?
The first chapter of this thesis outlines the theoretical and intellectual
developments that led to the rise of Hindutva as a form of Hindu ethno-cultural
nationalism. The second chapter identifies the precursors to the BJP. It explores their
organizational structures and missions to gauge the historical and political contexts
from which the BJP borrowed. Chapter three details the evolution of the BJP and its
core mobilization strategies. Subsequent sections of the thesis focus on specific cases,
in order to illustrate how the BJP’s rhetoric and mobilization tactics have garnered
Hindu support for communal violence against Muslims.
Chapter four describes the destruction of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya in
1992, and assesses the role of the BJP in the demolition. It argues that Ayodhya was a
catalyst for future communal violence; one such instance being the 1993 riots in the
city of Mumbai. By demonstrating how southern, regional organizations like the Shiv
Sena advanced Hindutva goals in the Mumbai riots, the chapter highlights the
hierarchical tendencies in the BJP’s organizational and operational structures. The
fifth chapter is a study of the Gujarat riots in 2002. It deals with the complicity of the
11

For citation and further information, see table 1 in appendix.
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BJP-led state government in the communal carnage, and exposes the absence of
boundaries between religion and secularism in the Indian context. Chapter six explores
the communal bias in the Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act (POTA) 2002, which
was legislated during the BJP’s reign at the Center.12 By demonstrating how the Act
was used to indict Muslims in the Gujarat carnage (2002) and Mumbai blasts (2003
and 2006), the chapter indicates POTA’s legacy in Indian politics.
In light of the BJP’s consecutive electoral defeats in the 2004 and 2009
national elections, the study proposes that the lack of a concrete socio-economic
agenda is an impending loophole in the party’s political strategy. It also suggests that
for the BJP to maintain its current national standing, a more pluralistic stance is of the
essence. This being said, the thesis acknowledges that the BJP’s leadership has refused
to forfeit Hindutva, despite the party’s defeat at the 2004 and 2009 union polls. It
establishes that while the party’s share of the national vote has declined from 37.06
percent in 1999 to 24.6 percent in 2009, the BJP remains the second largest political
party in India.13 This not only indicates the continued presence of Hindutva in BJP
politics, it also suggests that the BJP will rely on anti-minority violence to secure
electoral victories.
This evaluation does not seek to project Hindutva as an ideology that has
gripped the entire nation. Much of this analysis focuses on political dynamics in northcentral India. Case studies in this thesis focus primarily on the states of Gujarat
(Godhra) and Uttar Pradesh (Ayodhya). Yet, it is clear that Hindutva forces have
12

“Center” is a term used interchangeably with “union government” or “national government.” See
footnote 4 for citation.
13
For more information, see tables 1 and 2 in appendix.
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established their presence in south Indian states like Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and
Maharashtra14—though on a limited scale.15 This analysis therefore attempts to
demonstrate the potency of Hindutva despite its essentially northern appeal.
It is important to acknowledge that communalism in the modern Indian context
is not a solely Hindu phenomenon. Islamic radicalism is an equally pressing concern
for Indian statesmen.16 Muslim-led communal riots in the pre-Partition era caused the
death of close to 250,000 Hindus.17 The 1967 riots in Allahabad (Uttar Pradesh) and
Ahmedabad (Gujarat) were instigated by the Muslims in these cities. The 1987 riots in
Pune (Maharashtra) commenced after Muslims burnt an idol of Lord Ganesha in a
Hindu neighborhood.18 Shiv Sena volunteers involved in the 1993 Mumbai riots
claimed that their actions were a response to Muslim resentment against the
destruction of the Babri mosque in 1992.19 More recently, the alleged involvement of
Muslim terrorists in the 2003, 2006, and 2008 Mumbai bombings have raised the ire
of many in the Hindu community.20
There are several reasons for the recent surge in Islamic violence in India.
Internal indoctrination by conservative priests or mullahs; radical Islamic rhetoric that
presents Muslims as both marginalized actors and subjects of Western exploitation;
14

The 1993 Mumbai riots illustrate the BJP’s presence in southern India. The Shiv Sena, a regional ally
of the BJP, led communal violence against Mumbai’s Muslims. The city of Mumbai is located in the
south western state of Maharashtra. See footnote 14 for citation.
15
Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, 1-2.
16
Ram Puniyani, “The Partition: Who was Responsible?,” in Communal Politics: Facts versus Myths
(New Delhi: Sage Publications India Pvt. Lmt., 2003), 111. Note: “Pvt. Lmt.” is an abbreviation for
“Private Limited.” The notation will be used in subsequent citations in this thesis.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid
19
Badri Narayan, “Introduction: Pastness and Politics,” in Fascinating Hindutva: Saffron Politics and
Dalit Mobilization (New Delhi: Sage Publications Pvt. Lmt., 2009), 17.
20
Ibid.
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and economic disadvantages associated with demographic factors like high birth rates
are some reasons for the emergence of Muslim-sponsored communalism in the
country.21 Of equal significance is the fact that Hindutva rhetoric has proved damaging
in this scenario. This assessment therefore underscores the manner in which the
discourse and political activism of Hindutva ideologues, notably the BJP, have
heightened the preexisting minority psychosis among Indian Muslims.22

21
22

Puniyani, Communal Politics, 111.
Ibid.
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CHAPTER 1
ORIGINS OF HINDUTVA

Making Connections
The birth of a distinctive view of Hindu supremacy is traced in historical scholarship
to the violent but puzzlingly short period from 1919 to the mid-1920s.23 It was in 1923
that V.D. Sarvarkar’s founding statement on Hindu identity (Hindutva—Who is a
Hindu?) was published.24 The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) was formed in
1925, and Sarvarkar’s Hindu Mahasabha of 1916, the central organ for promoting
Hindu demands during the Indian independence struggle, was strengthened.25 The idea
of the Sangh Parivar, a family of Hindu nationalist organizations, took root during
this period.
These crystallizing events were direct consequences of Hindu resentment
towards nationalist leader Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi’s support for the khilafat
movement; a global Muslim campaign in support of the Caliphate after the Ottoman
Empire’s demise in 1920.26 The rise of the All India Muslim League in the 1920s,
Muslim demands for separate electoral representation, and agitation in the aftermath
of the khilafat struggle led to the consolidation of a Hindu supremacist, anti-Muslim
constituency in India. In this register, Hindu consciousness was viewed as an external

23

Chetan Bhatt, “The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’s Ordered Society,” in Hindu Nationalism:
Origins, Ideologies and Modern Myths (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2001), 79.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid, 80.
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factor, subsidiary to the movement for self-determination, and of relatively minor
importance until well after independence.27
The link between Hindu consciousness and a nationalist view of political and
social history became apparent in post-colonial India with the stabilization of the RSS
in the 1960s, and the subsequent rise of its political arm, the BJP, in the 1980s.28 This
notwithstanding, the works of three scholars (V.D. Sarvarkar, K.B. Hedgewar, and
M.S. Golwalkar) during the pre-independence period were instrumental in the
fructification of Hindutva: an ethno-cultural and nationalistic view of the Hindu
religious tradition.29

Sarvarkar’s Discourse on Radical Ethno-Nationalism
Vinayak Damodar Sarvarkar was born in May 1883 in Bhagpur, a town in the
Nashik district of Maharashtra in western India. He is celebrated in contemporary
times as a revolutionary hero, a daring and courageous figure who fought the British in
India.30 While British colonialism was the catalyst for much of Sarvarkar’s writing, his
assessment of India’s past drew from both the ancient Vedic era and the medieval
period of Mughal domination.31 Much of his work—he began writing in 1920 and
continued until his death in 1966—is embedded in a dense hagiographical tone. His
references to gods, saints, and medieval Hindu heroes stress themes of

27

Ibid.
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
31
The Vedic age lasted from the 1st millennia BC to the 6th century BC. The Mughal period lasted from
1526 AD to 1858 AD. See footnote 1 for citation.
28
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uncompromising militancy and masculine strength, both against British colonial rule
and against Indian Muslims.32

Definition of Hindu Identity
Sarvarkar’s overarching aim was to provide a comprehensive definition of
what constituted Hindu identity. To do so, he instituted Hindutva as the essence of
Hinduness. Though he dismissed twentieth century views of Hinduism as rooted in
Western ideas, Sarvarkar’s goal was not to reject Orientalist conceptions of India’s
religious heritage.33 Rather, he wished to underscore that Hindu identity is not defined
merely through personal or collective religious beliefs: “A Hindu means a person who
regards this land of Bharatavarsha34 from the Indus to the seas as his Fatherland as
well as his Holyland, that is, the cradle of his religion.”35
In addition, Sarvarkar sought to introduce historically attenuated versions of
what he believed were the foundations of Hindu dharma (religion). The strategic
primordialization of Hindu identity proved essential in this regard.36 Despite his
outward rejection of Western conceptions, “the intellectual conditions for the essence
of Sarvarkar’s Hindu identity were the eighteenth and nineteenth century paradigms of
[German and British] Orientalism.”37 He found in such views an unchanging quality to

32

Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, 1-2.
V.D. Sarvarkar, “Excerpts from Hindutva,” in Communal Identity in India: Its Construction and
Articulation in the Twentieth Century, ed. Bidyut Chakrabarty (New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
2003), 69.
34
“Bharatavarsha” is one of the several terms used by Sarvarkar to describe the Hindu nation. See
footnote 9 for citation.
35
Sarvarkar, Communal Identity in India, 69.
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
33
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the historicity of India. Time was purely serial, bereft of any consequence, and history
was an outcome of external events: wars and invasions. Hinduism settled back to its
steady state, in consonance with its primordial content once the external threat
ceded.38 By linking Hindutva with history, Sarvarkar was able to temporalize and
secularize Hindu religious identity.
For Sarvarkar, the Hindu had come into being long before the Egyptian and the
Babylonian; when the Aryans had crossed the Indus River to occupy India. This racial
occupation of India’s geographical space during the Vedic age became a key
component of Sarvarkar’s imagined Hindu nation.39 Accounts of the Aryans’
migration from the north to the south, an important facet of nineteenth century
European Aryanism,40 figure extensively in the ideologue’s works.41 This elucidates
the link between Hindutva and European nationalist writings. Further, it stresses the
origins of the Aryan Race Theory and the Out of India Theory.42 The two are
extensively employed by BJP cadres to root their antecedents in the “pure” Vedic
civilization.43
While Sarvarkar believed that the comingling of indigenous and Aryan blood
gave rise to the Hindu-Vedic civilization, he clearly stated that Aryan blood, culture,
38

Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, 86.
Scholars believe that the Vedic period extended from the 1st millennia BC to the 6th century BC. See
footnote 10 for citation.
40
Sarvarkar borrowed from the European nationalist writings of Gramsci, as well as the fascist writings
of Hitler and Mussolini. Many of his ideas were rooted in German notions about the “pureness” of the
Aryan race. See footnote 18 for citation.
41
Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, 86.
42
Both the Aryan Race Theory and the Out of India Theory track Aryan migration (from Europe to
India), thereby establishing Aryans (Hindus) as the true inhabitants of the Indian nation. See footnote 18
for citation.
43
Ronald Neufeldt, “Hindutva and the Rhetoric of Violence: Interpreting the Past, Designing the
Future,” in The Twentieth Century Confronts Its Gods: Globalization, Technology, and War, ed. David
J. Hawkin (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2004), 159.
39
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and ideas were the ultimate basis of Hindu nationhood.44 For example, in his
discussions of the Ramayana myth, Hanuman, the representative of non-Aryan groups
in southern India, is depicted as a supporter of Rama’s Hindu mission to conquer the
non-Aryan rakshasas (demons).45
Interestingly, in assigning a primordial attribute to the word “Hindu,”
Sarvarkar stressed that its roots were not indigenous. Of the above he said: “But when
the self comes into contact with the non-self, then alone it stands in need of a name if
it wants to communicate with others or if others persist in communicating with it.”46
This dual structure to the patronymic is insightful. The word “Hindu” originated
among the British, who are projected as invaders in Hindu nationalist writings. The
primal patronymic, according to Sarvarkar, is therefore “a product of Vedic-Aryan
conquest that is antagonized in history through conflict with others.”47 The term
“Hindu” is conferred upon India, and outlives other labels like Bharata and Aryavarta,
at the juncture where conflict and war intersect with the primal patronymic.48

Fundamentalism in Sarvarkar’s Hindutva
Sarvarkar’s writings during the 1930s featured a definitively stronger version
of Hindutva.49 As noted earlier, European nationalism cast a profound impression on
the ideologue. In the work of Giuseppe Mazzini, for example, Sarvarkar found an
44

Ibid.
Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, 88.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid, 89.
49
Thomas Blom Hansen, “Imagining the Hindu Nation,” in The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu
Nationalism in Modern India (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 77.
45

18

ideological framework that combined cultural pride and national self-assertion with a
“vision of a homogenous nation embodied in a unitary state.”50 By 1938, Sarvarkar
began drawing comparisons between Hindus and ethnic Germans and between Indian
Muslims and German Jews. He repeatedly stated that an ethnically sound Hindu nation
“should be inhabited only by pure-blooded Aryans.”51 Whereas Sarvarkar’s previous
notions focused on race and territory, his subsequent ideas stressed the role of
militarism and war.52
The link between Hindu cohesion and German unification became the basis for
Sarvarkar’s comparison between Hitlerism and the “cowardly democratic-socialist
attitude” of India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru.53 The use of aggressive
discourse to mobilize the economically downtrodden proved particularly effective
during Sarvarkar’s lifetime. This provides another close parallel between right-wing
European ideas and the ethno-cultural nationalism that was emerging in India. By
focusing on economic apathy and disadvantage, Hindutva forces developed a
totalitarian view of manushya (man) and his role in Hindu civilization.54
Saffron is believed to be the color of purity and strength in Hindu mythology.
It became a means of internal colonization55 for Hindu nationalists, who readily

50

M.J. Akbar, “The Hitler Note: Or, Notes on Apocalypse Now,” in Riot After Riot: reports on caste
and communal violence in India (New Delhi: Roli Books Pvt. Lmt., 2003), 167.
51
Sarvarkar, Communal Identity in India, 70.
52
Ibid.
53
Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, 107.
54
Akbar, Riot After Riot, 179.
55
“Internal colonization” refers to the manner in which Aryanism was used to consolidate national
power in the hands of the elitist brahaminical or priestly class. The Hindu nation envisioned by
Sarvarkar was unified only in so far as it ascribed Hindu identity to the lower castes. In all other
respects, the project catered to the whims of the upper castes. See footnote 33 for citation.

19

employed fascist appeals to insignia56 while constructing the “otherness” of nonHindus.57 Armed with Hitler’s ideas on the purity of the German race, and Mazzini’s
delineation of present humiliation and past glory, Hindutva ideologues reinforced the
superiority of Hindu brahamins (priests).58 Thus began the internal colonization of
India, and the subjugation of all other castes and religions under the pretext of
securing a unified Hindu nation.

Muslim Identity and Reinterpretation of Indian History
Hindutva’s emphasis on aggression ensured that the Buddhist period between
the Mauryan era (321-185 BC) and the Mughal sultanate (1526-1858 AD) barely
received space in Sarvarkar’s historical scheme.59 Sarvarkar found Buddhism’s
universal, non-violent approach profoundly emasculating; demeaning to India’s
martial heritage.60 Sarvarkar’s repudiation of Buddhism also underscored his
opposition to the pacifist Gandhian ideas that typified India’s freedom struggle during
the 1930s and 40s.
With Sarvarkar, and the simultaneous advent of Gandhi, there emerged two
distinct interpretations of a modern Indian nation based on Hindu values. Sarvarkar’s
cultural nationalism was masculine, aggressive, and anti-Muslim, but also rational and

56

The bhagwa dhwaj (saffron flag) is for Hindu nationalists what the swastika (equilateral cross with
arms bent at right angles) was for proponents of Nazism. See footnote 33 for citation.
57
Robert E. Frykenberg, “Hindutva as a Political Religion,” in The Sacred In Twenty-First Century
Poitics, ed. Roger Griffin, Robert Mallett, and John Tortorice (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008),
205.
58
Ibid.
59
Ajit Karnik, “Sarvarkar’s Hindutva,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 38, No. 15 (April 12-18,
2003), 1426.
60
Ibid.
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progressive.61 Gandhi’s views, in contrast, were rooted in tradition. He stressed the
notion of swadeshi (economic self-reliance) and—unlike Sarvarkar who remained
ambivalent about Western culture—projected peaceful nationalism against the
backdrop of all that the West lacked.62 Sarvarkar perceptibly refuted these ideas. His
anti-Gandhian stance was strengthened on another account: M.K. Gandhi’s support for
Indian Muslims. These two features of Sarvarkar’s Hindutva, its militant activism and
anti-minority appeal, figure prominently in the contemporary discourse of the BJP and
its allies.63
The elevation of India’s ancient past and the repudiation of non-violent action
in India’s modern history were accompanied in Sarvarkar’s discourse by a staunch
dismissal of the medieval period. Sarvarkar readily employed the racial homogeneity
of the Vedic era to demonstrate how the Mughals had destroyed and dismembered
ancient archetypes of Aryanism.64 In fact, the myth of Vedic origin allowed Sarvarkar
to undermine all external forces. The essentials of the Hindutva landscape, blood ties
to India’s territory and a caste system founded on the purity of upper caste (Aryan)
blood, contextualized much of Sarvarkar’s critique of the British and Muslim eras.65
In an effort to undermine Muslim identity, Sarvarkar focused on Hindu martial
clans like the Marathas and Rajputs. He presented medieval Hindu princes like Shivaji
and Rana Pratap as epitomes of the Hindu essence. In addition, Sarvarkar cited
medieval directives such as the imposition of jaziya, or pilgrimage tax, as evidence of
61

Ibid.
Hansen, The Saffron Wave, 79.
63
Karnik, “Sarvarkar’s Hindutva,” Economic and Political Weekly, 1426.
64
Hansen, The Saffron Wave, 79.
65
Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, 95.
62

21

the atrocities Hindus bore under Muslim colonialists.66 His disdain for Muslim
domination stemmed from the belief that Muslims had denied Hindus the opportunity
to profess their faith.67 He held that religious stringencies68 were responsible for both
the economic marginalization of Hindus and the communalization69 of India’s social
space: “When Muslims penetrated India, the question of life and death
began…Muslim rulers systematically plundered the wealth of Hindus…the
illegitimacy of jaziya drove a wedge between the two communities.”70 Sarvarkar’s
repudiation of Mughal rule has made inroads into the BJP’s rhetoric. Featured in an
essay on the BJP’s official website is the following quote:
During the era of Islamic invasions, what Will Durant called the bloodiest
period in the history of mankind, many Hindus gallantly resisted, knowing fully
well that defeat would mean forced conversion, economic discrimination via the
jaziya tax, or death. It is no wonder that the residents of Chittor, and countless
other people over the length and breadth of Bharat [India], from present-day
Afghanistan to present-day Bangladesh, thought it better to die gloriously rather
than face cold-blooded slaughter. Hindus will never forget the repeated
destruction of the Somnath Temple, the massacre of Buddhists at Nalanda, or
the pogroms of the Mughals.71
The rationale of Muslims’ extra-terrestrial loyalties was used by votaries of
Hindutva to create an anti-minority psychosis among Hindus. In institutionalizing this
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reversal of affective states, a major problem for Hindu communalists was how the
majority could be made to fear the minority. Their solution: repeated references to the
Muslim brutes who specialized in sexual aggression against Hindu women.72 In
Sarvarkar’s view, Muslim conquerors raped Hindu women to sully the honor of Hindu
men: “Hindu women…were distributed in fives or tens amongst the most faithful
followers of Islam. Their future progenies were Muslim.”73
Sarvarkar’s preoccupation with medieval struggles between Hindus and
Muslims led to a narrow reading of Indian history, rendering Muslim identity a
contested category. His substitution of Hinduism by Hindutva ironically augmented
race at the cost of religion.74 In claiming that Muslims and Christians had to be
excluded from India because they were religiously dissimilar to Hindus, Sarvarkar
overlooked the fact that the communities’ racial identities were coextensive with their
religious leanings.75 Instead of rejecting the race-caste connection, Sarvarkar
generalized the category of race by arguing that Hindu religious constitution76
accounted for the primary difference between colonizers and the true inhabitants of
India. Sarvarkar’s view of Hindutva as comprising racial and geographic elements—
Vedic-Aryan blood and territorially ordained descent—contained another loophole.77
It failed to account for those Muslims who could lay claims to Indian territory owing
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to the practice of inter-marriage. In lieu of the above, Sarvarkar introduced a third
criterion for membership to the Hindu nation. The idea of a common culture
constituted by both Hindu religion and Sanskrit language came to occupy the center
stage in his theory.78
Although Sarvarkar sought a collective Hindu-Muslim front to curb British
colonialism and synthesize the political aspirations of the two communities, Muslim
demands for a separate nation turned him against inter-communal collaboration.79 The
solidification of the Pakistani state during the 1960s played an instrumental role in
advancing Hindutva. Many deemed it necessary to establish counterweights to an
intensely Islamic neighbor.80 Sarvarkar’s construction of the Muslim male as lustful
and threatening corresponded to his view of Indian Muslims as supporters of Pakistan
and agents of pan-Islamism.81
It is important to note that Sarvarkar’s scheme overlooked Hindu-Muslim
syncretism during the medieval era. It repudiated the links between the Hindu bhakti
movement and the Muslim sufi tradition—both anti-establishment campaigns that
sought to evade social hierarchies and move beyond deterministic orientations of
identity.82 Rather than incorporating notions of religious cohesion, Sarvarkar’s
Hindutva sought to bind Hindu men and women in an intensely nationalistic
framework by juxtaposing India’s martial heritage with the fertile, feminine nature of
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India’s geography. Hindustan became the pitrubhoomi, or the Fatherland, and the
matrabhoomi, or the Motherland.83
Sarvarkar’s vision of Hindu nationalism consisted of five salient elements.
First, it was anti-Muslim and presented the medieval era as a period of Hindu
exploitation. Second, it denounced Gandhian precepts of non-violence and favored
India’s martial tradition.84 Third, it extolled the Aryan race and the virtues of blood
ordained caste hierarchies. Fourth, it established blood ties to India’s territory as the
basis for membership to the Hindu state.85 Lastly, it promoted the idea of a common
Hindu culture based on Hindu religion and Sanskrit language. These components
became the foundations of Hindu nationalism in India and are visible in the goals and
charters of Sangh Parivar organizations.86

Hindu Nationalism under K.B. Hedgewar and M.S. Golwalkar
The ideas of Keshav Baliram Hedgewar (1889-1940)87 and Madhav Sadashiv
Golwalkar (1906-1973)88 built upon many of Sarvarkar’s notions. Brahamins from
western Maharashtra and co-founders of the Rashtriya Sawayamsevak Sangh (RSS),
the parent organization of the Sangh Parivar, both Hedgewar and Golwalkar proposed
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that India’s colonization was a result of the weak and disaggregated approach of
Hindus in the nation.89

An Overview of Indian History
Golwalkar and Hedgewar presented medieval accounts of Muslim domination
to demonstrate the organization and strength of Indian Muslims, thereby exhorting
Hindus to rise to the occasion.90 In his treatise on Hindu nationalism, We, or Our
Nationhood Defined (1939), Golwalkar sought to link Sarvarkar’s conception of the
Hindu nation with the notion of a Hindu state. Although he endorsed Sarvarkar’s
views on the antiquity and truism of India’s Vedic civilization, Golwalkar argued that
the Aryans were not exogenous to India.91 Yet, both Golwalkar and Hedgewar claimed
that the Hindu nation should not be viewed as the exclusive property of India’s
original inhabitants. Distinguishing between nation and state, they maintained that the
latter was distinguishable from and subservient to the national concept.92 The two
ideologues repudiated Buddhist pacifism and Gandhian non-violence. Like Sarvarkar,
they focused on the eight hundred-year period following the arrival of the Mughals in
India.93

Hindu Identity and the Social Organization of the Hindu State
The BJP’s political jargon of “one nation, one culture, one language, and one
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race” draws in multiple ways from the writings of early Hindutva ideologues.94 Both
Hedgewar and Golwalkar endorsed the parallels between Nazism and Hindutva, and
stressed the common racial spirit of the imagined Hindu nation.95
The complete abandonment of civic nationalism, which began under
Sarvarkar, found a continuous chain of supporters through India’s pre and post
colonial periods. As with Sarvarkar, culture was indistinguishable from religion for
Golwalkar and Hedgewar. This link formed the basis of a race consciousness.96
Golwalkar’s use of somatic metaphors—the healthy body of the Hindu nation being
plagued by the minority cancer—supplemented his ideological double binds in which
minorities could not be anything other than foreign, and therefore, could not claim
citizenship to the Hindu nation.97 According to Golwalkar, “The non-Hindu people in
Hindustan must adopt the Hindu culture and language, must learn to respect and hold
in reverence Hindu religion, must entertain no ideas but those of glorification of the
Hindu culture and race…We are an old nation; and let us deal, as old nations ought to
deal, with foreign races who have chosen to live in our country.”98
Interestingly, while Golwalkar and Hedgewar rejected Sarvarkar’s emphasis on
the caste system (varnashramadharma) and sub-caste hierarchies (jatis), they
promoted the idea of a uniform racial heritage. Like Sarvarkar, they advocated rigid
hierarchical organization in the RSS.99 The need to efface hierarchical power in order
94
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to sustain the RSS brotherhood highlights that the Hindutva movement was founded
on the premise of political clout.
In addition to providing structure to Hindutva organizations, the notion of a
uniform racial heritage was pivotal to Golwalkar and Hedgewar’s conception of a
democratic state. The two argued that in the absence of race-based organization, local
decision-making bodies like the village panchayats would cease to function
effectively as arbiters of dispute.100 The curtailment of state power to preserve
democracy clearly indicates Hindutva ideologues’ desire for control over India’s
religious affairs.
Although operating within the same organicist paradigm, the aforementioned
figures disagreed with respect to the strategies needed to achieve the Hindu rashtra
(nation). Sarvarkar focused on politics, agitation, and mass mobilization, whereas
Golwalkar and Hegdewar focused on character building.101 The crystallization of these
two positions marked a restaging of the double-stringed strategy of gradual cultural
change and public political articulation, which had emerged during India’s freedom
struggle.102

Upadhyaya’s Integral Humanism
Equally pivotal to the Hindutva scheme are the ideas of Deendayal Upadhyaya,
an RSS volunteer who wrote in post-colonial India during the 1960s. Borrowing from
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theologian Shankaracharya’s advaita103 (non-dualism or spiritual monism)104
philosophy, Upadhyaya developed the precepts of integral humanism; a premise that
figures repeatedly in the charters and expressed goals of the BJP.105 Upadhyaya’s
project was promethean. It sought to erase caste antagonisms and create a harmonious
society based on ideals from India’s Vedic past. Yet in offering equity among castes in
Indian society, Upadhyaya’s scheme appealed to the inequalities in the religious
domain: A unified Hindu community could be achieved only after Muslim influences
had been eliminated from the nation.106

Advaita and Hindutva
Upadhyaya used advaita philosophy to stress the principle of ekamata; a form
of unity that pervades the universe, and of which humankind is a part. He frequently
equated the human body, mind, intellect, and soul with the four universal objectives of
kama (pleasure), artha (wealth), dharma (duty or natural law), and moksha (salvation).
In so doing, he denounced economic systems like capitalism which accord autonomy
to the individual.107 By employing concepts like political morality, saryodaya (welfare
for all), and swadeshi (economic self-sustenance), Upadhyaya’s integral humanism
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“ideologically hijacked” the authority of the Gandhian idiom.108 These notions figure
widely in contemporary Hindutva. Contrary to the virtues of equality, Sangh Parivar
politics focuses on the upper echelons of society, arousing mass consciousness only in
name.109

Conception of the Hindu State and Projection of the Enemy
A staunch anti-modernist, Upadhyaya was deliberate in his choice of
vocabulary. He stressed the power of Hindu dharma (duty) in relation to both society
and the state, arguing that democracy is based on a hierarchical division of power that
corresponds to the four ultimate objectives of life.110 Despite his denials, Upadhyaya’s
conception of dharma oscillated between natural law, national soul, and the Hindu
nation. This demonstrates that he envisioned democracy as subservient to a religious
imperative. Upadhyaya’s discussions on secularism weigh against the ideology’s core
principles, given that they necessitate social hierarchy, while simultaneously stressing
the idea of an undifferentiated Hindu race.111
In assessing the interrelationships between secularism and democracy, it is
important to note that unlike the Western world, India lacks a formal segregation
between the religious and civic spheres.112 Religious practices among Hindus,
Muslims, Sikhs, and Jains are co-extensive with the communities’ cultural activities.
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Festivals and celebrations among these groups frequently possess religious
underpinnings. Given the above, the conventional understanding of secularism, “as an
ideology conveying social and political equality,” appears a denial of the veracity of
the Indian way of life.113
The Indian notion of secularism is influenced by the Hindu belief that various
faiths offer different paths that lead to the same truth. Hindutva adopts this view, but
with one crucial difference. It asks where the limits of the traditional acceptance of
plurality lie, and takes it upon itself to defend the freshly demarcated boundaries.114
The problem with Hindu ethno-cultural nationalism is not that it regards religion as an
encompassing phenomenon but that it insists on the compatibility and transferability
of secular and Hindu rationalities. The resultant dichotomies between the civil and
religious realms engender strife among communities. Furthermore, faith based politics
reinforces religious norms that perpetuate social hierarchies.115
Upadhyaya evidently appealed to the long-standing intersections between the
religious, political, and social spheres. In the end, his failure to separate religion and
nationalism significantly reduced the political currency of his secular rhetoric.116
Taking cue from Upadhyaya’s ideas, pro-Hindutva scholars like Ashish Nandy and
Tarun Vijay have employed the religious imperative to stress that secularism is a
colonial remnant. They maintain that secularity was imposed to create rifts between
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Hindus and Muslims.117 Unlike Upadhyaya, who embraced religious tolerance in
theory, Nandy and Vijay posit secularism as antithetical to the aim of a unified India:
It is important to recognize that one of the major reasons for the rise of
religious fundamentalism is the excess of ideological secularism and its
emergence as a dogma…by subverting religion as generally understood,
secularism sets off a reaction in the form of fundamentalism, which usually is a
perversion of religion and has less to do with the purity of faith and more to do
with the acquisition of power.118
To advance the idea of an undivided India, an Akhand Bharat, Upadhyaya
continuously counterposed his imagined Hindu nation with countries like Pakistan and
China. The first case, presents an enemy that was primordially part of the self, but that
has betrayed and denied the fulfillment of the self.119 In the second case, the enemy is
projected as so radically removed from the self that annihilation proves the only
logical counterweight. By delving into the notion of selfhood and constructing the
category of the “other,” Hindu nationalist forces concede to an important fracture in
their conception of Hindu superiority.120 That Hindus readily converted to other faiths
in the Mughal and British eras, and in post-colonial India,121 suggests that it is
Hinduism that is left wanting. Hindutva’s problem with “otherness” is, therefore, just a
means of masking the inherent failings in Hindu society. This is precisely the point at
which Hindu nationalism relinquishes the Hinduism project and establishes itself as an
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ideological substitute of the latter.122 For this reason, Hindu nationalism has been
unimportant for epistemological and metaphysical advancements, but incredibly
significant for the substitution of Hinduism by the materialist concerns of territory,
culture, xenology, and state power.123

Ideological Formulations and Hindutva Rhetoric
To ascertain Hindutva’s impact on Indian societal formations, it is essential to
explore the ways in which ideology operates. Ideological constructions perform two
crucial roles. First, they act as lenses with which humans can view the world. Ideology
“converts…contingency into an ostensibly stable symbolic order that promises to
close gaps in social existence through the construction of a more harmonious social
world.”124 Ideology becomes a means of either repudiating facts or embracing new
knowledge. It then emerges as an affect of power; an attempt to conceal the raw
contingency of the world. This allows ideology to perform the powerful function of
articulating “subjects” and “objects.” The disunity between imagery and symbolic
orders at the subject level eventually paves the way for the creation of communities as
objects of intense hatred.125
According to this framework, anti-Islamism in India is a consequence of
rhetoric that holds Muslims responsible for fissures in Indian society. Hindutva
rhetoric has indeed influenced the manner in which Hindus view Muslims. The

122

Aloysius, “Trajectory of Hindutva,” Economic and Political Weekly, 1450.
Bhatt, Hindu Nationalism, 160.
124
Hansen, The Saffron Wave, 65.
125
Ibid.
123

33

ferocity of violence during Hindu-led riots in Ayodhya (1992) and Gujarat (2002)
bears testimony to this trend.126 The potency of hatred among common people is
expressed openly and candidly. With reference to a communal incident in Dattawadi,
Pune, in 1987, a Hindutva follower from a low caste grassroots organization called the
Patit Pawan stated, “Our Ganesh idols had been defiled by them…we actually
terrorized [the Muslims] and they could not fight us [they were in a minority]. We
burnt their houses and broke them down. We did not get enough time because the
police came immediately.”127
The aforementioned example illustrates the need for concrete frameworks to
gauge the multiple levels on which Hindutva operates. Two ideological paradigms are
particularly instructive in assessing the impacts of Hindu nationalism holistically: the
modernity versus anti-modernity debate (culturalism) and the Marxist theory on
economic relations (instrumentalism).

West vs. Rest: The Modernity vs. Anti-Modernity Debate
In The Renewal of the Radical Right, Michael Minkenberg says of right-wing
radicalism:
It is defined as a political ideology, the core element of which is a myth of a
homogenous nation…the contemporary religious right wants government by the
people, but in terms of ethnocracy rather than democracy…The nationalistic
myth is characterized by the effort to construct an idea of national belonging by
radicalizing ethnic, religious, cultural and political criteria of exclusion, to
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condense the idea of a nation into an image of extreme collective
homogeneity.128
Western scholars attempting to study the birth of radicalism in the Third
World have frequently used the European model, where extremism has been explained
in terms of the psychological conditions of anxiety faced by people under the stress of
modern-technological societies.129 However, the religious extremism defined by V.D.
Sarvarkar and practiced by BJP leaders like L.K. Advani cannot be explained in terms
of the psychological dilemma (owing to modernization) of the Hindu majority, as
Muslims in India arguably face similar societal and psychological constraints.130
According to Sumit Sarkar, pro-Hindutva scholars like Ashish Nandy project
modernity as the core cause of Hindu extremism, shying away from the inbuilt biases
in Hindu nationalist ideology. By refusing to accept that the comingling of faith and
politics taints the Hindutva perspective, Nandy offers a superfluous reading of Hindu
religion. His view of modernity does little in the way of offering insights into Hindu
nationalism.131
While the modernity versus anti-modernity approach appears less useful in
explicating the extremist tendencies in Hindutva politics, the essence of
fundamentalism is nonetheless found in the ideology and praxis of Sangh Parivar
organizations.132 In the first volume of Major Religious Fundamentalisms Observed,
Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby state: “Fundamentalists begin as traditionalists
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who perceive some challenge or threat to their core identity, both social and personal.
They are not frivolous, nor do they deal with peripheral assaults. If they lose on the
central issues, they believe [they’ve lost] everything. They react; they fight back with
great innovative power.”133 The above mentioned description of fundamentalism
provides a comprehensive picture of Hindutva in India. Indeed, Hindu violence against
Muslims, and more recently against Christians,134 stems from projecting the image of
“the Hindu” being threatened by believers of another land.135

Marxists on Economic Relations
Traditional Marxists view the political processes as a means of intervention
directed at creating a new social order.136 Politics for them is essentially the site of
conflict among contending social classes. A few distinctive features of Indian politics
may be stated for the purpose of finding an appropriate relationship between Hindutva
forces and the socio-economic soil on which they thrive.137 The most significant
feature of the current phase in Indian politics is that a majority of the competing actors
belong to different fractions of the upper class. This competition among ruling elites is
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unfolding at a time when the exploited are not in a position to effectively challenge the
dominant class.138
Political rivalry among the empowered sections of society is fierce, as each
section requires control of state apparatuses to lay claims over economic surpluses.
This struggle has nullified the left-of-center politics of the Congress Party.139 In a
country where modes of production are in an uneasy stage of equilibrium, the
processes of capitalism and globalization have only accentuated domestic social
disparities.140
Hindutva found new footing in the 1990s because it used social discontent over
the crisis of capital accumulation in India to its advantage.141 On one hand, the BJP
seeks to appease its traditional, upper caste voter base by opening India’s economy to
trade and foreign investment. On the other hand, the party has consciously appealed to
the ideal of a unified India to expand its base and endear the Hindu masses. In sum,
Hindutva has become the instrument that allows the BJP and its allies to employ
religious symbolism in political contests.142

Hindutva Rhetoric and Communal Violence
The key to understanding the complex links between communal violence and
militant nationalist discourses lies in three stages. First, are the everyday patterns of
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exchange, often marked by discrete separations or back-to-back interactions.143 Sunil
Kakar points out that in the case of the Muslim community in India, patterns of
separation have been reinforced by the segregation of living spaces and occupational
endeavors. The social void between Hindus and Muslims has in turn promoted
stereotypes pertaining to the impure living conditions and dietary habits among
Muslims.144 Muslims, on the other hand, regard the medieval militant tradition of the
Rajputs and Sikhs as indicative of a mob psychology among Hindus. Communal
tension, often a consequence of economic and spatial distinctions, is the precursor to
institutionalized forms of communal violence.145
Second, the narratives and actual experiences stemming from riots and other
forms of communal violence establish the “other” as the source of absolute evil.146 In
his study, Kakar focuses on how wrestlers, or pehelwans, in both Hindu and Muslim
communities are projected as heroes possessing immense martial prowess. While
assaults on women and children are viewed as acts of transgression, pehelwans seek to
commit such acts, seemingly to justify similar acts during subsequent retaliations.147
Rumor and myth construction are integral to this process. They act as instruments of
mobilization, encouraging individuals to engage in communal conflict.148
This leads to the third and final dimension of the reproduction of communal
violence: the formation, organization, and dissemination of political identities around
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discourses on the “other.”149 Provocation, usually through celebrative of funerary
processions that encourage direct confrontation among communities, is an important
mode of sustaining violence.150
According to Thomas Blom Hansen, the fundamental reason behind the
capacity of ethnic hatred is the lack of self-esteem within a particular community.
Fissures along caste and occupational lines demand a scapegoat: the Muslims appear
ready targets.151 The economic agenda of the Hindu elites, and upper castes’ desire to
retain their positional authority by preventing low castes’ empowerment, has
instigated violence since the inception of the BJP. A similar hypocrisy has been the
idealization of women as inherently peaceful, despite their prominence in the
communal activities152 of the Sangh Parivar.153
There are obvious discrepancies between localized expressions of communal
enmities and the more generalized majoritarian discourses on the Hindu nation. It is
clear, however, that the nationalistic, anti-minority rhetoric of the BJP has left its mark
on local communities.154 Moreover, communal violence (both at the local and national
levels) is cyclical and persists across centuries. The replication of violence illustrates
its nature and utility:
Violent acts are dramatic productions, creations of specific groups, persons and
political parties, operating through institutionalized networks within a discursive
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framework of Hindu-Muslim communal antagonism, which in turn produces
specific forms of political practice that make violence integral to the political
process.155

Hindus and Hindutva
Is there a community of Hindus that will vote for Hindutva ideologues
unfailingly? Will the BJP win all elections if all voters were Hindu by birth? As far as
practicing Hindus are concerned, the two scenarios seem unlikely.156 Even the most
ardent Hindu believes that it is unethical to denounce either Buddhist pacifism or the
medieval legacy of syncretism,157 as encapsulated in the Hindu bhakti movement and
the Islamic sufi tradition.158 Religious harmony remains a crucial part of a Hindu ethos
that stands on the principles of equality, mutual respect, and love for all beings. It is
this equality of status that Hindutva most vehemently opposes. Though it seeks to
endear all sections of society by espousing the rubric of a unified nation, Hindutva’s
ultimate allegiance lies with the high castes and elites.159
Communal violence in Gujarat, Ayodhya, and Mumbai has made people aware
of the cleavages in Hindutva rhetoric. They have begun questioning the idea of a
Hindu rashtra (nation) founded on the premise of denigrating Muslims.160 One of the
staunchest opponents of the destruction of the Babri mosque in Ayodhya, in 1992, was
155
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the head priest of a Rama temple adjacent to the site. Mahant Lal Das was vocal in his
disapproval and paid with his life. He was brutally murdered on November 16,
1993.161 Another instance of the non-malleability of Hindu society in relation to
Hindutva designs was seen a couple years ago. Following its defeat in the 2004
parliamentary elections, the BJP tried to mobilize Hindus to oppose the arrest of the
Shankaracharya of Kanchi, a Hindu spiritual leader from southern India, in a case
involving internal rivalries within his muth (religious organization). The effort failed
to win adherents, as the Shankaracharya’s significance was limited to one sect of
brahamins (priests) in the south. The BJP clearly miscalculated the relevance of the
issue to the Hindu masses.162
Though many Hindus genuinely buy into the “Hindutva ideal,” there is
significant resistance from within Hindu ranks to being mobilized in this way.
Backward classes and lower caste dalits fear being used as political implements for
electoral feats. Feminists and homosexuals seek greater social freedoms. Corporate
executives and entrepreneurs understand that political stability will augment their
fortunes.163
Evidently, the masses have not blindly endorsed the secularism of proHindutva scholars, who view communalism as a product of modern democratic
governance. Hindus are gradually realizing that while secularism is always in the
process of becoming, ethno-religious majoritarian rule is not a viable substitute.164
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CHAPTER 2
SETTING THE STAGE: PRECURSORS TO THE BHARATIYA JANATA
PARTY

Hindutva, as envisioned by Sarvarkar and Golwalkar, sought to instate an idealized
Hindu nation by hearkening back to the Vedic age. In post-independent India, the
ideology is represented by a group of political organizations collectively known as the
Sangh Parivar.165 Not every institution in this formation considers the bolstering of
Hindu identity its primary aim.166 This pragmatic self-designation is precisely the
electoral strength of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which appeals to the vote of
both the Hindu masses and those sections of the elite who view the BJP as a modern,
secular party that will not pander to minority demands.167
This chapter analyzes the ideological orientations of the BJP’s precursors. It
explores the discourse and activities of the organizations to determine how they have
influenced the ideology and praxis of the BJP.
Of the several Hindu nationalist organizations that gained prominence in postindependent India, four hold specific relevance within the politics of the BJP. The
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), the
Swadeshi Jagran Manch (SJM), and the Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS) played
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instrumental roles during the 1960s and 70s.168 Their missions and activities
perpetuated the Hindutva cause, and consolidated an environment within which the
BJP could thrive. While the first two organizations profess cultural and social
objectives, their activities—both in conjunction with and independent of the BJP—
have caused considerable political polarization in India.169 The Swadeshi Jagran
Manch, on the other hand, focuses solely on economic concerns. It is the institution
from which the BJP borrows principles of statecraft. The Jan Sangh was created as the
political arm of the RSS. However, the party’s inability to find following in the Indian
electoral system grossly undermined Hindu nationalist efforts. Its collapse was the
catalyst for the rise of the BJP.170

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)
Founded in 1925 by ex-Hindu Mahasabha171 member Keshavram Baliram
Hedgewar, the RSS is the ideological fountainhead of contemporary Hindutva politics.
With a membership base of nearly six million people, the Sangh is a formidable force
in Indian society.172 Given its outwardly cultural agenda, the organization does not
contest in elections. Regardless, its indirect control casts profound effects on the
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electoral face of Hindutva politics: the BJP. This is evidenced by the fact that many
BJP leaders are also members of the RSS.173
The visible work of the RSS pertains to the management of educational and
social institutions. However, these institutions are frequently used as centers to
propagate anti-minority views among impressionable children.174 The RSS’s claims of
being a cultural organization should not blind us to its identity as a body that can
disengage itself from the interests of Hindu minorities, should they refuse to comply
with the Hindutva ideal of assimilation.175 The organization’s emphasis on martial
competence is equally worrisome. Dressed in khaki shorts, RSS cadres routinely
engage in acts of communal aggression.176 The next section of this chapter
demonstrates the militaristic, hierarchical tendencies in the RSS.

Remapping Practices: Ideological Imperatives in the RSS
Dr. Hedgewar envisioned the RSS as a synthesis of Hindu elitism and the
sangathan (brotherhood) methodology.177 He argued in favor of the creation of a small
but efficient organization of devoted men who could provide leadership to the entire
Hindu community. Hedgewar therefore refashioned certain Hindu institutions, notably
akharas (wrestling pits) and Hindu spiritual sects.178 Though wrestling matches were
popular forms of entertainment among both upper and lower caste Hindus, spiritual
173
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sects were frequented mainly by the elites.179 In an effort to endear the Hindu masses,
Hedgewar merged these two traditions; endowing akharas with spiritual content and
religious sects with martial appeal.180
Shakhas—institutions where young boys would meet for physical exercise and
ideological training—became tools for promoting virtuous behavior (samskaras),181
strong fraternal bonds, and a compelling patriotic sentiment among volunteers. Even
today, shakhas function as ideological akharas.182
Masculine power lies at the center of the RSS’s nationalist fraternalism. This
notion of masculinity is based entirely on the consecration of warriorship. In one of his
speeches to RSS volunteers, Golwalkar stated, “Let mothers bless and send their sons
at this moment of trial. When the five Pandavas sought their mother Kunti’s blessings
before war in the [epic] Mahabharata, she told them, ‘Go ye all to the battle.’”183
Golwalkar’s stance is buttressed by a martial tradition wherein the RSS swayamsevak
(volunteer) is the kshatriyaized184 antithesis to Gandhi’s non-violent, effeminate
Hindu. While sevaks are encouraged to act as youthful soldiers, pracharaks, or
celibate cadres, are taught that asceticism is a way of reclaiming control and
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masculinity to counter the defiant and lustful Muslim foreigner.185 Interestingly, while
the RSS opposes the Gandhian notion of satyagraha, or passive resistance, its focus
on chastity and solidarity parallels Gandhi’s vision of an independent India premised
on moral supremacy vis-à-vis the modern world.186

Out in the Field: RSS Activities
A staunch proponent of activism, Hedgewar avoided the RSS’s involvement in
political agitations during its early years, so as to bolster its image among the
moderate members of the Indian National Congress (INC).187 On assuming his
predecessor’s position, Golwalkar sought to ascribe a nuanced cultural character to the
Sangh. This pitted him against those in favor of Hegdewar’s militaristic stance.188
The birth of Pakistan gave RSS members a renewed sense of purpose and
unity. For RSS cadres, the Partition was the outcome of a mistaken soft-handedness
towards Indian Muslims.189 They therefore sought to present communal atrocities
during the Partition as instances of patriotic baptism; initiations through blood and
sacrifice into the nationalist cause.190 Despite Golwalkar’s efforts, the strategic
pendulum of the RSS swung from character-building to activism. For their role in
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M.K. Gandhi’s191 assassination in 1948, close to 20,000 RSS workers were
imprisoned along with the chief suspect, Nathuram Ghodse. The RSS was banned.192
After the ban was lifted in 1949, those in the RSS worked to overcome their
tarnished image. Shedding militarism temporarily, the organization focused on four
specific projects during the 1950s. First, it established the Akhil Bharati Vidhya
Parishad (All India Student’s Organization), which encouraged India’s youth to
combat “leftist” influences on education. Today, the organization supports the BJP in
its electoral rallies.193 Second, the RSS focused on strengthening its women’s wing,
the Rashtriya Sevika Samiti (RSS*), which was founded in 1936. Hindu nationalists’
simultaneous emphasis on masculinity and women’s connection with Bharatamata, or
“Mother India,” is perhaps the most striking contradiction in Hindutva ideology.
Regardless, the BJP consistently appeals to this dichotomy in its electoral
endeavors.194 Third, the RSS made a conscious attempt to connect with India’s urban
working class by creating the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (Indian Worker’s
Association) in 1955.195 The Mazdoor Sangh is a visible voice among the several labor
organizations in contemporary India. The RSS later established a rural affiliate: the
Bharatiya Kisan Sabha was created in 1979.196 Fourth, the Vanavasi Kalyan Ashrama
was formed in 1952 with RSS support. By 1980, it had become the leading re191
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conversion body, and sought to counter Christian and Islamic missionaries197 by
working closely with India’s tribal communities.198

Organizing the Brotherhood: Home to Hierarchies
In addition to widening its outreach through subsidiary institutions, the RSS
also strengthened its internal organizational structure during the 1950s. To
institutionalize authority and order, RSS leaders created a rigid hierarchy system.199
The entire structure of the RSS rests on permanent gradations. It is comprised
of elite swayamsevaks or volunteers, who are ranked by education and age;
gatanayaks or squad leaders; mukhya shikshaks or superior instructors; karyavahas or
secretaries; pracharaks or celibate staff commanders; and sanghchalaks or directors at
regional, local, and national levels. Each of these individuals is subordinate to the sar
sanghchalak, the RSS’s supreme leader and guide.200
While hierarchical relationships govern a vast majority of RSS activities,
Hedgewar and Golwalkar understood that the organization’s standing depended, to a
large extent, on free information exchanges. They ensured that tacit, informal channels
were established in their regional and local constituencies.201 The existence of
informal communication in an intensely hierarchical setup has lent charisma not only
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to the RSS as an organization but also to individual leaders like L.K. Advani and A.B.
Vajpayee, who now play conspicuous roles in the BJP.202

Second Wave of Activism: Reconfiguring India’s Educational System
From the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, the RSS engaged in a massive outreach
effort, creating once again, a host of organizations that served as subsidiaries to the
RSS cause.203 The Bharat Vikas Parishad was formed in 1963 to work with poor
communities. The Bharat Shikshan Mandal was created in 1969 to promote Hindu
values in the education system. The Vidhya Bharati was created in 1976 as the RSS’s
formal educational wing. It caters to primary and elementary school children,
imparting them with the Hindutva view on history and social organization.204 The RSS
also has an international wing called Sewa International, which organizes funds for the
Sangh Parivar by identifying Hindutva supporters outside India. Through the
Deendayal Research Institute, and its journal Manthan, the RSS ensures the
dissemination of Hindu nationalist ideas.205

Revisiting Hindutva Ideology
The RSS has worked for nearly seven decades to strengthen its position in
Indian society. Through its organized and informal networks, the RSS structure grew
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from a single shakha in 1926 to over 25,000 shakhas in 1989.206
While hierarchical organization remains a crucial aspect of the RSS’s success,
ideology is by no means unimportant. The primary objectives of the RSS are
succinctly illustrated in its constitution. The document states that the RSS seeks to
“eradicate differences among Hindus; make them realize the greatness of their past;
inculcate in them a spirit of self-sacrifice and devotion to Hindu society as a whole;
build an organized and well disciplined social life; and bring about the regeneration of
Hindu society.”207 Rejecting secular ideas, the RSS constitution posits: “We make
war or peace, engage in arts and crafts, amass wealth and give it away—indeed we are
born and we die—all in accord with religious injunction.”208
The RSS works through multiple layers of symbolic integration. Ironically,
symbols of purity are frequently used by its members to perpetuate irreligious acts.209
Saffron flags, for example, are used to demarcate Hindu territories during communal
riots. Other symbols and events, such as the celebration of specific festivals210 during
the year, serve to enhance unity and reinforce ties of brotherhood within the RSS.211
The ritualization of Hinduism through insignia rests on a form of masculinity
that draws from militancy and monastic existence.212 Though it opposes Semitic
traditions (Christianity and Islam), the RSS tries to overcome the supposedly
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effeminate state of subjugation by emulating the aggressive foreigner (both Muslims
and the British).213 Yet it simultaneously presents the Hindu capacity for endurance
against subjugation. It follows that the RSS envisions the sevak (volunteer) as a
liminal figure capable of transcending between celibacy and warriorship.214
Like Sarvarkar, RSS leaders maintain that masculinity provides the link to
India’s grandiose and paradoxically victimized past. Accounts of ancient Aryan heroes
and medieval Hindu warriors figure extensively in the rhetoric of present-day RSS
members.215 The sanctification of manhood in these accounts provides an avenue for
uniting factions in Hindu society. In eulogizing the idea of a nation to be defended,
RSS leaders convince lower caste communities that external domination and not caste
segregation is solely responsible for their fate.216
Images of power and strength within the RSS reflect a complex interaction
between three forces: the structural logistics of a hierarchical environment; the
perpetuation of heroic mythology in an ordered institution; and the indoctrinated
psychological need among rank-and-file workers to revere their leaders.217 RSS
leadership expresses these ideas in a single statement:
The ultimate vision of our work, which has been the living inspiration for all
our organizational efforts, is a perfectly organized state of society where each
individual has been molded into a model of ideal Hindu manhood and made
into a limb of the corporate Hindu society.218
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The Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP)
The Vishva Hindu Parishad came into being under the auspices of the RSS in
1964, following a movement to ban cow slaughter.219 A recent incident in the Indian
state of Haryana effectively represents the explosive potential of the cow slaughter
issue.220 On the morning of July 20, 2002, five men suspected of cow slaughter were
encircled and lynched by VHP volunteers. The men turned out to be dalits, low caste
Hindus, whose traditional work entailed laboring in tanneries.221 People of this
community obtain raw material for their work from the carcasses of cows that have
died of natural causes. In a revealing clarification, VHP members brushed aside the
incident as one of “mistaken identity,” in which dalits were taken to be Muslims.222
The revelation clearly indicates the anti-Muslim orientation of the Parishad.

On Hinduism and Hierarchies
The VHP’s charter outlines the following as it core objectives: to consolidate
Hindu society, to spread Hindu values, to establish a network comprising all Hindus
living outside India, and to welcome back to the Hindu fold all those who had left
Hinduism.223 In accordance with its agenda, the VHP enunciated five requirements for
being a good Hindu in a conference on religion in 1967. These included regular
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worship, visits to temples, basic knowledge of the sacred geography of India,
knowledge of mythical epics, and loyalty to Hindu culture.224
Estimates hold that the VHP’s membership base ranges from two and a half to
four million persons.225 The Parishad is organized on a state by state basis. It is
divided into zonal branches or vibhaags, district branches or prakhands, and subdistrict units or upkhands. The supervisors at each of these levels ultimately report to
two shankaracharyas or spiritual leaders. While the VHP draws extensively from the
hierarchical structure of the RSS, interactions between volunteers at the civic level and
leaders at the spiritual level are much stronger in the framework of the former
organization.226

Defining an Agenda
The Vishva Hindu Parishad was founded as a religio-cultural institution. Its
cadres serve as intermediaries between Hindu religious institutions and the RSS
establishment. The VHP’s activities are, therefore, dedicated to producing a Hindu
ethos that is divorced from the prescriptions of caste and sect.227 To achieve this end,
the organization has constructed a series of rashtra mandirs (national temples).
Drawing upon the Indian tradition of sadhus (holy men) heading religious institutions,
the VHP relies on gurus (guides) to oversee its discourse on spirituality.228
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Global in reach, the VHP’s international profile, not surprisingly, is one of
promoting Hindu culture. The Vishva Hindu Parishad of America and other related
organizations, such as the Hindu Student Council, focus specifically on garnering
financial support from the overseas diaspora community.229 Proceeds from these
organizations have supplemented VHP activities in India.

From Words to Action
VHP efforts to promote a Hindu nation commenced as early as 1966, with the
first International Hindu Conference in Allahabad.230 During the next decade, the VHP
pursued the strategy of uniting Buddhists, Sikhs, and Jains by promoting a common
understanding of each religious tradition’s beliefs and practices. The organization’s
professed syncretism was limited in reach (focused only on Hindu sects) but strategic
in form (endeared more supporters).231 The far reaching significance of this strategy
was demonstrated in the late 1980s, when the VHP and RSS used their version of
Hinduism for rallying the masses during the Ramjanmabhoomi agitation.232
VHP endeavors during the early 1970s reflected a broader activist agenda. The
organization embraced social causes, instituting schools, medical centers, and hostels
all over the country.233 Like the RSS, the VHP set up reconversion units, or Vanavasi
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Kalyan Ashramas, to encourage adivasi (tribals) Christians to embrace Hinduism
during this period. It conducted thousands of shuddhi (purification) ceremonies under
the auspices of these ashramas.234 To enhance Hinduism’s appeal among those who
had converted to other faiths, the VHP engaged in a rationalization of ritual practices.
By stipulating that only three rites, birth (namkaran), marriage (vivah), and death
(antesi), were integral to Hinduism, the VHP sought to convince low castes that
Hindutva would rid Hindu religion of excessive ritualism.235 A VHP pamphlet from
1972 indicates the urgency with which this project was pursued: “The VHP is
dedicated to preventing the apprehensions amongst the have-nots [from leading] to a
storm of hatred which will destroy the whole structure of society.236
The rhetoric on the need to educate India’s youth was another compelling
aspect of the VHP’s agenda. After initial difficulties in convincing parents to send
their young sons to ahramas (places of worship and learning), the VHP succeeded in
promoting Hindutva’s cultural and spiritual values.237 Language (Sanskrit), tradition
(Vedic culture), and Hindu religion became instruments for promoting ordered
relationships in society.238
The organization’s experiments in the social sphere, though momentous, were
short lived. Like the RSS, the VHP assisted the BJP during its communal campaigns
in Ayodhya (1992), Mumbai (1993), and Gujarat (2002). In consonance with the
Hindutva ideal of a unified India, VHP members organized several Ekamata
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(unifying) processions between 1980 and 1999.239 Mythological accounts of Hindu
warriors like the Pandavas in the Mahabharata and Lord Rama in the Ramayana
continue to characterize the VHP’s discourse. It is important to note that the VHP’s
emphasis on cultural goals veils its identity as an elitist organization.240 The mere
presence of women and low caste Hindus in the VHP does not prove its sincerity
towards the masses. In reality, the VHP seeks to acquire mass support by unearthing
local myths and casting them in the masculine, martial framework of the
aforementioned epics.241

Saints and Swords
While the RSS regards both warriors and monks as symbols of masculinity,
the VHP bases its masculine agenda solely on the premise of martial expertise. The
Bajrang Dal, which was founded in 1984 as the VHP’s youth wing, is a fitting
example of this tradition.242 Men in the Dal are always armed with trishuls (tridents),
and openly resort to violence during times of communal tension. Members of the
organization played visible roles in both the 1992 Ayodhya riots and the 2002 Gujarat
riots. Since the RSS and VHP plan communal violence under cover, their links to
militant bodies like the Bajrang Dal are hard to establish.243
It is important to note that the similarities between the RSS and VHP are not
accidental. Like other Sangh Parivar members, the latter enjoys little autonomy.
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Constant RSS oversight ensures that VHP members conform to its hierarchical and
majoritarian nationalist framework.

Swadeshi Jagran Manch (SJM)
The SJM was founded in 1991 with the exclusive agenda of opposing
economic imperialism.244 Since its inception, the organization has actively promoted
the slogan of swadeshi, “Of one’s own land,” which originated during India’s
nationalist movement against the British. Perceptibly, the SJM stands against
contemporary corporatism and foreign economic assistance. It opposes International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organization (WTO) sponsored Structural
Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in India, arguing that their inbuilt conditionality
imposes significant costs on the Indian poor.245
The SJM repudiates Western aid and promotes instead indigenous economic
models of statecraft246 contained in works like the Arthashastra, a treatise compiled by
Kautilya in 300 BC.247 The organization frequently assists the Bharatiya Mazdoor
Sangh, an RSS-oriented trade union, in its campaigns against multinational institutions
in India.248
As noted previously, the BJP employs the SJM’s principles to articulate its
economic position. Despite its professed allegiance to economic self-sustenance, the
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BJP has emerged as a visible agent of liberalization. The party’s reign at the union
level between 1998 and 2004 resulted in market reforms, and paved the way for
international developmental initiatives.249 The most contested of all BJP endeavors
was its decision to commission a dam on the Narmada River. In this case, the drive for
development led to large-scale displacement of tribal communities in central India.
The party’s stance raised concerns over its implicit urban bias.250
Though the BJP’s orientation during the 1990s caused RSS leaders and leftists
to accuse the party of hypocrisy, the former’s move towards economic
interdependence did not undermine its “Hindutva” plank. On the contrary, the BJP’s
version of liberalization has augmented the fortunes of its upper class supporters. And
globalization has won the BJP new adherents.251 The middle class in urban and rural
India have benefited from the influx of entertainment, economic opportunity, and a
higher quality of life.252

The Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BJS)
While the VHP was instituted to the RSS’s cultural agenda, the vision of
Shyama Prasad Mukherjee led to the birth of the political affiliate of the RSS. The BJS
was formed during an RSS consultation in October 1951.253 The party’s stated
objective was to rebuild India on the basis of four ideals: one nation, one culture, one
249
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country, and rule of law. The Jan Sangh embodied an eclectic mix of tradition and
modernity, and while it proclaimed open membership and sought a populist stance, it
possessed a covertly communal character.
The BJS began its political career by securing three Parliament seats in the
1952 general elections.254 Its strongest electoral performance came in the 1967
elections, when the Congress majority was the thinnest. Between 1967 and 1971, the
BJS participated in coalition governments in five states.255 It played a vital role during
the National Emergency between 1975 and 1979, when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
imposed the second ban on the RSS. The party was left to monitor the Sangh
Parivar’s agenda in the absence of key RSS leaders.256
The BJS’s performance during the 1960s and 1970s impressed conservative
members of the Congress Party, as well as elites (merchant and landed communities)
in urban and rural India.257 Despite its populist activism during the period, the BJS
was unable to establish a national presence.258 Through the 1970s, the party oscillated
between Hindutva’s ethno-religious orientation and the need to integrate itself with
mainstream politics.259 The problem was that the BJS could never establish its
legitimacy as a progressive political entity. The party depended on RSS support for all

254

The Indian Parliament is divided into two houses. The Lok Sabha is the House of Commons, or the
Lower House of Parliament. See footnote 90 for citation.
255
The Bharatiya Jan Sangh won the state assembly elections in Maharashtra, Gujarat, Madhya
Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and Rajasthan. See footnote 84 for citation.
256
Ibid.
257
Robert L. Hardgrave Jr., “Hindu Nationalism and the BJP: Transforming Religion and Politics in
India,” in Prospects for Peace in South Asia, ed. Rafiq Dossani and Henry S. Rowen (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2005), 191.
258
Ibid.
259
Ibid, 192.

59

its electoral endeavors.260 To make matters worse, RSS volunteers sensationalized
their role during the Emergency by equating themselves with mythical heroes in epics
like the Ramayana and Mahabharata.261 This proved to be a major setback for the Jan
Sangh’s progressive economic campaign.
Taking cue from ex-RSS member Jay Prakash Narayan’s Total Revolution,
the BJS eventually joint forces with the Bharatiya Lok Dal, the Socialist Party of
India, and Congress (O)262 to form the Janata Party.263 Strong at the outset, the Janata
government failed to harmonize the goals and aspirations of its disparate political
actors. The party remained active on the Indian political scene for scarcely three years,
during which time internal controversies weakened its electoral capabilities.264 The
Sangh Parivar’s diminishing political presence demanded the creation of a cohesive
and stable organization that would fill political lacunae in Hindutva politics. The BJP
was instituted to achieve this goal.
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CHAPTER 3
BHARAT: THE INDIA OF THE BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY

Having secured victory in India’s twelfth parliamentary elections in 1998, the Hindu
nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) assumed power as the head of an inchoate
alliance of political entities.265 A year later, the government in shambles, India went to
the polls again. The BJP secured a more decisive victory this time, establishing a front
of twenty-four regional parties that lasted till the 2004 elections; when the Congressled United Progressive Alliance (UPA) assumed the political reins.266 Though out of
power at the time of this writing, the BJP remains a formidable force in Indian politics
in 2010, and Hindutva, more generally, continues to cast profound implications for
India’s future.
This chapter delves into the electoral history and mobilization strategies of the
BJP. It provides a comprehensive sense of the structural and functional aspects of BJP
politics. In so doing, it establishes a backdrop for the forthcoming case studies, which
explore Hindutva-inspired communal violence in twentieth and twenty-first century
India.

The Bharatiya Janata Party
By 1977, the Janata Party coalition under Prime Minister Morarji Desai was
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onto the last chapter of its life.267 Enfeebled by the persistent ideological
disagreements among its member parties, Desai’s government faced another ordeal:
the dual member controversy. Given the Janata Party’s alliance with the Sangh
Parivar, most of its members were also members of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS), and did not want to give up either of the two positions. The RSS, on the
other hand, seemed less impressed with the fact that the Janata Party shared forces
with leftist and socialist actors. This spurred a huge debate within the Parivar.268
Opinions became increasingly polarized, and the RSS was unable to contain the
debate. The disunity among Hindutva ranks adversely impacted the electoral fortunes
of the Janata Party, which was replaced by a Congress-led front in 1980. In the
aftermath of the 1980 elections, the Janata Party disintegrated, only to be replaced on
April 5, 1980 by the new and invigorated Bharatiya Janata Party.269

Establishing a Name
The BJP spent most of the 1980s out in the cold. In an effort to build a modern,
progressive image during this period, the party distanced itself from its communal
lineage, and embraced instead the model of Gandhian socialism.270 BJP leaders
consciously reflected on issues like price rise and corruption to attract a broader voter
base. Unfortunately, the party’s experiments with these alternatives did not yield
immediate outcomes.
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Change came in the mid-1980s, when specific developments—namely the
dispute over the Babri mosque in Ayodhya and the debate over a Uniform Civil Code
(UCC) for Hindus and Muslims271—led to the realization that there was greater
potential in reviving the Hindutva platform.272 Another related event was the Congress
government’s Operation Blue Star of 1984, which targeted the premises of the Golden
Temple in Amritsar, Punjab, in order to end Sikh secessionist demands for an
independent state of Khalistan. Indira Gandhi’s decision to target the Sikh community
provided the BJP with an opportune moment. By claiming that Sikhs were members of
Hindu society, the party accused the Congress of insensitivity towards Hindu
sentiments.273 With the termination of Operation Blue Star began the most
orchestrated Hindu revivalist movement in India. The slogan of jagaran (revival)
pervaded Indian politics for the next two decades.274

The Plunge into Hindutva
Armed with the ideology of Hindutva, the BJP emerged as a formidable force
during the 1989 elections. It won an impressive total of eighty-nine seats in the Lok
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Sabha,275 where it previously possessed only two places.276 The 1989 elections were
important on another account: they demonstrated how the BJP utilized anti-minority
violence to secure electoral victories. The party won forty-seven of the eighty-eight
state assembly seats in Gujarat and Bihar.277 In addition, it obtained a majority in the
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh state elections.278 BJP leaders were
quick to note the relationship between electoral gains and the use of force. The
communal tactics that characterized the BJP’s early efforts have unfortunately won the
party political office on most occasions.279
The 1991 election campaign is regarded as the most expensive and violent
campaign in the history of independent India. Contesting parties used the electronic
and print media, video raths (trucks with large video screens), as well as religious and
cultural rallies to perpetuate an unprecedentedly sharp communal tone.280 The BJP
seemed to be making all the right overtures during the campaign, until an unexpected
event changed its fortunes. The assassination of then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by
a Tamil suicide bomber swung the campaign in favor of the Congress. Having won the
“sympathy vote,” the Congress was back to man the helm. Despite this, the BJP
secured feats at the state level, winning intensely communal electoral struggles in
Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh.281 The reemergence of the Congress prompted the

275

The Lok Sabha is the lower house of the Indian Parliament. It contains 552 seats. States are allotted
seats in the Lok Sabha based on their relative populations. See footnote 10 for citation.
276
Menon, Nigam, Power and Contestation, 43.
277
Ibid.
278
Ibid.
279
Thomas Blom Hansen, “The Saffron Wave,” in The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu
Nationalism in Modern India (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 163.
280
Ibid.
281
Ibid.

64

BJP to assert its Hindutva agenda with greater vigor. The demolition of the Babri
mosque in 1992 was a clear indication of the BJP’s ideological stance. The party also
endorsed the Shiv Sena’s282 communal atrocities in Mumbai in 1993. This reiterated
the BJP’s disapproval of the Congress’s soft-handed approach toward Muslims in
India.283
After its debacle at the Center in 1996 and 1998, the BJP perfected its coalition
building skills. With 270 parliamentary seats and 37.06 percent of the national vote in
the 1999 general elections,284 the party emerged as the linchpin of the National
Democratic Alliance (NDA), a twenty-four party coalition285 with regional and leftist
parties.286 These parties did not join the BJP for ideological reasons. They were
motivated by the logic of political configuration in their states. For instance, the
Trinamool Congress opposed the Congress and CPI (M) in West Bengal, the Telugu
Desam Party opposed the Congress in Andhra Pradesh, and the DMK and MDMK in
Tamil Nadu were opposed to a third party (the AIADMK)287 in the state.288 Due to the
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BJP’s attempts to forge stable coalitions during the 1990s, regional political
considerations began impacting a multitude of union-level alliances. In fact, the
Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) tapped on the BJP’s strategy to
regain central control in 2004.289

Politicians and Militants: Caretakers and Communalists
In the aftermath of the Babri mosque dispute in 1992, the BJP consciously
sought to project a right-of-center image. The BJP’s 1998 election manifesto
contained explicit references to the Hindu nationalist vision of early ideologues like
Sarvarkar.290 It presented Bharatavarsha291 as the cradle of the superior and ancient
Vedic culture. In addition, the manifesto presented the BJP and not the Congress as
the true inheritor of the freedom legacy. It is worth noting that while a majority of
NDA members were not adherents of Hindutva politics, their participation in the
coalition continued unabated. Though these actors supported the BJP in the hopes of
strengthening their own position in regional constituencies, they were unable to
challenge the party—even as communal stakes were gradually and alarmingly
raised.292
Soon after assuming power, the NDA repudiated hegemonic anti-proliferation
regimes, and crossed the nuclear threshold by testing the inter-ballistic missile, Agni,
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in May 1998. Shortly thereafter, Pakistan declared its nuclear capabilities as well.
Within a year of the BJP’s ascension, India was entangled in its first military conflict
in thirty years.293 The 1999 Kargil War, a product of the two nations’ long-standing
dispute over Kashmir, ended only when the United States actively intervened.
Following conflict at the Indo-Pakistan border, the BJP engaged in a cultural
venture.294 In overhauling history textbooks across India, the party consciously
articulated a narrow version of India’s past. The supremacy of India’s Vedic-Aryan
roots and the ignominy of Hindu subjugation under medieval Mughal rule became
common themes in India’s educational system. The project essentially aimed at
unifying the diverse sections of Hindu India into a homogenous community.295

A Tryst with Moderation
Its experiments in the educational sphere notwithstanding, the BJP sought to
project itself in a more liberal light. Although its Hindu nationalist partners
(particularly the RSS and VHP)296 accused the party of digressing from a conservative
platform, the BJP’s economic progressivism actually strengthened Hindutva’s support
base. The party’s liberalization program appealed to Hindu elites. The strategy also
won a new section of India’s society. Trade and investment created a wealth of
economic opportunities, and expanded the already burgeoning middle class. Despite
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its numerous efforts to garner political support, the BJP failed to survive another term
in office.297
Though the elections of 2004 and 2009 routed the NDA alliance, it would be a
mistake to read the events as a clear vote against communalism.298 First,
disagreements among party members have not undermined the importance of
Hindutva within the BJP. On the contrary, the RSS’s involvement in the party
suggests that Hindutva will remain a key component of future BJP operations.299 It is
worrisome that some sections of the Hindu right have concluded that their defeat
proves that people have rejected not Hindutva but its dilution of the BJP. Communal
violence is, in their view, an essential means of countering this dilution.300 A recent
instance is a series of violent acts in coastal Karnataka in 2006. Economic factors,
such as the competition between Hindu and Muslims traders, are being used by BJP
and RSS forces to whip up anti-communal sentiments. The aim is to reclaim the lost
grassroots support.301
This being said, the final tally in an election never represents the country-wide
trend. National and local elections are fought under completely different conditions. It
is noteworthy that merely three months after the Congress won the 2004 Lok Sabha
election seat from Junagadh (Gujarat), the BJP swept the municipal corporation
election in the district; capturing thirty-five of fifty-one seats. Evidently, forecasting
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patterns in party victories based on insights from a single round of elections amounts
to an oversimplification of the trends in question.302

Means and Ends: Mobilization Strategies of the BJP
The BJP has relied on four pillars to advance Hindutva ideology during its time
in and out of office. First, it has created alternative discourses on nationalism in order
to bring lower caste Hindus into its ideological fold.303 Second, by paralleling its
masculinist rhetoric with discourses on the latent power of the Hindu woman, the
party has achieved the illusionary notion of women’s emancipation.304 Third, as noted
earlier, it has embarked on a massive overhaul of the existing educational system. By
revamping history textbooks, the party seeks to impart Indian students with a Hindu
supremacist view of Indian nationhood.305 Fourth, it has effectively employed the print
and electronic media to reach out to Hindus in India.306

Broadening its Base: Lower Castes and the BJP
The 1996 election manifesto of the BJP promised to work for a strong and
prosperous India. Though self-rule (swarajya) and good governance (surajaya) were
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central to the party’s campaign, the notions veiled the monolithic tendencies in
Hindutva politics.307

Voices that don’t Count
Dalits, Scheduled Castes (SC), and Scheduled Tribes (ST) constitute the lower
castes in India. Estimates from the 1991 census reveal that SCs, including dalits,
constitute about 16.48 percent of India’s population, while STs account for close to
8.08 percent of the population.308 The Constitution of India clearly establishes that the
development of these communities must be the imperative of every government.
Article 46 of the Constitution maintains that, “The State shall promote with special
care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and
in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and Schedules Tribes, and shall protect them
from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.”309
Despite constitutional dictates, and the existence of legislation such as the
Prevention of Atrocities Act (1989), SCs continue to suffer social and economic
subjugation. After six decades of independence, only 37.8 percent of SCs are
literate.310 As of 1991, 72 percent of SCs and STs worked as landless laborers. Since
the mid-1990s, close to 74,00,000 adivasis (tribals) have been displaced in the state of
Jharkhand.311 Several others live without access to their traditional forest spaces,
owing to BJP-led development initiatives. The construction of a dam on the Narmada
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River is a case in point. It led to the displacement of a sizable section of Jharkhand’s
tribal community.312
Since caste norms were traditionally tied to occupational modes, economic
status in medieval India was an outcome of the caste into which an individual was
born.313 Given the centrality of the ancient Vedic age in Hindutva discourse, it is
ironic that Hindu elites seem bent on incorporating the caste gradations that emerged
in medieval India. This being said, it seems clear that elites in Hindu society seek to
safeguard themselves from low castes and Muslims alike.314 The genesis of Hindu
violence against Muslims lies in this tri-polar relationship between class, caste, and the
alienation of the “other.” According to Ornit Shani, “Communalism [grows] in the
intersections between caste and class. The threat Hindu nationalists [claim is] posed by
Muslims actually expresses a fear about the peril of violating the Hindu social and
moral order from within.”315
The upper class appeal of the BJP is in no way accidental. The rise of dalit
consciousness in independent India threatened the Hindu brahamanical316 community.
In Hindutva, the elites found a “majoritarian” substitute for true democracy:
The formation of a Hindu nationalist government in May 1998 at the crest of
Hindutva’s recent electoral surge clearly testifies to the increasingly
authoritarian urges of India’s ruling class. Hindutva’s chances of holding state
power more securely lies in a more complete hegemonization of this now
overwhelmingly
capitalist
class…The
implication
is
clearly
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majoritarianism…And majoritarianism, as always, comes clothed in the rhetoric
of democracy.317
By subverting democracy, Hindutva forces sought to subjugate dalit identity. But
Hindutva forces were unsuccessful in clamping down on the community’s rising
consciousness for long.318

Narrowness of the Broad Base: The BJP’s Rationales for Mobilization
The Nehruvian consensus319 on secularism broke during the 1970s. The
National Emergency320 resulted in black marketing on the economic front and
corruption on the political front.321 In light of the above, the 1980s witnessed a
resurgence of dalit activism. The newly formed BJP322 took charge of affairs at this
juncture.
In a tactical move to unite all Hindus under the national umbrella, the party
embarked on an era of strategic political incentives. Unfortunately, in their attempt to
endear dalits, BJP leaders reverted to the brahaminical Hinduism and caste supremacy
of V.D. Sarvarkar. The strategy was clever. It allowed the BJP to reap the benefits of a
broader support base.323 The party could mobilize low caste communities as foot
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soldiers without making any tangible attempts to ensure their assimilation in
mainstream politics and society:324
The Sangh Parivar, for all its rhetoric on the upliftment of the dalits, hardly
ever raises a voice against caste-based discrimination or atrocities against
dalits. This ambivalent attitude has led to considerable disenchantment and
confusion among the dalits, which is exacerbated during times of tension.325
Whether it was the Chakravara incident in the 1980s, where dalits were denied the
right to enter the village pond, or the Jhajjar incident in the 1990s, where five dalits
were lynched to death owing to their “impure profession” as leather tanners, dalits
have consistently been disposed off by the dominant classes.326

Blocking Progress
The recommendations of India’s first Backward Classes Commission, known
as the Kelkar Commission, went largely unnoticed in the political community.
Following the commission’s disintegration, the Janata Party327 instituted the Mandal
Commission in 1976; supposedly to keep its electoral promises to low caste
communities.328 However, the Janata government did little in the way of reform during
its time in office. During the 1980 anti-reservation riots, “the party tried to project the
anti-dalit war [waged by upper class Hindus against lower classes] as a Hindu-Muslim
conflict.”329
A decade later, the Mandal Commission submitted its report to V.P. Singh’s
324

Ibid.
Ghanshyam Singh, “BJP’s Rise to Power,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 2/3 (Jan 1320, 1996), 166.
326
Louis, Religion, Power and Violence, 166.
327
The Janata Party (1977-1980) was a precursor to the BJP. Chapter two outlines the party’s history.
328
Hansen, The Saffron Wave, 146.
329
Shani, Communalism, Caste and Hindu Nationalism, 151.
325

73

National Front government.330 The twenty-seven percent quota proposed by the
Mandal members caused uproar in urban India. Like its predecessor, the BJP emerged
as an advocate of a socially conservative platform. The party consistently blocked
lower caste emancipation.331

Stories, Symbols, and Sour Promises
Hindutva’s appeals to low caste communities are invariably undergirded by the
desire to perpetuate the goals of India’s traditional elites. Sangh Parivar organizations
have adopted a range of strategies to incorporate weaker sections into their fold. In
particular, BJP leaders have reverted to figures like B.R. Ambedkar, who fought
vehemently for the cause of dalits and Other Backward Classes (OBC) following the
collapse of colonialism in India.332 Instead of promoting these individuals’ ideas on
equality, the party has co-opted the likes of Ambedkar into the Hindutva scheme by
presenting them as guardians of the brahaminical tradition.333
Additionally, Hindutva forces have relied on a series of processions and prayer
ceremonies to mobilize low caste communities. The BJP’s Ekamata Yatra (unifying
procession) of 1983 is a case in point.334 The Yatra was the first of a series of monthlong campaigns undertaken to broaden the BJP’s social base, brush off the urban,
upper class label attached to it, and popularize the idea of a unified Hindu society in
330
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the wake of regional secessionist movements and dalit assertions.335 Three symbols—
Bharatmata, Gaumata, and Gangamata336—have found resonance in each of the
subsequent BJP-led processions. Collectively, they remind the lower castes of their
responsibility towards a unified Hindu society.337
Repeated victories in the political realm strengthened the BJP’s resolve. In
1984, the party launched the Ramjanmabhoomi liberation campaign. The movement
endowed the BJP with another central symbol: the myth of a unified India under Lord
Rama became a pivotal feature of subsequent BJP mobilization efforts.338 In his ratha
yatra (chariot procession) in 1984, BJP leader L.K. Advani declared: “Manu and Shri
Krishna are our Lawgivers and Shri Rama, the commander of our forces. Let us
relearn the manly lessons they taught us.”339
The selection of Rama as the fountainhead of Hindu identity was a calculated
decision. The dispute over Rama’s birthplace became a national issue, which
eventually culminated in the destruction of the Babri mosque in 1992. More
importantly, however, every household in India is familiar with the Ramayana.340
Since narratives in the epic ranged from local myths involving the downtrodden to
upper class ideas on warriorhood and kinship, the BJP could achieve what it most
335
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desired: the support of all Hindu castes and classes.341 In choosing Rama as its
overarching symbol, the party repudiated the VHP’s discourse on Rama as a
benevolent figure in poet Tulsidas’s Ramcharita Manas. It employed instead the
symbolism of the aggressive, masculine warrior.342 Ironically, the BJP’s emphasis on
“martial Rama” was deemed essentialist by many in India. In the aftermath of its
defeat in 2009, the BJP has consciously embraced local discourses to endear the lower
castes.343

Myth, History, and Past Glory
History became an essential means of creating and promoting a lower caste
consciousness. Hindutva ideologues sought to evoke a sense of historicity in
communities by referencing mythical and historical heroes belonging to specific
castes. These mythical figures were identified, and portrayed as subsidiaries or aides
to overarching figures in Hindutva meta-narratives.344 For example, the story of
Eklavya, the loyal dalit archer who gave up his right thumb for his teacher, Drona, is
presented as an instance of dalits’ support for the kshatriya (warrior) class, to which
Drona belonged.345 The local popularity of Eklavya is transposed onto the overarching
narrative of the Mahabharata;346 where traces of upper and lower caste exchanges are
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found. Similarly, the BJP has employed the myth of Guhya, the king of low caste
Nishads347 in Uttar Pradesh, to highlight Guhya’s role in the Ramayana.348
Hindutva ideologues’ use of the myth of Suhaldev, another hero among the
Nishads, finds close parallels with fascist narratives based on the mysticism of blood
and sacrifice.349 Fascist narratives attempted to construct racial unity by demonizing
other communities. According to right-wing nationalists, violence was a means for the
superior and cohesive racial group to project heroism and supremacy.
The tactic of employing myth to create foot soldiers is all too evident in the
BJP’s political strategy.350 Through legend and mythology, the RSS, VHP, and BJP
convince marginalized communities that Muslims and not upper caste Hindus are
responsible for their plight. By tailoring mythical narratives to reflect contemporary
struggles, proponents of Hindutva ensure the perpetuation of medieval antagonisms in
contemporary socio-political interactions.351

Hindutva at the Grassroots
It was with the intent of mobilizing the poor, downtrodden castes that
Sarvarkar organized a band of young boys into a society called the Patit Pawan.352 The
group has been active since the 1950s, and allies with BJP members in the state of
Maharashtra. If Rama is the BJP’s unifying symbol for northern India, the legend of
347
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Maratha leader Shivaji is the party’s avenue into southern territory. In recent years, the
Patit Pawan has grown tremendously due to the BJP’s strategic discourse on Maratha
leaders’ endeavors to counter Mughal rule.353 Many view the Patit Pawan boys as the
progenies of these valiant Hindu princes.
Equally important is the manner in which the BJP has linked local communal
skirmishes—such as the Dattawati riots in Pune, Maharashtra, in 1992—with the
overarching struggle against domination by other nations and religions.354 The
adoption of religion as the idiom for popular mobilization is illustrated by the Patit
Pawan. In arguing that external influences have violated Hindu religious sentiments,
volunteers of the organization mobilize their dalit constituents to partake in communal
violence.355
Another example of the use of local spaces to inject communal ideas is the
Suhaldev festival. Since 2001, BJP forces in Uttar Pradesh have invited wrestlers to
participate in the Virat Dangal competition during the Suhaldev festival in
Bahraich.356 It is noteworthy that by secluding the Muslim community from these
events, the BJP reinforces the age-old distinction between “self” and “other.”
Wrestling matches become occasions where Hindu myth, religion, and social conduct
are discussed in the absence of external influences.357

Political Alliances: Hindutva and the Hindu Masses
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As proponents of Hindutva cater their rhetoric towards the subordinate section
of Hindu India, lower caste communities find themselves entrenched in an ambiguous
set of socio-economic realities. On one hand, dalits and backward castes invest
tremendous faith in modernity. They hope that new institutions and ideas will redeem
their place in society. On the other hand, they are averse to the dominant secularnationalist discourse on modernity.
This ambivalence is visible in Indian culture and politics.358 On the face of it, it
seems logical that the lower castes seek to join the right-wing to undercut the latter’s
internal upper caste hegemony. The problem, however, is that instead of the lower
castes deriving political and economic voice, they are co-opted into the Hindu
nationalist scheme.359 The rise of dalit political formations like the Bahujan Samaj
Party (BSP), and their subsequent ties with the Hindu right, is a fitting example of the
above. Based in Uttar Pradesh, a predominantly dalit region, the BSP has repeatedly
embarked on alliances with the BJP.360 It formed state level coalitions with the party in
1993, 1997, and 2002. BSP leaders also supported the BJP’s endeavors in Gujarat
during the 2007 elections.361 More importantly, however, the BSP-BJP alliance
indicates how individual dalit leaders often collude with the Hindu nationalist agenda
of economic and political supremacy. BSP leader Mayawati’s use of both the
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Hindutva discourse on sarvajan (all inclusiveness) and the myth of Rama during the
2007 state elections in Uttar Pradesh affirm the above.362
Contrary to Mayawati’s approach, leaders like Laloo Prasad Yadav have
consistently opposed Hindu right-wing operations. Laloo Yadav played an
instrumental role during the arrest of L.K. Advani, a BJP member involved in the
destruction of the Babri mosque, and lost his Chief Ministership in Bihar as a result.363
Traces of dissidence are also evident among low caste communities in southern India.
For these individuals, the struggle is two-pronged: an opposition to brahamanism and
a repudiation of the north Indian variant of the religious system.364
Undeterred by the efforts of enterprising dalit leaders, the BJP has largely
succeeded in mobilizing the masses. Even after the collapse of the BJP-BSP alliance
for the third time in August 2003, reports from Uttar Pradesh indicated that the dalit
masses believed the BJP would assist them in securing dignity in society.365 Evidently,
the BJP’s discourse contains a strong trace of hope—an evocation of the desires of
marginalized communities. Mythical narratives chosen by the party undermine Hindu
casteism and denounce external control. By providing an alternative vision of sociocultural relationships, these myths become instruments for achieving political
support.366
To appreciate the import of the BJP’s mobilization efforts, it is worth assessing
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the conception of caste in contemporary India. Modernization has rendered the official
discourse on caste as a construct of the past.367 Most of India is given to believe that
caste is no longer a prominent issue in Indian society. Yet, discourses on caste
frequently break through everyday narratives, as generalized remarks on the
characteristics of other caste groups—on customs, cleanliness, and atmosphere. The
parameters of caste have thus become an “idiom of civic order: the brahamin caste
spirit has gradually been injected into the modern mentality.”368
Given the above, Hindutva’s denial of caste as an issue is a way of convincing
lower castes that they are a part of the Hindu civilization, as well as a means of
perpetuating the hierarchical model of social organization deemed “orderly” in the
discourse of Sarvarkar.369 In co-opting dalits into the Hindu rashtra (nation), the BJP
has undermined the communities’ mythical figures and cultural practices. These have
been replaced by the obligations inherent to brahamanism.370 In essence, those seeking
to advocate Hinduism have countered its egalitarian appeal at every level. Hinduism is
being impoverished of its erstwhile tolerance as a result. Long prized for its diversity,
the religion risks loosing a multitude of symbolisms and practices.371

Subdued yet Assertive: Women and the Feminization of Violence
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According to the 1991 Census, women constitute about 40 million of India’s
1.2 billion people. Yet, they are the most marginalized section of the country’s
population. The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a marked increase in feminist movements
across India.372 The Chipko movement in the Uttaranchal hills,373and the Naxalite
movements in the northeast and Bengal,374 empowered women to protest against the
patriarchal system upon which gender inequality in India is based. Unfortunately, the
emergence of Hindutva has given a new lease of life to patriarchal social structures by
ensuring that women collude with its overtly masculine agenda.375

Bringing Hindutva to Women: The Rashtriya Sevika Samiti
Since its inception, Hindu nationalist ideology has appealed to the notion of
masculinity to justify violence against foreign forces. This being said, the Hindutva
framework has not excluded women’s organizations altogether.376 Founded in 1936 by
Laxmi Kelkar, the Rashtriya Sevika Samiti (RSS*) is the largest women’s affiliate of
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).377 The symbolism inscribed in the names of
the organizations is in itself instructive: the former presents women as sevikas or
servants of the Hindu nation, while the latter refers to men as swayamsevaks or
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volunteers of the national cause.378 Furthermore, while the founding myth of the RSS*
underscored India’s martial heritage by focusing on stories of heroic men (like the
Rajput king Rana Pratap and the Maratha leader Shivaji)379 during the medieval
period, the Sevika Samiti was founded on the myth of the Muslim goonda or brute.380
In addition to uniting Hindu women against Muslims, the Samiti underscores
the importance of reaffirming traditional Indian values. With regards to the latter, a
sevika stated: “Forgetting their own self, they are fascinated by the idea of equal rights
and economic freedom. This unnatural change in the attitude of women might have led
to the disintegration of the family, the primary…unit for imparting good samskaras
[values].”381
These differences aside, the RSS and the Sevika Samiti follow a decidedly
militant line. Although women of the Samiti are encouraged to revert back to the
hearth, they are simultaneously told to partake in militant ventures against the nation’s
enemies.382 In this scheme, the man has complete control over nation and home. The
woman’s job is to nurture her sons, abide by the word of her husband and father, and
preserve her homeland when called upon to do so: “A Hindu woman has performed
excellently…by her forbearance, affection, and dedication. It is quite natural to get
injured during a battle but it requires boldness, steadfastness, bravery, and tenacity to
378
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sustain injuries. These qualities are to be acquired by a Hindu woman to deal with
problems of all sorts.”383

Symbols of the Samiti
The Samiti’s ideology of a passive and sacrificing home-maker and mother is
supplemented by its conceptualization of “the Goddess;” the latter being symbolically
linked with the sacred topography of India.384 This religio-territorial identification
highlights the Samiti’s underlying partriarchal nature, as it indicates an active and
militant notion of womanhood. While this symbolism is a “stark mobilization of
political affect, in order to cultivate a religious-territorial nationalism, it key intention
is to function as a pedagogy for an idealized Hindu womanhood.”385
In this conception, the Motherland endures for the sake of her Hindu children.
Her forgiveness arises from her suffering. An important component of the Samiti’s
character-building is, therefore, to promote a dual role of womanhood. Female
militarism focuses on the force of sacrifice. The tenderhearted woman becomes bold
and aggressive if time demands.386 The goddesses Durga and Kali are presented as the
shakti, the innate power, that Hindu women require to face problems in life. They are
not simply “the powers” which redeem the Hindu nation in times of trouble, but also
“the resilience” the Hindu woman must cultivate to be dedicated and chaste.387
383
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Mythological female figures perform similar roles. As part of its discourse on the
sanctity of the epic Ramayana, the BJP has highlighted the character of Sita, the
devoted wife of Rama, who remained chaste even though she was captured by the
daemonic Ravana (the foreign force in the epic).388 Kunti, the mother of the five
Pandava brothers in the Mahabharata is portrayed as the epitome of motherhood. By
raising dutiful warriors, she contributes to the sustenance of the kingdom of
Hastinapur. Like the valiant goddess, Kunti’s shakti is directed at nurturing and
protecting her people.389
The discourse on female shakti reinforces the systemic forms of patriarchy and
hierarchy that typify the Hindutva framework.390 The use of the feminine metaphor—
the equation of female dignity with the sanctity of Hindu India—enables Hindutva
ideologues to emphasize that India must be constantly protected by the strong Indian
male.391

Politics and Hindutva women
The political fortification of cultural nationalism—through the BJP’s use of
historical and mythical narratives—has played out rather interestingly in India. On one
hand, it has strengthened feminist voices among more liberal middle class women. On
the other hand, it has subverted these women’s efforts by mobilizing lower class
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women.392 In fact, the party’s hegemonic approach has subverted the rights of women
in communities that hitherto granted females considerable autonomy. The tribal
populations in states like Bihar, Jharkhand, and Chhattisgarh are a fitting example of
this trend.393 Despite the fact that these communities have been subjugated by Hindu
elites over many centuries, their animistic traditions and informal social networks
grant women significant leverage. As dalit and tribal women embrace Hindutva, they
risk losing this aspect of their traditional cultures.394
An interesting development within BJP politics is the appointment and
promotion of women leaders. Women like Sushma Swaraj and Uma Bharati have
emerged as outspoken proponents of gender-based legislation such as the Women’s
Reservation Bill of 1996.395 While both favor reservation policy, Bharati seems
predisposed to the idea of double quotas. In her view, low caste women require twice
the assistance because they are twice as disempowered as ordinary women.396 It is
worth noting that Bharati’s popularity in the BJP indicates that Hindu elites view
women as “acceptable counter-measures” to the rising backward class consciousness
in Parliament.397
The aforementioned

discussion illustrates that the BJP’s supposed

empowerment of women is a means of both assuaging low caste anxieties and
upholding Hindu masculinity.398 This development only reiterates the relative
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powerlessness of women. That they are placed at the forefront of Hindu nationalist
organizations because of the belief that they will not prove effective agents of change
highlights the masculinist tendencies within BJP politics. A similar trend is reflected
in the operations of Jan Kalyan, a grassroots organization set up by a shankaracharya
(spiritual guide), in Kanchipuram, Chennai.399 The organization was established in the
1980s, by Jayanendra Saraswati, supposedly to represent the lower castes in the city.
However, Jan Kalyan has been using feminine idioms—women’s involvement in
prayer and ritual—to project itself as a mediator between the low castes and the upper
caste smarta community in the region. This is ironic, because the smartas repeatedly
establish their superiority over other castes.400

Feminization of Violence: Women Under the BJP
Hindutva’s infatuation with the Vedic past provides its supporters with a
means of denigrating Muslims: The convenient chronology is that women lost all their
glory and liberty in the dark period of history when India was ruled by the Mughals.401
This notion of female victimization has found profound expression in the ideas and
activities of right-wing Hindu women. Militant, and committed to the ideal of a Hindu
nation, many female activists promote a millenarian vision of Rama being the new
messiah.402 By promoting the unity of Sitaram, these women ensure that Sita becomes
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an integral dimension of the martial Rama. A popular tape of the speeches of Uma
Bharati, one of the most prominent women acolytes of the BJP declares: “If needed we
will make bricks out of our bones, and our blood will be the mortar to build
[temples].”403 Women’s collusion with the Hindutva cause is evident in the 2002
Gujarat riots, “when women led mobs and dragged Muslim women and children into
the streets, applauded their gang rapes, and joined men in stoning Muslim women and
setting them on fire.”404 This brutality against other women is explained as a
manifestation of female anger towards the entire Muslim community. Referring to the
power of goddesses, women unknowingly assume masculine traits to instigate acts of
communal violence against Muslim men and women.405
In reality, the RSS strategy of managing Hindu male sexuality excludes
women. Hindutva ideology places men in a purified space typified by celibacy. The
continual sublimation of sexual energy becomes a means of serving Mother India and
warding off foreign influences.406 Notions of sex segregation, communalized
narratives on myth and history, as well as the differentiation of male and female roles
may reflect the empowerment of women, but women’s autonomy extends only insofar
as they profess faith in the notion of an “endangered nation that requires immediate
unification.”407
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Knowledge Distorted: Education under the BJP
A National Steering Committee on Textbook Evaluation consisting of widely
respected scholars was instituted before the BJP regime assumed power. In its
meetings in January 1993 and October 1994, the Committee evaluated the content of
school textbooks in India through the reports prepared by the National Council for
Educational Research and Training (NCERT).408 The reports also focused on the
educational curricula of RSS-led institutions like the Saraswati Shishu Mandir
Prakashan. The Committee’s recommendations to the Ministry of Human Resource
Development (MHRD) underscored the partisan and communal nature of Sangh
Parivar-led educational endeavors.409 Voicing its concerns about the Saraswati Shshu
Mandir Prakashan, the Committee revealed:

“Some of the textbooks which are

currently in use at the primary level…present an extremely virulent communal view of
Indian history…historical facts have been fabricated …[to achieve] blind bigotry and
fanaticism. These textbooks should not be allowed in schools.”410 The NCERT and the
Steering Committee strongly recommended that legal stipulations be imposed upon
those seeking to dismantle India’s education system.411

Remapping History: A National Endeavor
The de-secularization of national space has been highly apparent in the policies

408

Aditya Mukherjee, Mridula Mukherjee, Sucheta Mahajan, “RSS and School Education,” in RSS,
School Texts and the Murder of Mahatma Gandhi (New Delhi: Sage India Publications Pvt. Lmt.,
2008), 21.
409
Ibid.
410
Ibid.
411
Ibid.

89

of the BJP since the mid-1990s; particularly since the coming to power of BJP-led
governments at the Center in 1998 and 1999. While the RSS has endeavored to
communalize India’s society since its inception, the BJP’s rise to power resulted in a
dangerous trend: the use of political office and state power to attack secular historians
and promote communal historiography.412 After the BJP’s victory in 1999, Murli
Manohar Joshi, long time RSS member and BJP Minister for Human Resource
Development, initiated several proposals to amend school textbooks.413 The changes
were intended to make the Indian education system “Indianized, nationalized and
spiritualized.”414
Anticipating resistance from autonomous institutions like the NCERT,
University Grants Commission (UGC), and the Indian Council of Social Science and
Research (ICSSR), the government appointed to educational commissions those who
were willing to serve as its instruments.415 After unceremoniously sacking Professor
D.N. Jha, the reigning chairman of the country’s national educational organ, the
Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE), the BJP secured control over the
nation’s examination system.416 The party thereafter used the CBSE to pressure the
NCERT and other organizations. In 2001, for example, the NCERT was forced to
delete passages in history textbooks without informing scholars like Romila Thapar,
Satish Chandra, and R.S. Sharma, who had authored these texts.417
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In BJP-controlled states, these measures paved the way for the imposition of
RSS primary and secondary school curricula onto state textbooks. In Gujarat, for
example, the Narendra Modi government engaged in a massive overhaul of the
existing educational framework, replacing history and political science textbooks with
RSS material on the Hindu tragedy during the medieval era.418 Studies conducted post
the Gujarat riots of 2002 have shown that two decades worth of communal
indoctrination made the carnage in Gujarat inevitable: young minds in the state
gradually became willful subjects of the political regime. 419

Indoctrination: The Basis of Violence
Consistent with Sarvarkar’s discourse, BJP and RSS funded texts have said of
Islam: “Wherever they went, they had a sword in their hand…Houses of prayer and
universities were destroyed. Religious books were burnt. Mothers and sisters were
humiliated; mercy and justice were unknown to them.”420 BJP endorsed historical
texts in school systems extol the “Greater India,” of the ancient times; they describe
the Aryan civilization as the birthplace of humanity, from which the Persians, Greeks,
and Egyptians borrowed.421 The pre-Aryan Indus Valley civilization is described as
the Vedic core of Indian culture. Islam is said to have brought with it the rule of the
sword.422 For this reason, school texts focused on the Rajput and Maratha clans,
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featuring their vigorous efforts to thwart the dominion of the Mughals; the idea being
that Hindus cannot confine themselves to words. This message pervades BJP attempts
to re-cast history.423
In political science textbooks, Upadhyaya’s ideology of integral humanism and
Dharmarajya (rule by righteousness) has been inserted. A Gujarati history textbook
from 2002 states that the “Aryans were the most illustrious race in human history,
[and] Hitler instilled the spirit of adventure in the common people.”424 A state-level
examination for tenth grade students featured a question which asked, “If it takes four
sevaks [RSS volunteers] to destroy one mosque, how many does it take to destroy
twenty?”425 In a literature textbook in Rajasthan, a guide to essay writing includes the
following conversation between a teacher and pupil:
Student: Master, what has India achieved by doing the nuclear tests? Was it a
correct step?
Teacher: Undoubtedly, it was correct…Economic sanctions do not matter. The
country first has to become powerful. Only the powerful are listened to. Now
we can talk about world peace aggressively.426
In today’s context, it is of particular interest to see how the Hindu effort to
appear nationalist has led to the distortion of the Hindutva. The Indian independence
movement, which was a secular struggle against communalism, is projected as cultural
nationalism.427 Leaders are presented in an intensely partisan light, and the entire
struggle is projected against a communal backdrop. Gandhi is consistently criticized
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for supporting Muslims, while Muslim leaders like Jinnah are viewed as aggrandizing
individuals who hinged their political victories on Gandhi’s support.428
Despite nationwide protests, this process of Talibanization of education was
continued.429 It culminated in the existing NCERT history textbooks being withdrawn
altogether. These were replaced by the works of key Sangh Parivar ideologues. 430
By using education as the primary vehicle of ideological dissemination, the
BJP fortified the fictions of the Hindutva curricula. The attempts to distort Indian
history veiled the momentous developments in Hinduism, and undermined the
substantive elements of traditions like Buddhism, and Jainism. More importantly, they
have snatched from posterity the opportunity to bask in the truly diverse nature of
India.

Pervasive Press, Manifest Media
Since its inception, the BJP has employed visual and print media in a targeted
and focused manner, since its inception. Following the proliferation of news channels
during the last two decades, political reporting has found new following in India.431
This has bestowed an indirect advantage upon the BJP: its activities and programs are
often accorded excessive publicity. A formal association between Sangh Parivar
leaders and the media emerged around the mid-1980s, around the same time that the
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VHP and BJP were trying to link Hindu ethno-cultural nationalism with the notion of
ramrajya, or rule by Rama.432

The Targets: Women, Children, and the Marginalized
The popularization of the Ramayana through television prepared the public for
the Hindu nationalist venture of the BJP and RSS, by presenting Rama as both a
historic hero and a supreme deity of the Hindus.433 The BJP clearly understood the
potential of Lord Rama as a god, ideal, and hero or mobilizing people of both rural
and urban areas. The slogan “man man mein hain Rama,” or “in everyone’s hearts
resides Lord Rama,” was successful in targeting rural communities, for whom the
stress on culture and tradition signified a break from the BJP’s urban-developmental
agenda.434
A characteristic feature of the BJP’s media campaign between 1999 and 2004
was the broadcasting of national festivals centered on the deification of the Ganges
River. This sacralization of India’s geography was accompanied by news reports on
yajnas (sacrifices) and yatras (processions).435 The VHP’s Ekamata Tatra (unifying
procession) of 1983 and BJP leader L.K. Advani’s ratha yatra (chariot procession) of
1992 are fitting examples of the above. Both the movements were extensively covered
by news channels like Aaj Tak and leading national newspapers like the Pioneer.436
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The media also enabled the BJP to enlist the support of the marginalized in
Hindu society. For example, in the state of Uttar Pradesh, the BJP relied on the print
media to carve the image of Suhaldev, a Pasi437 hero who spent his life countering
Muslim rule.438 Booklets like Hindu Samaj ke Gaurav: Pasi Veer Maharaja Suhaldev
Ki Shaurya Gatha, written by Trilokinath Kol, a local RSS activist and BJP leader in
Bahraich, used the figure of Suhaldev to demonstrate how the Pasis had been
dethroned and ostracized by the Mughals. For the BJP, Muslim rule became the sole
means of deflecting blame from its traditional elitist voter base. That lower caste
troubles, and divisions in Indian society, were a consequence of medieval colonial
domination was a strand of thought that underlay the entire rhetorical approach of the
BJP.439
Co-opted Media: Recasting Violence
The most appalling aspect of the BJP-media accord is the latter’s extensive
coverage of BJP-inspired riots. Prior to the Ayodhya riots in 1992, news channels like
Aaj Tak covered entire speeches of BJP members like L.K. Advani, whose views
extolled violence against the Muslims. Coverage of the riots themselves presented the
image of Hindus going to “avenge the wrong leashed upon them.”440
Gujarati newspapers played a provocative role in highlighting the communal
riots in 1998 in Bardoli, a town about thirty kilometers from Surat. Shortly after the
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incident, a twenty-member assessment team reported: “The story about the attack by a
Muslim crowd on the midnight of June 26 in Bardoli which appeared in Gujarat
Samachar and Dhabkar on June 27 was found by us to be completely fabricated.
Photographs published in one newspaper were manipulated.”441 Gujarat Samachar
had a four-column headline: “Muslims Retaliate in Bardoli: Disgusting Attempt to Set
Fire to Three Innocent Children. Attempt to Rape Women, Idol of Ganpati [Lord
Ganesh] Broken.”442 Dhabkar stated: “A strict economic boycott will throttle the
Muslims. It will break their backbone. Then it will be difficult for them to live in any
part of the country. Friends begin this economic boycott from today...”443
Addressing an electoral rally in the city of Lucknow in 2009, BJP leader
Advani stated: “It is a dream of [millions] of people across India and a magnificent
temple will definitely come up in Ayodhya.”444 His speech was welcomed by youths
in organizations like the Bajrang Dal and the Akhil Bharati Vidhya Parishad;
newspapers like the Gujarat Samachar celebrated this decision. 445
Educational institutions and the media have proved indispensible electoral
planks of the BJP. They have provided Hindutva ideologues with the means necessary
to disseminate its rhetoric and ideology. Women and lower caste communities are the
primary targets, but also the means—they are the noble volunteers who spread the
BJP’s message far and wide. Through their endeavors, the supposed “dream” of
441
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homogenous India is partially actualized, consecrated in the violence that Hinduism so
overtly opposes.
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CHAPTER 4
MOSQUE OR TEMPLE? THE BABRI MASJID-RAMJANMABHOOMI
DISPUTE
With regards to the decision of whether to give in to the Hindu demand
concerning [Lord] Rama’s traditional birth site, it is sufficient that there is a
consensus among those people who worship Rama…When on October 8,
1990, fighting broke out in Jerusalem over the “Dome of the Rock” and the
Al Aqsa mosque, absolutely no one stood up and questioned the Muslim
claim that the Al Aqsa mosque was built over the Prophet’s footprint in the
rock. So why should Hindus start proving the sacredness of their sacred
places?
-Koenraad Elst, Ayodhya and After: Issues Before Hindu Society, 8.
The demolition of the Babri mosque was justified by Hindu zealots as an
attempt to rid India of a relic of Muslim domination.446 While proponents of Hindutva
continue to advocate for the construction of a temple where the mosque hitherto stood,
several Indians view the events of 1992 as an onslaught on Indian secularism and
democracy.447

Precursors to the Demolition: Shah Bano and the Uniform Civil Code Debate
Sensing the heightened insecurity among Muslims following the Partition448 in
1947, the Congress government under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru sought to
assure members of the community that they were an integral part of India. It did so,
ironically, by excluding them from what was to have been a uniform civil code
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(UCC).449 Accommodation of religion became a matter of intense controversy with the
enactment of the Hindu Code Bills in 1950.450 While the Bills replaced Hindu personal
law governing marriage, divorce, adoption, and inheritance with a uniform civil code,
they left Muslim customary law unchanged. This infuriated Hindu nationalists, who
claimed that the proposed directives undermined traditional Hindu practices.451
Through the 1960s and 1970s, proponents of Hindutva decried the
government’s pampering of minorities, and denounced pseudo-secularism—state
policies that accorded special rights to Muslims in matters pertaining to personal
law.452 The issue reemerged in a 1985 Supreme Court Case453 involving a seventythree-year-old Muslim woman, Shah Bano, who was divorced by her husband after
forty-three years of marriage.454 By requiring that Shah Bano receive monthly
maintenance from her husband, the Court’s decision broke with the legal precedent of
adjudicating Muslim family disputes455 under the Islamic Personal Law Application
Act.456 Hindu nationalists opposed the Supreme Court’s decision, maintaining that it
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was unnecessarily sympathetic towards Indian Muslims. They were equally critical of
the Congress Party, which was in power at the time.
Indian Muslims found their own set of religious rationales for opposing the
Bills. Islamic clerics condemned the decision as an interference with Sharia law,457
and a step towards a uniform civil code that would deny Muslims the right to profess
their faith.458 In an attempt to stem the withdrawal of Muslim support from the
Congress Party, the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi announced his support for the
Muslim Women Protection of Rights on Divorce Bill. The Bill became law in 1986,
despite widespread agitation by conservative Islamic clerics, progressive Indian
Muslims (who genuinely desired Hindu-Muslim cohesion), and Hindu nationalists
(whose communal agenda was severely compromised due to the law).459
The Shah Bano controversy provided proponents of Hindutva with a tailormade opportunity, for it dramatized the dilemma of instituting democracy in a
multicultural, multi-religious society.460 The courts461 bolstered Hindu nationalist aims
by situating the issue of women’s rights in the conflict between a monogamous Hindu
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society and a polygamous Islamic tradition.462 Appeals to gender problematized the
debate on personal law within an intensely religious setting.463
Recognizing the benefits that would accrue from cashing in on these events,
Hindu nationalists used the consensus in favor of a national civil code to their
advantage. They repeatedly emphasized that the Congress response to the Shah Bano
case proved that the party was courting the Muslim vote. This affirmed, in their view,
that Indian secularism was a sham, that it was, in fact, anti-Hindu.464 The Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP), by contrast, stood for a “positive secularism” that embodied a
uniform civil code—albeit a Hinduised version.465 By framing the Shah Bano case as
one involving the sentiments of a Muslim woman, the BJP expressed a clear move
against womanhood and Islam.466 In reality, the UCC debate reflects the communal
tendencies of the Hindu right-wing. Proponents of Hindutva deliberately overlooked
the persistence of personal law in other communities, among the Indian Parsi
community, for instance.467 That they consciously appealed to the structural patriarchy
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in Islamic society indicates how Hindu nationalists used the Shah Bano case, and the
related debate on personal law, to promote their anti-Muslim agenda.468
As indicated in chapter two, the BJP was forced to return to its militant roots in
the wake of its electoral defeat in 1984.469 L.K. Advani, who possessed closer ties with
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), replaced the more moderate A.B. Vajpayee
as party president.470 This change in the BJP’s leadership, the aforementioned Hindu
Code Bills controversy, and the Shah Bano episode were events that crystallized the
Hindu revival movement of the 1980s. In search of an outlet to express their
grievances against Congress pseudo-secularism and the Muslim minority, the BJPRSS-VHP471 triad launched the Ramjanmabhoomi movement: The drive to erase the
Babri mosque at Ayodhya encompassed the gambit of fears that plagued votaries of
Hindutva.472

Hindu Revivalism: The Struggle over Ramjanmabhoomi
Hindu revivalism during the 1980s was characterized by massive reconversion
drives. The aim was to reclaim those low caste communities who had embraced
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Islam473 during the medieval period.474 To this end, the BJP organized national yagnas
or integration rituals, and the VHP made attempts to reestablish control over holy sites
like the Kashi Vishwanath Temple in Varanasi and the Krishna temple in Mathura.475
Public processions such as the Ekamata Yatra or unifying pilgrimage of 1983, and the
solidification of subsidiary militia units—the VHP’s youth wing, the Bajrang Dal,476
came into being in 1984—paved the way for a nationwide campaign directed at
affording legitimacy to the “idealized Hindu nation.”477
Though incremental, these measures positioned Hindutva forces for strategic
action in the future.478 In 1985, the VHP launched a movement to liberate
Ramjanmabhoomi, the birthplace of Lord Rama in the city of Ayodhya.479 The
operation was spearheaded by the Sri Ramjanmabhoomi Mukti Yagna Samiti
(Committee for Sacrifice to Liberate Rama’s Birthplace).480 At issue was the Babri
mosque, which was constructed in 1528 AD by the first Mughal emperor Babur.481
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Hindu nationalists alleged that the site hitherto housed a mandir (temple) marking the
birthplace of Rama. The belief led to the eventual destruction of the mosque in
1992.482

Ayodhya: Contested through History
The Babri masjid-Ramjanmabhoomi controversy is not of recent origin. It is
believed that Hindus attacked the Babri mosque four times during Babur’s reign and
close to twenty times a century later, during the reign of Emperor Akbar.483 Conflict
over the territory resurfaced in the modern period, when a group of Hindu ascetics
attacked the mosque in 1850.484 A compromise was later reached under the British
government, and Hindus were allowed to offer prayers on a platform outside the
mosque. The move failed to placate Hindus: In 1883, a coalition of devotees
demanded that a temple be built adjacent to the mosque. The British refused to
comply.485 Then in 1949, Hindu priests broke into the Babri mosque and placed an
idol of Lord Rama in the premises. Against the backdrop of nearly a century of
conflict over the shrine, the Congress government of 1949 declared the premises a
disputed area and locked the gates.486 These efforts failed to avert contention, and a
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1951 district court ruling in the state of Uttar Pradesh affirmed Hindus’ rights of
worship on the land.487
For nearly four and a half decades, Hindu nationalists sought an agenda which
would warrant the call of revival. The opportunity arrived in 1986 when a district
judge from Faizabad, in the state of Uttar Pradesh, ordered that the gates of the
mosque be opened to Hindu worshippers.488 The decisions of 1951 and 1986 brought
to the fore the inherent politicization of the Indian judiciary. The BJP would use this
dynamic to its advantage in time to come. While the VHP launched its revival
movement, Muslims formed the Babri Masjid Action Committee and observed
nationwide mourning.489 More than 300,000 Muslims gathered in New Delhi in March
1987 to demand the return of the mosque. This was the largest organized Muslim rally
since independence; only to be followed a month later by a massive Hindu rally
organized by the pro-Hindu BJP.490
As Hindu-Muslim tensions escalated, the VHP intensified its stand.
Undergirding its efforts was the desire to consolidate a support base that could be
mobilized to perpetuate Hindutva goals.491 The BJP pursued a mixed strategy. It
entered into open alliances with opposition parties and also focused on Hindu
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mobilization campaigns. The VHP had revived the Ramjanmabhoomi dispute and the
BJP promptly boarded its chariot.492

Revivalism, Rama, and Rationales for Aggression
Through its discussion of the BJP’s mobilization strategies, the previous
chapter established that the god-hero Rama holds a pivotal position in Hindutva
iconography. The notion of ramrajya (rule by Rama) has enabled the party to
perpetuate Sarvarkar’s views by employing symbols and narratives with which
modern-day Hindus can relate.
In appropriating Rama as a party symbol, the BJP has substantially altered the
conventional iconography associated with the historical figure. First, the effort to
equate Rama with a uniform Hindu consciousness received a tremendous boost
following the popularization of visual media. In particular, the broadcasting of a
televised version of the Ramayana in 1987-88 allowed millions to view excerpts from
the epic on a daily basis.493 The move ensured that local traditions and myths were
contextualized by a dominant, national narrative. It also enabled Hindu nationalists to
use the myth of Rama during their political campaigns.494 The BJP’s projection of
Rama as the linchpin of Hindu religion was and remains a monolithic attempt that
subverts the diversity in Hinduism:
492
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One could argue that the Sangh Parivar’s strategy of generating a
nationalized Hinduism through the production of a religious community
imagined around the national geography of sites like Ayodhya…is an attempt
to “massify” the nation in a concrete spatial sense…The majoritarian notion
of the “rights” of Hindus as the dominant interpretation of secularism…has
settled among broad groups as the fundamental principle of intelligibility of
the social world.495
Second, by representing Rama as an aggressive warrior, the BJP has converted
the hitherto moral representation of Rama into an overtly physical one.496 Anuradha
Kaur says of this development: “Rama [has become] a warrior, not easily
distinguished from other warriors: Ben Hir, El Cid, or to take Indian examples, Arjuna
and Bhima. Like them, he fights for possession, control, [and] status.”497
Finally, the new iconography of the Hindu right focuses explicitly, on Rama’s
opposition to the Mughal Empire. By portraying the mosque at Ayodhya as a relic of
oppressive and unjust Muslim rule, and as the chief obstacle to the restoration of
ramrajya, Hindu nationalists have made Muslims a permanent subversive element in
all references to Rama.498 As Tapan Basu and his co-authors remark, “The new
historical myths have achieved a vital substitution of associative feeling so
effectively…that Muslims need not be introduced at all…Rama’s face and his life
story are enough…to [bring] in the invented medieval history of India.”499 This
sentiment is explicitly expressed in the ideas of Jana Krishnamurti, former BJP VicePresident and strategist. In an interview in 1999 he stated, “Ask [Hindus]…whom do
they prefer: Babur or Rama? [The destruction of the Babri mosque] was…a
495
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misreading of the mood of Hindus by other political parties. We are not asking for
every mosque to be removed. We desire only the birthplace of Rama back…if the
Muslims feel this is their land, why do they not agree to leave the site?”500
The 1988 Rama shila pujas, wherein bricks inscribed with Rama’s name were
worshipped during a nationwide campaign organized by the VHP, illustrate the
inventive manner in which Hindutva rituals reinforced the singular myth of Rama. The
bricks, wrapped in saffron cloth and displayed at temples and public sites, proved
instrumental in the BJP’s operations in Ayodhya.501

Phase 01: Consolidating Consensus
Establishing an alternative set of significations allowed Hindutva ideologues to
instate a spirit of reformation among its cadres. The phase of revivalism ushered in
1985 culminated in a full-fledged drive against remnants of medieval Islam.502 For the
VHP, the Babri mosque was the edifice upon which Muslim rule once rested. Upon
joining forces with the BJP, VHP cadres took the final leap. They decided in 1989 to
launch an official movement dedicated to building a Rama temple in place of the
Babri mosque.503
As Hindu devotees from across India, each bearing a brick for the construction
of the new temple, made their way to Ayodhya, the nation witnessed a communal
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confrontation featuring over a 100,000 armed Hindutva volunteers.504 With
parliamentary elections around the corner, the BJP was forced to forfeit the temple
issue temporarily.505 Meanwhile, Congress representative Rajiv Gandhi, who had
made every attempt to stir the communal pot in his bid for Muslim support during the
Shah Bano controversy, sought to use the Ayodhya riots against the BJP.506 His efforts
proved largely ineffectual, and concerns over corruption and inflation drove the
Congress out of power.507 With 11.4 percent of the national vote and eighty-five seats
in the Lok Sabha,508 the BJP possessed all but one ingredient (a non-elitist socioeconomic agenda) necessary to rake up its ethno-nationalist Hindu agenda.509
The lack of a shared vision ate away at the BJP coalition. Out of power by the
1990s, the party faced another dilemma. The Mandal Commission, created a decade
ago by the Congress, released its report favoring a twenty-seven percent quota for
backward classes in all government institutions.510 The BJP responded with
disapproval, maintaining that the quota undercut the party’s attempts to unite upper
and lower caste Hindus. Caught between the pulls of its traditional elitist base and the
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newly emerging lower caste brigade, whose vote won the party national office a year
earlier, the BJP desperately sought an agenda that would ensure political victory.511

Phase 02: Dharma Yuddha (Righteous War)
Several BJP members proposed the revival of the Babri mosque dispute as the
path forward. Sensing the need to distract the party’s electoral base from the Mandal
Report, BJP leader L.K. Advani launched a rath yatra (chariot procession) in 1990,512
with the support of RSS and VHP volunteers513 The 10,000-kilometer journey514
across ten states in the heartland of north India was to end at Ayodhya on October 30,
1990, when the construction of the much awaited Rama temple was scheduled to
commence.515
As the date neared, tens of thousands of Hindu militants led by Advani met at
Ayodhya.

“Women

brought

coconuts,

incense

sticks,

and

sandalwood

paste…youngsters met the rath armed with…swords and trishuls (tridents)…VHP and
Bajrang Dal activists prepared the route with decorations.”516 Advani’s dharma
yuddha (righteous war) had begun.517 Invoking the principles of secularism, then
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Prime Minister V.P. Singh518 stressed that the Uttar Pradesh High Court’s interim
order to secure status quo at the disputed site would be enforced, and that the mosque
at Ayodhya would be “protected at all costs.”519 In lieu of the above, Advani and other
BJP leaders were arrested on October 23, en-route to the mosque.520 The arrests
sparked a series of clashes among Hindus and Muslims that left nearly three thousand
people dead. Hindu nationalist forces withdrew from Ayodhya with the promise to
return.521
The incident had immediate political impact. Following Advani’s arrest, the
BJP withdrew its parliamentary support from V.P. Singh’s National Front
government. On losing a vote of no confidence, V.P. Singh submitted his resignation
as Prime Minister.522 The BJP exploited the Ayodhya issue in the subsequent
elections, thereby increasing its holdings in the Lok Sabha from eighty-five in the
1989 parliamentary elections to a hundred and nineteen in the 1991 elections.523
The commonly cited rationales for Advani’s decision to launch the rath yatra
relate to the Hindu vote bank, which the BJP had been cultivating since the mid1980s. As caste loyalties came to the fore owing to the release of the Mandal
Report,524 proponents of Hindutva were faced with the need to safeguard their
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established electoral base.525 Advani continues to claim that whether or not the Babri
mosque had been built over an existing Rama temple is irrelevant. Of importance is
the symbolism of Ayodhya in Hindus’ imagination. In fact, several accounts have
suggested that a temple never existed on the site.526 The Ramjanmabhoomi movement
was therefore an attempt to substitute the issue of caste discrimination with an
alternative political configuration in which backward castes could be “sutured into an
integrated Hinduism.”527 This allowed the BJP to displace blame for the post-Mandal
era anti-reservation riots (spurred by Hindu elites) onto the Muslims. It also ensured
low caste support for the party’s agenda in Ayodhya. Advani’s yatra was a calculated
political move. Put simply, it was the BJP’s anti-Mandal strategy.528

Phase 03: Turned to Rubble
Lalit Vachani’s documentary, The Boy in a Branch, depicts BJP leader Arun
Shourie hoisting the bhagwa dhwaj,529 the saffron flag, at the RSS’s 1992 Founders
Day rally, shortly before the destruction of the Babri mosque.530 Shourie is dressed in
secular clothing, not in the khaki shorts and saffron stoles worn by other RSS
members at the rally. Unlike his contemporaries K.K. Shastri and Devendra Swarup,
Shourie is not a dogmatic RSS man.531 A man with well-thought-out but nonetheless
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controversial economic views, he portrays himself as wanting the BJP to lose its
extremism. Yet his speech accords complete support to the Ayodhya campaign. There
is no getting around the fact that Shourie joined the BJP not for its economic policies
alone, but because of the conviction that Muslims pose a danger to India and must be
kept in check. Shourie’s case is a classic example of the implications of Hindutva.
Through the promise of an economically vibrant India, Hindu nationalists seek to
control even the moderate Hindu vote.532
Following the 1991 elections, the BJP’s liberal economic bent under Prime
Minister A.B. Vajpayee was severely critiqued by several RSS leaders. In a joint
VHP-RSS rally on October 29, 1991, Hindutva forces threatened, “If the BJP dragged
its feet over the construction of the temple at Ayodhya, its government will fall.”533 In
the face of mounting pressure from other right-wing organizations, the BJP had little
choice but to comply with the larger demands of the Hindutva family. This being said,
Hindutva ideologues recognized that the garb of economic liberalism would ensure the
BJP’s success in office. The party’s stable position at the Center was a golden
opportunity for the right-wing forces embroiled in the decade-long struggle at
Ayodhya.534
The rally launched in October 1991 spurred thousands into action. By October
31, 1991, a sizeable front had gathered in the grounds adjacent to the Babri mosque.
The same day, a group of young activists climbed onto the domes of the Babri mosque
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and hoisted saffron flags, destroying one of the building’s outer walls.535 By the end of
July 1992, RSS cadres were in the midst of completing a concrete platform on the site.
Their actions clearly violated a 1990 Supreme Court order which prohibited the
creation of “a permanent structure” in the vicinity of the mosque.536
By December 5, 1992, about 100,000 supporters joined Hindutva forces at the
mosque. At this juncture, the BJP sent hard-liners like Advani with explicit
instructions to engage the masses while the government sought a compromise with
RSS cadres. Unfortunately, Advani’s speeches yielded the opposite result. Those at
Ayodhya viewed the presence of BJP leaders as a tacit endorsement of Hindu
communal intentions.537 On December 6, 1992, as three hundred thousand supporters
gathered to listen to RSS speeches, some pilgrims breached the cordon, entered the
disputed area, and began stoning the mosque.538 Using iron rods, they defaced the
mosque’s north wall. By late afternoon, five and a half hours after the first group of
Hindus crossed the cordon, all three domes of the mosque had been pulled to the
ground. Two thousand Muslims were killed in the three weeks of rioting that ensued in
the north western states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh.539

A Successful Siege
There is still no agreement about the extent to which the demolition was
planned. Advani is said to have shown signs of surprise and distress: he resigned from
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his post as the leader of the opposition. Vajpayee, who was not present at the time,
said the demolition was the “worst miscalculation ever made by his party.”540
Meanwhile, the Congress government under Narasimha Rao vacillated, failing
to take strong action against the Hindu nationalist perpetrators. The ban imposed on
the VHP and RSS on December 8, 1992 was quickly withdrawn.541 Aware that the
demolition was not receiving strong criticism, BJP leaders repealed their earlier
statements, arguing that there was no salient distinction between moderates and hardliners in the party. The initially apologetic Vajpayee seemed only happy to support his
camp’s misdemeanors. He stated, “The Babri mosque was a symbol of shame and has
been erased.”542
Although the Congress instituted an inquiry commission to investigate the
Ayodhya riots under Supreme Court Justice M.S. Liberhan,543 the commission finally
submitted its report to the current Congress-led coalition under Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh after seventeen years and forty-eight extensions. Despite the
report’s release on June 30, 2009, the ruling government has failed to institute
concrete measures against the RSS and BJP.544
The political potential of the Ramjanmabhoomi agitation lay in the multiple
ways in which it engaged the dominant discursive narratives in post-colonial India. It
sought to use alternately, and to its advantage, three contested ideas: the fallacy of the
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Nehruvian state,545 Indian society as dominated by an inherently tolerant Hindu
culture; and communalism as anti-national sentiments among minorities.546 By
asserting that Ayodhya was Rama’s birthplace, the BJP cast the Babri mosque as a
remnant of medieval Mughal rule.547 This became the central mobilization tactic
during the 1992 campaign. Domestic constraints only aided Hindu nationalists.548 The
breakdown of Nehruvian socialism during the early 1990s, along with allegations of
corruption which plagued the Congress, augmented the Ramjanmabhoomi
campaign.549
The sharpest edge in the entire campaign lay in the constant drawing of
boundaries between “self” and “other.” Just as it was crucial to “fetishize the
materiality of the Babri mosque,” it was important to “essentialize the Muslim
community.”550 Muslim destruction and brutality—as epitomized in the Partition—
became popular themes for women like Sadhvi Ritambara and Uma Bharati. The two
BJP leaders continually stressed their status as sadhvis, or women willing to sublimate
their femininity. The parallels between the RSS warrior-monk and the sadhvi are
instructive, as they point to women’s co-optation into the male-centric framework of
the Sangh Parivar.551 As noted in chapter three, the use of rhetoric imbued with
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violent metaphors has caused women and backward communities to equate
empowerment with acts of force. This orientation has advanced the BJP’s attempts at
legitimizing violence against Muslims.552 The staging of Uma Bharati as a young,
angry, “backward class woman” has played subtly on the assimilationist attributes of
Hindutva. Bharati’s statements reflect this collusion: “We could not teach them with
words, now let us teach them with kicks…tie up your religiosity and kindness and
throw it in the Jamuna [River]…[A]ny non-Hindu who lives here does so at our
mercy.”553

Ayodhya: A Road Map for Future Violence
The illegal construction of the Rama temple in Ayodhya commenced soon
after the destruction of the Babri mosque in 1992, and has gathered pace since.554 The
demolition brought in its wake an unprecedented attack on Muslim communities in
late 1992 and early 1993, in both north and south Indian towns and cities. In Mumbai,
the Hindutva campaign was systematically planned. Muslim individuals, business, and
homes were methodically targeted by the Shiv Sena, a regional Hindu nationalist
outfit.555 Though the Mumbai violence was a product of a range of causes, such as the
lack of land redevelopment and the rise of organized crime, it is nonetheless estimated
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that close to 67 percent of the people who died in the 1993 Mumbai riots were
Muslim.556
In the aftermath of the riots, Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao instructed the
Maharashtra state government to institute a commission of inquiry under Justice B. N.
Srikrishna.557 Though its initial brief was to investigate the causes of the Mumbai
riots, the Shiv Sena-BJP joint government that took control of Maharashtra expanded
the commission’s area of inquiry to include the bomb blasts that occurred in Mumbai
in March 1993.558 The blasts were believed to have been supported by individuals in
the city’s growing criminal circle, whose Muslim origins were of particular concern to
the BJP. The commission refrained from expanding its focus, and identified the
Hindutva camp, in particular the Shiv Sena, as responsible for the 1993 communal
riots in Mumbai. 559
According to the Srikrishna Commission Report, “While several incidents of
violence took place during the period…large scale rioting commenced from January 6,
1993…owing to the efforts of the Shiv Sena and its leader Bal Thackeray who
continued to whip up communal frenzy [through] their statements and acts.”560 The
Mumbai riots are significant because they exemplify the extent to which Hindutva
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ideology is impacting India’s political character. The increase in regional
organizations supportive of the BJP indicates the potency of Hindu nationalist ideas.561
From Mumbai, riots spread to cities like Allahabad in the state of Uttar
Pradesh (1994-95) and Ahmadabad in the state of Gujarat (1996). Communal tensions
in Gujarat culminated in the carnage of 2002, in which the BJP played a pivotal
role.562 The Ramjanmabhoomi campaign represented “the coming together” of the
BJP’s communal tactics. The destruction of the Babri mosque proved that the party’s
mobilization strategies and discourse could actualize change. The BJP, having
perfected the myth-mobilization paradigm, reverted to the myth of Rama in virtually
every communal skirmish thereafter.563
In some ways, the BJP has created a monster it can no longer contain. As
historian Christophe Jaffrelot states, “It was easier to mobilize Hindus against the
Babri mosque than for anything else.”564 Subsequent riots initiated by the
undisciplined members of the Bajrang Dal and other youth organizations caused
trouble for the BJP, which needed to play its cards deliberately but carefully.565
Additionally, the party’s rhetorical support for the status of Muslim women
(post the Shah Bano controversy) and its simultaneous emphasis on the virtues of
adopting a uniform civil code have roused the ire of conservative Indian Muslims.
Such anti-minority imports, coupled with the institutionalization of violence in the
decade following Ayodhya, have caused clerics to affirm international Islamic
561
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radicalism.566 Hindu nationalist-led violence has caused consistent Muslim backlash.
This was evident in the Allahabad and Ahmadabad riots in 1987 and 1993, where
Muslims reacted fervently to Hindutva activism.567 “The size and spontaneity of
Muslim rallies—such as the 300,000 people who gathered in Mumbai on November
20, 1985—indicate the frustration and insecurity among Indian Muslims.”568
The Ayodhya incident was a godsend for Pakistan. Islamabad used the event to
convince other Islamic countries that Muslims everywhere should prevent Hindu India
from “butchering” its Muslim citizens.569 Pakistanis used the Babri mosque
controversy as an occasion for temple-burning and the murder of Hindus, who
constitute less than 1.6 percent of the nation’s population.570 Unfortunately, the Indian
Senate Committee on Religious Freedoms and Minority Affairs sided with Pakistan,
citing the Liaqat-Nehru Pact,571 which promised safeguards to minorities in both India
and Pakistan. Between November 1989 and November 1990, over 240 Hindu
temples572 were destroyed in Bangladesh.573 Since sections of the Indian media openly
promoted the Hindutva standpoint during and after the Ayodhya riots, India’s
immediate neighbors seized the opportunity to engage in anti-Hindu reporting. In
recent years, moderate voices in the BJP have spoken against biased media reports in
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India.574 V.K. Malhotra, former BJP Secretary notes, “The responsibility for what has
happened in Pakistan and Bangladesh is entirely that of the Union government and the
[media]. They have been engaging in so much anti-Muslim propaganda that [other]
governments have an excuse for [reverse] publicity.”575
It is clear that the BJP’s current anti-minority stance will strengthen the
majoritarian politics576 of Islamic separatists in contested territories like Kashmir.577
Aside from bolstering the aims of Pakistan, continued militancy in such areas will
heighten fundamentalist tendencies among Hindus and Muslims alike. A secure and
confident Muslim community in India is therefore the surest means of refuting
Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s legacy of the Two-Nation Theory.578
As the caste system became increasingly dogmatic during the medieval period,
Hindu low castes sought other faiths.579 Conversion gained popularity in latter half of
the British era (1900-1947). In independent India, the 1980s witnessed a wave of
adivasi (tribals) conversions to Islam and Christianity.580 These conversion drives,
along with the strong assertion of Muslim identity in connection with the Shah Bano
case caused proponents of Hindutva to strengthen their right-wing stance.581 The rise
of Islamic fundamentalism has received significant space in the writings of Hindu
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nationalists and intellectuals alike. While Islamic backlash suggests the possibility of
heightened communal confrontations in India, those writing in the Indian context
forget that Hindu nationalist discourse has contributed to Muslim insecurities.582 By
postulating that Islam is hijacking Hindu devotees, votaries of Hindutva invariably
appeal to the fundamentalist tendencies they seek to oppose.
In recent years, notable Muslim figures in India have used their status to
oppose the conservative elements in India’s Islamic community. Asghar Ali Engineer,
a prominent Islamic scholar based in Mumbai, said in 1990: “Every human life is
much more precious than a hundred masjid’s [mosques] or temples…we should
therefore do everything possible to resolve this issue…through the spirit of
reconciliation.”583 The likes of Imam Maulana Waheeduddin Khan, and Professor
Imtiaz Ahmed of the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, have on several
occasions initiated inter-communal dialogue. Unfortunately, the BJP and RSS have
responded by hinting that they may press in due time for more mosque demolitions
across India.584
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CHAPTER 5
MODI AND HIS MUSLIMS: THE GUJARAT CARNAGE

On January 26, 2001, as India celebrated her fifty-first Republic day, the most
powerful earthquake in almost two hundred years shook north western Gujarat.
According to official estimates, over 20,000 persons perished and close to 200,000
were injured.585 The aftermath of the earthquake was a portent of the partisan nature of
both state and society in Gujarat: As government officials rushed to assist Hindus,
Muslims were denied access to relief and rehabilitation.586
Ever since its inception, Gujarat’s polity has witnessed many turbulent phases.
In the three and a half decades between 1960 and 1995, when the Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) established its power in the state, Gujarat witnessed four spells of
Presidential rule587 and the turn of seventeen ministries. Due to unstable political
alliances and fragile state coalitions, not a single Chief Minister, except Madhavsingh
Solanki who headed the Congress cabinet from 1980 to 1985, competed a full term of
five years.588 The instability in government paralleled upheavals brought about by
rapid urbanization. Political entities exploited the fierce competition between castes
and communities seeking to assume meaningful identities in Gujarat’s evolving
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society. Hindutva forces in the state embarked on each of these waves of discontent,
turning them to their political advantage.589

Laboratory of the Hindu Nation
Though the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) found footing in Gujarat as
early as 1941, votaries of Hindutva failed to establish political control in the state until
the 1960s, when the erstwhile unity within the Congress Party’s ranks became feeble.
As Atal Bihari Vajpayee assumed the political reins of the Jana Sangh590 in 1972, he
pledged to move beyond reformist rhetoric, and promoted in its place an organized
coalition of diverse Hindu groups in India.591 The Gujarati Navnirman movement of
1974 provided Vajpayee and his followers with a golden opportunity to mobilize
varied constituents in the state. As noted in chapter two, the movement allowed the
Jan Sangh to join hands with Jay Prakash Narayan’s Total Revolution, a campaign
spearheaded by a newly formed party, the Congress (O), comprising a disgruntled
group of former Congressmen who sought to involve the poor in electoral politics.592
In addition to backing factional tendencies within the Congress,593 Hindutva
ideologues supported right-wing political bodies like the Swatantra Party, whose
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staunchly elitist appeal dominated Gujarat’s political scene for much of the 1960s and
1970s.594
The general elections of 1980 witnessed a significant digression from the status
quo, and changed the entire spectrum of political and social equations that hitherto
characterized the state. Armed with a new strategy to counter its debacle in the
previous decade, the Congress Party launched the KHAM (kshatriya, harijan, adivasi,
Muslim)595 alliance, which sought to challenge the hegemonic position of the
Swatantra Party.596
Following this development, members of the educated middle class in Gujarat,
specifically the banias and patidars,597 retaliated with a series of anti-reservation riots
during the early 1980s. The riots aimed at reducing the political and social leverage of
Muslims and low caste Hindus alike.598 Clashes between upper caste (savarnas) and
lower caste (avarnas) communities in the industrial periphery of Ahmedabad
gradually mutated into a caste war, which spread to eighteen of the then nineteen
districts in Gujarat.599
Caste tensions resurfaced in 1985 during a second anti-reservation agitation. At
this juncture, BJP leadership, drawn mainly from the upper castes, realized the

594

Yagnik, Sheth, The Shaping of Modern Gujarat, 228.
“Kshatriya” refers to the warrior caste. It is the second tier in the four-fold caste system that
originated in the medieval period. Harijans are a class of untouchables. The adivasis are tribal
communities. They may be Hindu, Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, or Jain. See footnote 4 for citation.
596
Yagnik, Sheth, The Shaping of Modern Gujarat, 260.
597
Banias and patidars belong to Gujarat’s merchant community. See footnote 16 for citation.
598
Yagnik, Sheth, The Shaping of Modern Gujarat, 260.
599
The state is now divided into twenty-four districts. See footnote 14 for citation.
595

125

importance of expanding the party’s social base to achieve electoral success.600 While
the BJP implicitly supported those allied with the Swatantra Party, it simultaneously
employed a succession of yatras (processions) aimed at incorporating dalits into the
party’s gambit. The Social Assimilation Platform movement of the 1970s provided
BJP members with a precedent for low caste mobilization.601 The anti-Christian
campaign was also brought in under this context. Hindutva’s negative definition of
Indianness—neither Christians nor Muslims were true Indians—paved the way for
anti-minority violence in Gujarat.602
When communal riots broke out in the city of Ahmedabad in 1986, during an
annual procession to the famed Jaganath Temple, the series of stabbings that ensued
were projected as evidence of dalits’ allegiance to the Hindutva cause. Revisiting the
concept of ramrajya (rule by Lord Rama), the BJP initiated the Rama-Janaki Dharma
procession in 1987, the Rama shila prayer ceremonies in 1989, and the Rama Jyoti
pilgrimages during the early 1990s.603 Advani’s rath yatra (chariot procession) of
1990 lent fuel to the fire. It adroitly played on the Mandal reservation issue (19891990),604 which favored political and educational quotas for the lower castes. BJP
leaders repeatedly stressed that religious and caste issues should not be channeled to
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the secular front. In reality, the party used low caste disillusionment605 with the
Mandal Report to perpetuate anti-Muslim hysteria.606
Each of these events resulted in a trail of communal clashes. The first in the
series, the Rama-Janaki Dharma procession affected large areas of north western
Gujarat.607 The second set of clashes due to the Ram shila ceremonies impacted 180
Gujarati villages. The Ram Jyoti pilgrimages and Advani’s yatra unleashed violence
in thirty-three districts across the northern, eastern, and western regions of the state.608
The riots following the demolition of the Babri mosque in 1992 exacerbated HinduMuslim tensions. Violence in the city of Surat, for example, caused the death of nearly
200 persons over a seventy-two hour period.609
The BJP adeptly used the chaos emanating from these acts of violence to shift
attention to matters of development. The strategy appeased the disgruntled Hindu
elites in Gujarati society. Following an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan in
1987, the BJP began constructing a dam on the Narmada River; supposedly to
augment India’s power generation capacity. The resultant displacement of tribal
communities and low caste Hindus exposed, yet again, the elitist and urban-centric
agenda of the BJP.610 Inter-caste violence in Gujarat during the 1980s enabled votaries
of Hindutva to launch a nationwide economic reform movement rooted in the
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repudiation of affirmative action.611 This in turn facilitated the BJP to project elitesponsored violence against lower castes as evidence of Muslim communalism. The
link between low caste mobilization and anti-Muslim hysteria remains an integral
aspect of BJP operations.
The cyclicality of violence in Gujarat created social cleavages, enabling the
BJP to connect with the grassroots. By 1995, the party had achieved a clean sweep in
Gujarat’s local power institutions.612 It won 395 seats in the state’s six municipal cooperations; the Congress captured only thirty-seven. The BJP’s feats at the village
level were equally promising. The party secured close to eighty seats at the panchayat
(village) level in 1995.613

Why Gujarat?
Aside from the fact that the BJP was extremely successful in establishing a
firm political presence in Gujarat, the socio-economic climate in the state provided,
for a multitude of reasons, the grounds necessary for the party to launch its nationwide
endeavors.
As subjects of the Mughals, Gujaratis had witnessed the destruction of Hindu
shrines and temples by foreign forces. This subversion of Hindu religiosity left
irreversible antagonisms in the social fabric of the state.614 That the north western
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frontier of Gujarat borders Pakistan remains a significant factor in people’s minds.
Appeals to the Partition615 and accounts of medieval Muslim oppression have fueled
suspicions of Indian Muslims’ loyalty to Pakistan.616 This has strengthened the
political currency of the BJP’s rhetoric.
The economic apathy that gripped Gujarat after the 1980s was a crucial reason
that Hindutva found following in the state. The closure and downsizing of the state’s
traditional textile industry, and the gaining popularity of Western modes of life, have
severely challenged the pre-existing religious syncretism in Gujarati society.617
Increased migration in search of economic opportunity has led to the emergence of a
strong Non-Resident Indian (NRI) community. This has in turn created a rootless
middle class dependent entirely on monetary infusions and retrograde ideological
imports from abroad.618 A parallel development is the enhanced willingness of low
caste Hindus (dalits) and tribal communities (adivasis) to engage in communal acts.
For these individuals, the journey to Hindutva is propelled by both the desire to escape
poverty619 and the quest for an overarching identity beyond the confines of caste and
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community.620 It is ironic that the BJP’s promise of inclusion has prompted a majority
of Hindus to overlook its elitist tendencies.621
Historical trends associated with Gujarat’s industrial and economic sectors
shed light on the rise of conservative forces in the state. The division of labor in
Gujarat is based entirely on the Gandhian concept of trusteeship, under which
submission of laborers is integral.622 Given this antecedent, the tribal and low caste
communities of Gujarat have remained menial workers under the state’s landowning
and entrepreneurial upper class. This trend explains the lack of an organized
movement among low caste Gujaratis. It also underscores how socio-economic
dynamics in the state curtailed neighboring Maharashtra’s anti-brahamin movement
from establishing its presence in Gujarat.623
Besides adversely impacting socially backward communities, economic apathy
contributed to an increase in unemployment in the state. By 1995, close to 4.9 percent
of Gujarat’s youth lacked a permanent source of income.624 Pointing to the
repercussions of this development, Asghar Ali Engineer states, “BJP propaganda
communalized, [i.e. indoctrinated with an anti-minority orientation] not only lower
castes but also young Hindu elites in cities like Surat.”625 These individuals became
ardent supporters of Hindutva, and actively endorsed the ideology through Vinayaka

620

Nivedita Menon, Aditya Nigam, “Politics of Hindutva and the Minorities,” in Power and
Contestation: India since 1989 (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing Lmt., 2007), 52.
621
Nussbaum, The Clash Within, 24.
622
Puniyani, Communal Politics: Facts versus Myths, 292.
623
Ibid.
624
Ibid.
625
Ibid, 282.

130

idols, which aimed at culturally co-opting local subalterns into an elitist brahaminical
culture.626
The contrarieties in Gujarat’s educational system explain the sense of
disillusionment among the state’s youth.627 Bound within the confines of a rote-based
system, students are indoctrinated with right-wing European writings and Hindu
ethno-cultural ideas. Textbooks in the state frequently equate fascism with
nationalism.628 It is hardly surprising that individuals bred in this system regard
Hitler’s feats as messianic, and look to his political model during times of struggle.
Godhra Train Attack
The macabre events in Gujarat began with the Godhra train attack in February
2002. The four-month long carnage that followed, from March to June 2002, led the
country into the depths of violence. March 2002 witnessed the displacement of a
100,000 women and children. Close to 250 Hindus and over 2,000 Muslims perished
in the clashes.629
The events in Gujarat reflect the barbarism of the Hindutva agenda.
Alternatively, they demonstrate the disenchantment of broad sections of Indian society
towards such a colossal tragedy.630 Particularly reprehensible is the fact that the
carnage occurred in a state ruled by the BJP for several years.631 The infiltration of
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communally oriented individuals in the state apparatus allowed the Gujarat
government to instigate and aid communal violence. The RSS and Vishva Hindu
Parishad (VHP) emerged as the BJP’s primary aides.632
On the morning of February 27, 2002, the Sabarmati Express train, carrying
over four hundred Hindu pilgrims (kar sevaks), made its usual stop at the Godhra
station in the western Indian state of Gujarat. During its four-minute stop, the train’s
S-6 car was set ablaze, allegedly by Muslims waiting on the platform. The incident
caused the death of fifty-seven people.633 Since the destruction of the Babri mosque in
1992, the dispute over the alleged birthplace of the Indian deity Rama has been the
focus of Hindu-Muslim confrontations. Those on-board the Sabarmati Express were
returning from their yearly pilgrimage to Ayodhya, a journey aimed at garnering
support for the construction a temple where the Babri mosque hitherto stood.634
Forensic reports reveal that trouble erupted in Godhra when a Bajrang Dal
activist635 humiliated a Muslim tea stall vendor. Eyewitness accounts have suggested
that violence commenced when some pilgrims on the train abducted a Muslim girl.
Regardless of what was the catalyst, it seems clear that a large crowd descended on the
platform. Shortly thereafter, a group of Muslim men began pelting bricks on the Hindu
pilgrims.636 The Hindus retaliated by using the sharp flint-like stones they found along
the railway bed.
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Accounts of the events prior to the explosion offer fairly cursory information.
Since the explosion was preceded by a confrontation with a Muslim mob, local police
officials immediately blamed the Ghanchi Muslims living near the station.637 The
government later claimed that members of the community had thrown flaming
kerosene-soaked materials into the train. Refuting this assertion, forensic expert
Mukul Sinha stated, “If I may crudely use a term from tennis, the advantage lay with
the kar sevaks [volunteers], because they were on the railway lines and had….ready
made weapons in the stones on the tracks.”638

Gujarat on Fire
Communal riots erupted in full force on February 28, 2002, a day after the
Godhra train attack. Sporadic incidents of violence rapidly spiraled into a statesponsored program against Muslims across Gujarat. Of the twenty-four districts in
Gujarat, eighteen witnessed an outbreak of communal insurrection.639 In Gandhingar,
the capital of Gujarat, several Muslim administrative and religious buildings,
including the Muslim Waqf Board and the Minority Development Board offices, were
burned.640 A series of trucks manned by Muslim drivers were also set ablaze on
National Highway 8, just outside the main entrance of the Gujarat High Court. A
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Muslim sitting judge of the High Court was forced to leave his official residence and
take refuge in a Muslim majority district in Gandhinagar.641
The most barbaric scenes were played out in industrial Ahmedabad, where
forty-three persons, including former Congress Member of Parliament (MP) Ahsan
Jafri were burnt alive. That evening, a mob of 15,000 Hindus attacked the slum area of
Naroda, killing eighty-four people.642 The army was called in to contain the violence
on March 1, 2002. By this time, violence had erupted in cities like Vadodra, Kheda,
Panchmal, and Sabarkantha. The same day, fourteen people, nine of them Muslim,
were burnt alive outside the Best Bakery in Vadodra. A week later, violence had
spread both westwards and eastwards; to Surat and other locales around the Narmada
River.643
Mobs during the period generally consisted of between 2,000 and 3,000
persons, although they sometimes swelled to 10,000. Rioters were armed with tridents,
agricultural implements, and swords. The manner of arson suggested a well-laid out
strategy of attack.644 The rioters identified minority homes and businesses. Women
and children were deliberately targeted, and sites of religious significance (shrines and
mosques) were systematically destroyed.645 Hanuman and Rama temples came up

641

Ibid.
Nussbaum, The Clash Within, 19.
643
Shani, Communalism, Caste and Hindu Nationalism, 170.
644
Nussbaum, The Clash Within, 19.
645
Ibid. / The shrine of sufi poet Wali Gujarati was attacked numerous times. Several other monuments
built during the Mughal period (1526-1858 AD) were dismembered.
642

134

overnight where Muslim monuments earlier stood. Losses from the rampage were
estimated at 3,800 crore Rupees (800 million USD).646

Truth Behind the Carnage
Even before people gained an understanding of the events at hand, the charred
bodies of the Godhra victims were brought to Ahmedebad, where slogan shouting
bands of VHP and BJP activists raised the communal temperature.647 The district
collector, Jayanthi Ravi, insisted that the tragedy was unplanned and must not be
viewed from a religious lens.648 Reports from the railway police, and subsequent
confirmations from the National Forensic Science Laboratory and the 2005
Independent Commission under Supreme Court Justice U.C. Banerjee, debunked the
theory that the fire was started by local Muslims.649 A later forensic report also
confirmed that the train had caught fire from inside, possible owing to a leaking
kerosene stove that belonged to one of the pilgrims. The report went on to speculate
that the event was a deliberate move by enraged kar sevaks (volunteers), whose ire at
the Supreme Court’s denunciation650 of the Hindutva agenda in Ayodhya drove them
to frame Muslims in a pre-fabricated incident.651
The complicity of the state government in the carnage that followed was
appalling. Despite contrary evidence, Chief Minister Narendra Modi projected the
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incident as a pre-planned act of Muslim-sponsored terrorism.652 Following Modi’s
instructions, the local police arrested sixty-two persons, including seven Muslim boys,
under the Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act (POTA).653 The BJP had introduced
the Act in Parliament merely three months before the Godhra incident. Though the Act
was repealed in 2004 owing to its inherently partisan nature, few questioned the Modi
government’s decision to enforce POTA at the time.654
Modi categorically instructed the police and other key officials in the
administration to remain indifferent to riot victims’ appeals for assistance. His
inflammatory statements, such as his decision to label Muslim relief camps as “baby
producing centers,” exacerbated the mob mentality already prevalent in the state.655
With the Chief Minister’s support, members of the RSS and Bajrang Dal achieved the
legal immunity necessary to lead anti-Muslims riots.656 The infiltration of RSS cadres
in Gujarat’s the bureaucracy ensured that a nexus between the state and the civil
service was secured and maintained. Then Cabinet Secretary TSR Subramanian said
of this development, “There is no civil service left in Gujarat….over the years, it has
changed from steel frame to non-existent.”657
The closure (bandh) that followed on February 29, 2002, is equally illustrative
of the extent to which Gujarat’s polity drew from Hindutva’s anti-minority orientation.
The bandh was fully backed by the BJP, despite a 1998 Indian Supreme Court ruling
652
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regarding the unconstitutionality of religiously motivated closures.658 The appointment
of Justice Shah—known for his anti-minority judgments which were later reversed by
the Supreme Court—to investigate the Godhra case was another piecemeal
development, intended to silence moderate elements in Indian society.659

Aftermath: Relief and Rehabilitation
Through the course of the communal riots, Modi repeatedly asserted that
action was taken to avert every mob. He maintained that violence after the Godhra
train attack was brought under control within seventy-two hours.660 In reality, Gujarati
Ministers like Nitin Patel and Narav Laloo Patel led riots against Muslims in locales
like Kadih, Unja, and Mehsana in western Gujarat.661
Relief camps instituted by the state lacked adequate financial support. While
local and international NGOs made significant progress in securing immediate relief,
those in power neglected rehabilitation and crisis management completely.662 Even
pre-existing mechanisms of relief were denied to the riot victims. Fire brigades did not
come to the rescue, hospitals turned away Muslims patients, and ambulance services
to Muslims were systematically disrupted by the police.663 Modi rejected demands for
any form of resettlement and refused funds for the restoration of ransacked Muslims
shrines. The breakdown of civic amenities heightened the sense of urgency among
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those affected.664 Faced with no other alternative, these individuals turned to relief
camps in the hopes of receiving aid. By March 2002, nearly 100,000 persons were
enlisted in one of the many camps in the state. The figure grossed 150,000 just two
weeks later.665
The Gujarat government’s callous attitude towards those appealing for relief is
manifested in the fact that Modi finally visited a relief camp at Shah Alam—during
Prime Minister Vajpayee’s survey trip to Gujarat—two months after the Godhra train
incident had occurred.666 Those in civil society either genuinely supported Modi’s
actions, or sided with the government owing to the fear of punishment.667
Communalism Combat, a journal tracking Gujarati relief measures, said the following
with regards to the situation six months after the riots:
In Ahmedabad and Baroda, a salient yet effective boycott of Muslims, socially
and economically, continues. A few icons of the Gujarati business community
have tried to counter the hate politics encouraged by the Gujarati
government…But schools and businesses…have now more so than ever…bid
good-bye to Muslims. The general sentiment among mixed localities is that
they do not want Muslims back. And the many Hindus who helped their
neighbors…are under the threat that they will not be spared next time
around.668

Aftermath: Reports of Human Rights Groups
A tragedy of serious proportions had struck the country. The targeting of
minorities and the complicity of the Gujarati state government was both obvious and
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painful.669 Was all of this a signal of the permanent erosion of civic and democratic
norms in India?670
Though the Modi government tried desperately to put a lid on events, members
of organizations such as the National Human Rights Commission, the Forum Against
Oppression of Women, and Human Rights Watch, focused precisely on the political
conditions under which the carnage had ensued.671 Their reports brought forth the
gruesome nature of violence against women and children, the plight of refugees, and
the apathy displayed by goverment and administrative ranks.
Yet, those in power in the union government, including then Prime Minister
Atal Bihari Vajpayee, made every effort to deflect blame.672 Whereas Modi
deliberately cast the Godhra incident as an outcome of the radical Islamic movement,
his Home Minister, Gordhon Zadafia, saw the hand of Pakistan’s Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) throughout the whole episode.673 Politically, these orientations laid
the foundation for a Hindu nationalist movement. For the popular mind, they
heightened the allegedly paramount link between international terrorism, Pakistani
intentions, and the Indian Islamic community. In its account of this trend, Human
Rights Watch reported:
The state of Gujarat and the central government of India initially blamed
Pakistan for the train massacre, which it called a ‘pre-meditated terrorist
attack’ against Hindus in Godhra. [Later], the revival of the Rama temple
campaign, and the increased fears of terrorism since September 11 were
exploited by local Hindu nationalist groups and the local press which printed
669
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reports of a ‘deadly conspiracy’ against Hindus in the state…Muslim survivors
of the attacks repeatedly told Human Rights Watch that they were told to ‘go
back to Pakistan.’674
By casting Indian Muslims as agents of Pakistan, the BJP incorporated a pivotal
tenet in early ideologue V.D. Sarvarkar’s writing: a repudiation of the Muslim voice in
India. This, along with the attempts to present the “pro-Muslim” Congress Party as
“anti-national,” allowed the BJP to deflect attention from the immoral proceedings in
Gujarat.675 At a speech in Goa on March 3, 2002, when Gujarat was seething under
riots, Vajpayee claimed:
If a conspiracy had not been hatched to burn alive innocent passengers of the
Sabarmati Express, then the subsequent tragedy in Gujarat could have been
averted…wherever Muslims live, they don’t like to live in coexistence with
others…they want to spread their faith by resorting to terror and threats. The
world has become alert to this danger.676
If Vajpayee had intended to convey that India would not tolerate the spread of
terrorism, then his decision to link the events in Gujarat with general observations
about Indian Muslims was a serious miscalculation.677 Referring to the nation’s entire
Muslim population under the rubric of terrorism would hardly rid the subcontinent of
violence. Surely then, his rhetoric sought to counter the charges that were being
leveled upon the Hindu community.678 The conspiracy theory and the jargon on
international extremism proved instrumental in achieving this goal.
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Fortunately, the international response to events in Gujarat has been more
conclusive. It seems beyond dispute that the Gujarat carnage meets the definition of
genocide offered in the United Nations Convention on Genocide.679 Article two of the
Convention states that:
Genocide implies any of the following acts, committed with the intent to
destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, such as:
(a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or part; (d)
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group.680
Incidents of rape and murder figured widely in the Gujarat riots. In light of the above,
international journals such as Dissent and Boston Review tirelessly pursued contacts
within the European and American State Departments.681 Following the media frenzy,
a March 2004 report by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
found Chief Minister Narendra Modi guilty of complicity in the Gujarat riots.682 In
September 2004, the State Department’s International Religious Freedom Report
reviewed the Gujarat case, giving a detailed account of the derailment of law and order
in the state. The trajectory of violence associated with the BJP’s Hindutva agenda
came to the fore through this report.683 Perhaps the most conclusive of these measures
was the U.S. State Department’s decision to deny Modi a visa, when he was invited to
address the Asian-American Hotel Owners Association in Florida in 2005.684
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While these efforts reined in militancy temporarily, and may have contributed
to the BJP’s defeat in the 2004 general elections, the party’s presence in its traditional
constituencies in northern India has not diminished. Of particular concern is the
manner in which present-day Hindutva both reinforces and is reinforced by the antiMuslim bias that has crept into India’s judicial and executive branches.685 The
aforementioned discussion of the partisanship in the Gujarati civil service applies to
the national context as well. Legal decisions involving infamous cases, such as the
burning of fourteen persons outside the Best Bakery in Vadodra on March 1, 2002,
demonstrate the loopholes in Indian secularism. In addition, they call attention to the
absence of a formal “separation of powers” in the Indian federation.686 In 2006, the
Indian Supreme Court awarded a death sentence to Zahira Sheikh for her alleged
involvement in the Best Bakery case. That the Court ruled against Sheikh, even though
the National Human Rights Commission supplied the judges concerned with evidence
of her innocence, indicates the prevailing biases in India’s judicial system.687

Violence with a Difference
The 2002 riots were not the first time Gujarat had witnessed communal
violence. Hindu-Muslim skirmishes have characterized the state’s socio-political scene
both prior to Partition688 and in the decades following 1947.689
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It is worth noting, however, that the nature and scope of violence in postindependent India has witnessed a dramatic shift. In the pre-independence period,
communal riots were a form of reciprocal violence between Hindus and Muslims who
were pitted against each other by colonial forces.690 Two features of rioting during the
last two decades are perceptibly different. First, the number of victims from the
Muslim community has consistently risen with each successive act of violence.691
Second, Muslims have suffered a significantly higher rate of property loss during
inter-communal clashes.692 Small-scale riots in India have escalated due to the
communalization of social space by dedicated organizational outfits. Rhetorical
slogans, such as “Muslims are aliens,” and “The only two abodes for Muslims are
Pakistan and the graveyard,” are an essential feature of the mob mentality, and have
been used extensively in past riots. The 1967, 1975, and 1984 riots in Allahabad (Uttar
Pradesh) and Ahmedabad (Gujarat) exemplify the above.693
The events in 2002 reflected many conventional patterns associated with
religiously motivated violence. Yet there is consensus that the occurrences in Gujarat
were fundamentally more alarming, as they signaled the rise of leaders steeped in
Hindutva ideology.694 For many, the most chilling aspect of the violence (and the one
feature which demonstrated that Hindu-inspired communalism is capable of assuming
genocidal proportions in India) was the complicity of those charged with law

690

Ibid.
Ibid.
692
Ibid.
693
Ibid, 152.
694
Ibid.
691

143

enforcement. Indeed, it was the steady infiltration of the BJP into the political fabric of
Gujarat that enabled key leaders to enlist mass support for the violence that ensued.695
Unlike before, when rioters sought to intimidate Muslims by targeting
vulnerable sections of the Muslim community, the violence in 2002 witnessed
unprecedented attacks on middle and upper class Muslim localities.696 Seemingly
urbane Hindus participated in the looting. Muslims were openly attacked, even in
areas where they constituted the majority.697 Victims of violence in Vadodra
remarked: “Earlier, if there were riots, there was stabbing or stone-throwing in the
streets. If Muslims stayed at home, they were safe. This time…they came to destroy
houses, loot and burn. Our neighbors were involved. We have lost our trust.”698 A
section of the media—newspapers like Sandesh and Gujarat Samachar—added fuel to
the fire by sensationalizing the tragedies reported. Their efforts were supplemented by
the advertisements posted by Sangh Parivar organizations; many of which extolled
acts of violence in the name of self-defense.699
Despite an outwardly defensive stance, internal estimates under the Modi
government acknowledged the characteristic predominance of Muslim casualties in
the Gujarat riots. Estimates indicate that initial violence resulted in the death of five
Muslims for every Hindu. The ratio was as high as fifteen-to-one in the riots that
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followed Godhra.700 Women were raped. Infants were burnt alive.701 The large-scale
incineration of civilians, indicative of a sophisticated plan for extermination, had never
been seen before; nor had the widespread use of sexual torture. For Hindu nationalists,
the assault on Muslim women’s sexuality was a means of redeeming the dignity that
Hindus had lost under Mughal dominion.702 These features of the Gujarat carnage
point to the institutionalized aspects of rioting articulated in the first chapter of this
thesis. They affirm that rhetorical and symbolic appeals to a negative view of history
can instigate cyclical acts of violence.703

A Haven for Hindutva?
As rioting gained momentum in Gujarat, Modi’s government conducted a
survey to assess the electoral prospects of the BJP. The survey indicated that the
party’s prospects were excellent. A news magazine, The Week, confirmed similar
findings a fortnight later.704 At a time when the cry for rehabilitation was searing the
Gujarati conscience, talk of elections seemed unfounded. Yet Modi was firm in his
resolve. Aware that his government was under no threat, since he enjoyed a majority,
Modi dissolved Gujarat’s state legislative assembly. His motive was clear: the Chief
Minister sought to use electoral victory as a means of improving the BJP’s national
prospects.705
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In a remarkable show of unity, the VHP, Bajrang Dal, and RSS came together
to assist the BJP in its run for control over the state. By distributing leaflets, CD’s, and
free meals during electoral rallies, Sangh Parivar organizations expressly endorsed the
Gujarat government’s agenda.706 As the Modi government secured a laudable sixtyfive seats707 in the state in 2002, the precedent for using communal violence to achieve
electoral gains was strengthened. Seventy-one percent of the total votes obtained by
the party came from thirteen (of twenty-four) riot affected districts in Gujarat.708
Given the BJP-led union government’s support for Narendra Modi, the
Election Commission of India decided to review the situation. The three-member
committee appointed by the Commission confirmed that the political environment in
Gujarat was unfeasible for fair elections to be held. In line with expectations, the Modi
government challenged the committee’s decision and referred the matter to the
Supreme Court.709 Though the Court has since refused to express a view on the
conduct of elections in a state gripped by strife,710 the events of 2002 reflect the BJP’s
successful manipulation of the Indian judiciary.
In the aftermath of the Ayodhya incident, the BJP’s Rama campaign was
loosing its steam. With the Babri mosque in ruins, and without an alternative rhetorical
rallying point, BJP members struggled to garner local support. In light of the above,
situating the violence in Gujarat in the “retaliation for Godhra theme” paid rich
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dividends to the Sangh Parivar.711 It follows that the events in Gujarat cannot be
viewed in isolation from the electoral fortunes of the BJP. As is typical of situations
involving socio-political struggles, people in riot-stricken Gujarat sought stability. In
fact, many in India believed that the BJP’s ideal of inclusion would provide them with
safety and security.712 Unfortunately, the average Hindu gradually became invested in
anti-minoritism due to Hindu nationalists’ persistent rhetorical maneuvers.713 By
juxtaposing the issue of violence with Hindu nationalism, the BJP achieved not just
electoral polarization, but also the communalization of civil society.714
The communal riots in Gujarat left a lasting imprint on the Indian conscience.
First, they called attention to the inadequate protection of life and personal liberty in
the country.715 Second, they unraveled problems of relief and rehabilitation in the face
of political and natural crises. Third, they exposed the need to hold perpetrators of
political crimes accountable.716 The Modi government failed to respond to any of these
concerns. In relation to the above, historian Ram Puniyani remarked:
An analysis of the Gujarat violence combined with the struggle against
communalism not only leads to a better understanding of the phenomenon, but
also brings out the real character of our ‘democratic’ institutions. Amidst our
discussions regarding good governance, the crisis [of secularism], the decline
into prejudice and partiality of our executive and judicial bodies, and the general
decay of ‘civil society’ organizations of various forms have not been given due
attention.717
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Perhaps the most tragic result of the 2002 conflict is a phenomenon Allen
Feldman calls the “militarization of everyday life.”718 One sees clear evidence of this
not only in the form of everyday skirmishes amongst Hindus and Muslims in Gujarat,
but also through the high incidence of suicides witnessed in the state between 2002
and 2003.719 This indicates that violence has moved beyond the semantics of
discourse. It has pervaded political institutions and previously syncretic social
structures. A popular view is that communalization is the BJP’s recourse to electoral
supremacy. However, traces of communal undertones are visible in the politics of
several entities in the Indian context. What distinguishes votaries of Hindutva is that
communalism for them is both a means to political power and an essential component
of an overarching end: an ethno-nationalistic form of governance.
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CHAPTER 6
LEGALIZING COMMUNALISM: PREVENTION OF
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES ACT (POTA) 2002

POTA: Political Context and Legislative Scope
Sensing the need for a national framework to combat terrorism in the postSeptember 11 world order, India’s union cabinet issued the Prevention of Terrorism
Ordinance (POTO) in October 2001. The government claimed that POTO was a
response to “the upsurge of terrorist activities, and the intensification of cross-border
terrorism and insurgency across the country.”720 A precursor to POTA, the ordinance
targeted those who “incited, supported, abetted, harbored, concealed, or benefited
from the proceeds of terrorism.”721 In reality, POTO granted law enforcement officials
“sweeping powers to investigate, detain, and prosecute for a wide range of terrorismrelated offenses.”722
For many, POTO bore a resemblance to India’s “notorious” Terrorist and
Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA), which lapsed in 1995 after years of
abuse.723 Despite initial criticism, POTO became an imperative segment of the ruling
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led coalition’s posture on extremism.724 Events thereafter
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only bolstered the party’s rhetoric on the need for national anti-terrorism legislation.725
On December 13, 2001, the Indian Parliament was attacked; allegedly by members
belonging to two prominent Islamic terrorist groups.726 Accusing Pakistan of
complicity, the BJP-led national government claimed that the attack was an assault on
“the very heart of [India’s] system of governance, on the symbol [the Parliament] and
the keystone of the largest democracy in the world.”727 The adroit attempt to link
global terrorism with Pakistan’s (and implicitly Muslims’) ill-founded motives in
India728 placed the country on a war footing (India deployed thousands of troops along
the Indo-Pakistan border), and proved pivotal in pushing POTA through the
Parliament. Less than three months after the attack, on March 28, 2002, during a joint
session convened at the Prime Minister’s request, POTO, a temporary ordinance, was
phased out in favor of a permanent legislative directive: the Prevention of Terrorist
Activities Act.729
While the current Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition
repealed POTA in 2004 due to its pro-Hindu bias, the Act legitimized rampant
violations of minority rights in the two years that it was in force.730 More importantly,
POTA’s legacy in India’s executive, judicial, and legislative organs has long-standing
implications for future decisions regarding inter-communal clashes and acts of
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terrorism.731 Although the Congress oversaw POTA’s demise, the party’s own antiminority orientation,732 and its reliance on Hindutva support for articulating a national
economic vision, has bolstered the BJP’s nationalist aims. This chapter therefore seeks
to describe both the import of POTA in the past and the legacy it has left for the
future.

POTA Evaluated
Opponents of POTA cite three aspects of the Act—its broad definition of
terrorism, the sweeping powers of arrest and detention enshrined in the legislation, as
well as the appeal and review process mandated under it—to demonstrate how
Hindutva forces used its inbuilt discretionary authority to perpetuate communal
ends.733
Broad Definition of Terrorism
Many of POTA’s flaws stemmed from its broad text. While all laws may be
susceptible to abuse, anti-terror legislation enables misdemeanors by placing
permissive language in the hands of law enforcement officials.734 POTA defined
terrorism as any act that “threaten[ed] the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of
India… [a] strike in the people or any section of the people…or a disruption of any
supplies or services essential to the life of the community.”735 It was taken for granted
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that neither the government nor Indian security forces could be guilty of any of the
aforementioned charges listed in Section II of POTA.736 Since the Act granted
significant leverage to political actors, it was used to justify military operations and
activism. Successive governments’ mobilization of troops in civilian populated
regions of war-torn Kashmir, for example, was entirely exempt from the purview of
POTA.737 Moreover, the law imposed a minimum five-year sentence on “[w]hoever
conspire[d] or attempt[ed] to commit, advocate, abet, advise, incite, or knowingly
facilitate the commission of a terrorist act, or any act preparatory to a terrorist act.”738
Particularly troublesome were the words “advocate” and “incite,” for they indicated
the erosion of fundamental rights like free speech and political expression. Section 21
of POTA stipulated that even addressing “a meeting for the purpose of amassing
support for a terrorist organization” was an outright offence.739 Evidently, POTA did
more than just create new categories of crime under the rubric of terrorism. By
defining terrorist acts in generalized terms that encompassed ordinary cases of murder,
robbery, and theft, the Act enabled law enforcement officers to circumvent
constitutionally mandated procedural safeguards. Due to this immunity, the police
could subject violators to severe penalties such as electrocution and arbitrary
detention.740
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Sweeping Powers of Arrest and Detention
POTA’s vague definition of terrorism was especially problematic in light of its
arrest and detention procedures. A fundamental criticism leveled against POTA is that
the legislation disregarded the tenets of “due process” and “presumption of
innocence.”741 Persons arrested under the Act could be held for thirty days before
authorities were required to produce them in a special POTA court. POTA also
allowed law enforcement agencies to withhold the identities of witnesses.742
Human rights organizations have demonstrated that Indian authorities routinely
used the thirty-day period to extract confessions from individuals of targeted
communities. POTA was used by the government, writes Human Rights Watch,
“against political opponents, religious minorities, dalits [or untouchables], tribal
communities, and children.”743 India’s Human Rights Commission also condemned
POTA. Its members declared that existing laws were “sufficient to deal with any
eventuality, including terrorism.”744
As noted earlier, threats and torture became common means of extracting
statements from individuals arrested under POTA. Detainees involved in the 2002
Godhra case and the 2002 Mumbai blast case were raped, burned with cigarette butts,
and subjected to electric shocks. In both instances, POTA allowed the prosecution to
use a person’s confession—to a crime that he had not formally been charged with—as
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evidence in the court of law.745
Section 49(2) of POTA enabled the police to detain a suspect for up to 180
days without a formal charge. This far exceeded the limit stipulated under Indian
criminal law.746 The Indian Constitution requires police to immediately inform a
person of the grounds for his or her detention. Indian case law states that a speedy trial
is “an integral aspect of ‘the fundamental right to life and liberty’ as enshrined in the
Constitution.”747 POTA dramatically undermined each of these safeguards by
endorsing arbitrary and punitive detention.
Stringent bail procedures further suppressed the rights of the accused. Under
Section 48 (7) of the Act, special POTA courts could postpone bail petitions for a
year. Moreover, if a prosecutor opposed bail, the courts could not release the accused
without “grounds for believing that he [was] not guilty.”748 This provision reversed the
“presumption of innocence” clause in the Indian Constitution, and granted prosecutors
a veto over bail applications.749 In effect, POTA mandated a “presumption of guilt”
even in cases where the accused merely possessed arms or explosives, or if his or her
fingerprints were found at the scene of crime.750
Appeal and Review
While POTA enabled either party to appeal a special court’s bail ruling before
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a bench of two judges of a concerned state’s High Court,751 the Act stipulated no
qualifications for the appointment of judges. Moreover, orders passed by a special
POTA court during the interlocutory stage752 were non-reviewable.753
The central government initially defended POTA, arguing that it was “safe
from abuse” because it entrusted only senior law enforcement and judicial
functionaries with extensive investigative and adjudicative authority.754 Because
POTA operated at the state level, however, regional governments wielded tremendous
power over state law enforcement officials, regardless of their seniority.755
In an attempt to check this power, Indian legislators created a Central
Review Committee. The measure was flawed from the outset. Though POTA’s text
provided for a review committee, the absence of interpretive guidelines led to
considerable confusion: “The government’s early interpretations limited the
provision’s application to the primarily advisory review of certain surveillance
procedures and the designation of terrorist groups.”756 Only after numerous reports of
POTA’s anti-Muslim bias proliferated across India did the central government select
certain cases, notably the 2002 Godhra case and the 2003 Mumbai blast case, for
further review.757 A formal amendment in December 2003 gave the Committee the
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power to “review prima facie cases,” and declared that its decisions were binding on
POTA courts. Despite these changes, the Committee continued to lack both the time
and resources required to address the cases brought to its attention.758

POTA Applied
Once POTA was enacted, states wasted no time “in capitalizing on its broad
definitions and sweeping powers of arrest and detention. Warning signs of POTA’s
susceptibility to abuse surfaced in the summer of 2002.”759 Only four months after its
enactment, law enforcement officers had arrested 250 people nationwide under the
Act.760 Eight months later, seven states had used the legislation to arrest over 940
people, 560 of whom are still held in jail. The instances discussed in the following
section shed light on both the communal and political motives behind the use of
POTA.761
A Means to Communalism and Anti-Minoritism
Communalism and “political gamesmanship” have a long history in India.
POTA’s opponents warned that officials would use the law to target minorities and
political opponents.762 Their fears were soon realized.763

Gujarat
The misuse of POTA along communal lines was most glaring in the state of
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Gujarat, where the Act was invoked to arrest 123 Muslims who were supposedly
involved in the February 2002 Godhra train attack.764 The government declined,
however, to use POTA against the Hindus involved in the March 2002 riots that killed
over 2,000 Muslims.765 Gujarat’s Chief Minister Narendra Modi characterized the
violence as a “spontaneous reaction” to the train attack, despite evidence that the riots
had been initiated by Hindu right-wing organizations like the Rashtriya
Swamyamsevak Sangh (RSS) and Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP).766 The Gujarat
police later used POTA to arrest Muslims involved in a post-riot reprisal against a
former police official, K.N. Rao. Justifying the arrests, officials claimed that their
investigations had “uncovered a major conspiracy. . .to strike terror in the minds of a
particular section of [Hindu] people.”767
It is worth noting that all but one of Gujarat’s 240 POTA detainees were
Muslim. Law enforcement officials evaded even the few existing safeguards intended
to protect detainees from abuse.768 According to Amnesty International, “The police
neglected the writ of habeas corpus, held people for questioning for weeks without
access to legal counsel, and threatened to arrest detainees’ family members under
POTA if they petitioned the government.”769 The accused repeatedly complained of
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being tortured770 and forced into giving confessions. POTA’s text, and the state’s
justifications for prosecuting Muslims under the law, also supported charges against
Hindu nationalist groups771 involved in the riots.772 Yet the Gujarat government chose
to use the ambiguities in POTA to protect these groups. In so doing, it reiterated
Hindutva’s majoritarian stance.
In 2005, the POTA Review Committee instituted under the central government
opined that the accused in the Godhra case should not be tried under the provisions of
POTA.773 Then in December 2008, the Supreme Court ordered that all proceedings in
connection with the Godhra incident should be transferred from POTA special courts
to the Godhra sessions court.774 Its 2008 judgment notwithstanding, the Supreme
Court’s lack of leadership on the issue is disturbing. In a March 2009 follow-up
judgment to the Gujarat High Court’s February 2009 decision, Supreme Court justices
K.G. Balakrishnan and P Sathasivam maintained that they would “wait on the Gujarat
High Court’s verdict.”775
The state’s High Court also decided that the Godhra carnage was not an act of
terrorism and hence POTA was not applicable to the case. However, the Gujarat
government refused to comply with the judgment and appealed the ruling before the
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Supreme Court.776 Though the number of persons detained in connection with the
Godhra case reduced from 240 to 79 by late 2009, the accused are still held under
Section 3(10) of POTA by the Gujarat government.777

Uttar Pradesh and the Akshardham Attack
Gujarat was not the only state that targeted Muslim minorities arbitrarily.
“Jharkhand gained particular notoriety for arresting women, children, and the elderly,”
despite the fact that states like Tamil Nadu decided against arresting juveniles under
POTA.778 In April 2003, police in Uttar Pradesh arrested two Kashmiri Muslim
students under POTA for sympathizing with a Muslim terrorist group. Every Kashmiri
in the state became a suspect in the subsequent investigation.779
POTA was also invoked in the 2002 Akshardham temple780 terrorist attack
case, in which thirty-three persons (Hindus and Muslims) were killed.781 The case was
originally assigned to the national Anti-Terrorism Squad. For reasons unknown, it was
subsequently transferred to the Gujarat Crime Branch in Ahmedabad, which seized the
opportunity to employ POTA. In positing Akshardham with the Godhra train attack,
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Gujarati Chief Minister Narendra Modi advanced the BJP’s anti-minority discourse.
782

Mumbai: 2003 and 2006
POTA’s misuse after the 2003 Mumbai blasts was equally blatant. In 2008, a
special POTA court acquitted two of the three Muslims accused in the 2003 Mumbai
twin blasts at the Gateway of India and Zaveri Bazaar.783 A year later, in a review
judgment, the court sentenced to death the three persons (including a woman)
convicted in the case.784
The 2003 blast case was not the only time Mumbai witnessed the use of
POTA. According to official sources, the July 2006 blasts in the city’s suburban
railway trains killed 207 people, and left another 700 injured.785 Since no individual or
group claimed responsibility for the attacks, the media, police, and Hindu nationalist
groups seized the opportunity to accuse Islamic terrorist organizations786 of complicity
in the bombings.787
The Mumbai police now claim the involvement of India’s Lashkar-e-Taiba
(LeT)788 and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in both attacks. Since the
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2006 blasts occurred under the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA)
coalition, BJP leaders claimed that the events were a consequence of the ruling
government’s leniency towards Indian Muslims.789 The BJP’s leadership therefore
called for the revival of tough anti-terrorism measures such as POTA, which was
repealed in 2004.790 POTA’s re-enactment was brought up by Hindutva ideologues
again, in the wake of the Mumbai blasts on November 26, 2008.791
The danger of reinstating POTA lies in the fact that it was used extensively
against Muslims after the 2003 bombings in Mumbai.792 While the Congress-led UPA
coalition chose to neglect BJP demands, it actively used the controversial Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act (1967), which it revised and reenacted in 2004 after POTA
was phased out.793 It is clear that POTA’s anti-minority stance has implicitly been
adopted by the Congress. The move is telling of the extent to which the BJP’s
ideology has permeated Indian political scene.
A Tool to Eliminate Political Opposition
In addition to its application along communal lines, POTA was also used to
rout political opposition in at least three states. Politicians unaffiliated with the
Hindutva cause utilized “the national legislation” for personal purposes.794
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Uttar Pradesh
In Uttar Pradesh, “after months of harassment in the form of criminal
charges,” Chief Minister Mayawati used POTA to arrest her long-time political rival
Mulayam Singh Yadav795 in December 2003.796 Though the media openly criticized
Mayawati,797 the BJP-led national government endorsed the Chief Minister’s decision,
in the hopes of securing her support in the 2004 parliamentary elections.798 The BJP’s
agenda witnessed a serious setback when Mayawati lost the January 2004 Uttar
Pradesh state elections. On assuming political control after Mayawati’s defeat,
Mulayam Singh Yadav immediately released the former Chief Minister’s rivals.
Unfortunately, a POTA special court denounced his order as arbitrary.799

Jammu and Kashmir
In March 2002, police in Jammu and Kashmir invoked POTA to arrest a figure
sympathetic to the secessionist movement: A former detainee under POTA’s
forerunners, “Yasin Malik remains a prominent figure among a coalition of parties
which have long sought autonomy from the Indian union.”800 In July 2002, a POTA
special court granted Malik bail because of his failing health.801 The police rearrested
Malik soon after his release under Jammu and Kashmir’s Public Safety Act, which
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allows for preventive detentions.802 Malik was thereafter detained for five months
before the state’s new government mandated his release. The government proclaimed
magnanimously that the release reflected “a policy shift.”803 In reality, Malik’s
detention and release bear testimony to the arbitrary application of POTA and related
laws in India.804

Tamil Nadu
The most significant example of POTA’s political misuse occurred in July
2002, in the state of Tamil Nadu.805 Chief Minister J. Jayalalitha arrested several
members—both Hindus and Muslims—of a rival Tamil nationalist party for publicly
expressing sympathy for the banned Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam806 (LTTE).807
Prominent among those detained was Vaiko, the general secretary of the
Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK) Party. After over four and a
half months of questionaing, the police finally charged Vaiko, along with eight other
MDMK officials. In its 440-page report, the Jayalalitha government claimed that the
detainees had violated Sections 21(2) and (3) of POTA.808 Vaiko’s appeals against the
proposed charges eventually prompted the Supreme Court to clarify that a mere
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expression of “verbal support” did not amount to a violation of Section 21 of the
Act.809 Responding to Vaiko’s detention and prosecution, the BJP-led central
government endowed POTA’s Central Review Committee “with the power to issue
binding opinions on the validity of a state’s prima facie cases.”810 Jayalalitha
immediately challenged the Review Committee’s jurisdiction over Vaiko’s case,
which was proceeding in a POTA court. Eventually, on February 7, 2004, as “Vaiko
awaited word from the special court,” the Committee released him on bail “after
eighteen months of needless detention.”811
The aforementioned cases demonstrate the varied ends towards which POTA’s
discretionary authority was directed. So grave were the misdemeanors that occurred
under the auspices of the Act that Home Minister Lal Krishna Advani conceded—
despite his staunch approval of the Act a year earlier—that evidence of POTA’s
misuse was “serious enough” to warrant review.812

A Lasting Legacy
In its assessment of POTA in 2004, the Commonwealth Human Rights
Initiative (CHRI) opined that a “revised version” of the Act should not include
ordinary criminal cases in its definition of terrorism.813 The assessment also stipulated
that revisions to POTA must ensure that the independence of the judiciary is not
compromised. Specifically, CHRI argued that no judge’s tenure should extend beyond
809
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the age of superannuation.814 The study also suggested that the controversy with
regards to Section 49 (7) of POTA should be set at rest by endowing the judiciary (as
opposed to special POTA courts) with the power to grant bail. In addition to its
advocacy of shorter time frames for trials, the CHRI stressed the importance of
allowing the publication of trial proceedings.815
In consonance with the sentiment of Human Rights organizations, the
Congress Party vehemently opposed POTA during the 2001-02 debate over its
enactment. Though Congress leaders said little about the Act during the 2004 spring
election campaign,816 POTA’s repeal (on October 7, 2004) was included in the
Common Minimum Program (CMP) that the party negotiated with its UPA coalition
partners.817
The UPA government’s decision to repeal POTA failed to institute concrete
change. The Act already contained a sunset clause which stipulated “a parliamentary
review after three years of enactment,” and was set to expire in October 2004, merely
one month after its much praised repeal.818 More importantly, however, the Congress
combined the repeal of POTA with amendments to the 1967 Unlawful Activities
Prevention Act (UAPA). These amendments have made POTA’s repeal largely
cosmetic, given that the UAPA retains many POTA clauses.819
Some believe that anti-terrorism legislation essential to curb extremism in
814
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India. However, when such legislation was in effect, it did not prevent terrorist
attacks.820 The Indian Parliament was attacked in December 2001, when POTA was an
ordinance. The May 2002 Kaluchak army base attack in Jammu and Kashmir and the
September 2002 Akshardham Temple attack in New Delhi occurred after POTA was
enacted as a permanent legislation.821 In fact, “POTA might actually have been
instrumental in fueling terrorism.”822 Its misuse by Gujarati Chief Minister Modi is
said to have “prompted hundreds of young people to join extremist outfits to counter
the Indian state.”823 Unfortunately the lack of an international legal framework to
combat terrorism has led the BJP to promote “Hindu nationalist” alternatives.824 This
has ensured the perpetuation of anti-minority legislation like TADA and POTA.
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CONCLUSION

That the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) successfully enunciated a discourse on both
Hindu nationalism and the need for strong governance proved instrumental to its
success between 1998 and 2004.825 Yet, the party’s consecutive losses826 in the general
elections of 2004 and 2009 signal that its leadership has failed to strike a cord with the
growing plural sections of Indian society.827 As compared to the 270 parliamentary
seats (37.06 percent of national votes) that the BJP captured in the 1999 general
elections, its 159 seats (24.63 percent of national votes) after the 2009 elections
illustrate the decline in the party’s national standing.828
The state elections of 2003-2004 provided telling signs of the BJP’s possible
defeat in the upcoming national polls.829 The BJP-led National Democratic Alliance
(NDA) coalition lost in the February 2003 state elections, the northeastern states of
Tripura, Meghalaya, and Nagaland.830 In the next round in December—featuring
northern states like New Delhi, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan—reining Prime
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Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s moderate approach rather than Hindutva’s nationalist
plank ensured the BJP’s victory.831 Evidently, Hindu nationalists are still bound to the
norms of a democratic political system.832 They must, therefore, cater their discourse
to alternative electoral alliances and the impending anti-incumbency tendency; both of
which have rendered “the state,” i.e. regional constituencies, an important unit in
India’s electoral process.833

Hindutva and Muslims
Economic growth under the BJP’s Liberalization, Privatization, and
Globalization (LPG) program remained confined to urban areas. The party’s efforts to
commercialize agriculture during its reign between 1998 and 2004 were piecemeal,
and found relatively few Muslim beneficiaries.834 Though a middle class of Muslim
traders and professionals has emerged in the urban centers of western and northern
India, agriculture remains the primary mode of sustenance for a vast majority in the
Islamic community. The lack of economic opportunity, along with the fact that only
59 percent of Indian Muslims are literate,835 has contributed to the community’s sense
of marginalization and victimization.836
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organizations, in the wake of Hindu conversions to Islam during the late 1980s,837
demonstrated that Hindu nationalists enjoyed a relatively free hand in India’s political
arena.838 This predictably heightened Muslims’ insecurities. Realizing that their
community lacked powerful public leaders, religious heads like Imam Bukhari of
Delhi’s Jama mosque,839 and populist Islamic figures like Syed Shahabuddin, emerged
as outspoken proponents of a culturally conservative platform.840 A quote from a 1991
editorial in Shahabuddin’s monthly magazine, Muslim India, indicates an essentialist
construction of religious identity similar to that proposed by Hindu nationalists:
For a Muslim, at a personal level, his religious identity is supreme, rising
above race, language, geography, [and] political jurisdiction. Indeed, he is not
prepared to trade his religious identity at any price…to extend it is based in his
scriptures, the Holy Koran and the Traditions of the Holy Prophet…this
identity is universal, sacrosanct, and immutable; valid for all times and for all
societies.841
A glance at some of the transformations in the Indian Muslim community may
shed light on the outburst of what is now referred to as Islamic conservative
radicalism.842 As stated in chapter three, close to 4.5 million Indian Muslims migrated
to Gulf nations during the 1970s.843 The economic opportunities in these countries
enabled Muslims to bring back funds for the betterment of their brethren. Their newly
acquired resources aside, the anti-Western rhetoric professed by radical Islamists in
837
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the Middle East created a sense of urgency among Muslim intellectuals and clerics in
India. Constructing an Islamic identity became crucial in this register.844
Hindu nationalist rhetoric strengthened the conservatism in Indian Islam. On
one hand, Hindutva ideologues sympathized with the apathetic status of Muslim
women. This displeased Islamic clerics, who viewed the talk on gender inequality as
an assault on the traditional social norms of their community.845 On the other hand,
Sangh Parivar members spared no opportunity to direct rhetoric against Indian
Muslims.846 Of particular significance is the manner in which Hindu nationalists used
the discourse on global Islamic extremism847 to recast Muslims as a threat to the
Hindus.848 The 2002 riots in Godhra exemplify the above. Exploiting violence to the
party’s advantage, then BJP President Jana Krishnamurthi announced March 9, 2002
as “anti-terrorism” day.849 Worse still, the media embraced this orientation. While
controversies surrounding the construction of a Rama temple continued unabated,
news from Ayodhya was presented as reports from Ground Zero.850
The enactment of POTA after the 2001 attacks on India’s Parliament played on
both the legacy of the Partition and the notion of Islamic terrorism. The BJP
government’s decision to expose the Pakistani origins of the conspirators was more
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than just a statement of fact.851 The Muslim angle was deliberately introduced to
arouse Hindu sentiments. Though POTA is no longer an active legislation, the
ideological biases inherent to the Act have become systemic. Yet again, Gujarat is a
sad reminder of the extent to which partisan views have penetrated the nation’s
executive and judicial branches.852
By appropriating the rubric against terrorism, Hindu nationalists altered
attitudes in the Hindu and Islamic communities alike. For one, they subverted low
caste fears concerning globalization.853 The strategy allowed the BJP to serve Hindu
elites through the economic liberalization program of the 1990s. It simultaneously
convinced other sections of Hindu opinion that global concerns posed a greater threat
to the nation.854 Hindutva’s oscillation between anti-Muslim assertions and
sympathetic discourse had already cornered the Muslim community. The emphasis on
Islamic extremism further exacerbated conservative tendencies in Indian Islam.
Communal backlash was the inevitable result.855
Mushirul Hasan, a leading historian of Islam in India, elaborates on the latter
trend, when he claims that Indian Muslims’ desire to assert their identity during the
twentieth century encouraged them to insulate themselves from the processes of social
change and modernization.856 While Hasan rightly notes that internal factors were
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responsible for the community’s alienation from India’s secular and democratic
institutions, it is equally true that Muslims are scarcely free to operate in Indian civil
society. For over six decades, they have been targeted as undifferentiated enemies by
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and its affiliates.857

Hindutva and Hindus
It is clear that the BJP’s political praxis after the 1980s enhanced the preexisting minority psychosis858 in India’s Islamic community. Besides its approach
towards Islam, the party’s consistent subversion of the mass Hindu voice is perhaps
the greatest limitation in its political vision.859
The Sangh Parivar’s challenge to the secular state in the 1980s was founded
upon an alternative that the Congress Party had already made dominant in the political
field.860 According to historian Ram Puniyani, “The entire Ramjanmabhoomi agitation
did not actually demolish secularism as a ‘legitimate problematic’ but recorded it to
signify in ‘high’ political discourse what it already meant in political practice: the
competitive mobilization of intersecting majorities and minorities along increasingly
non-negotiable boundaries.”861
The crux of the issue seems to be that although the BJP introduced a host of
innovations into the practice of agitational politics, and set up a network of committed

857

Ibid.
The fear psychosis among Indian Muslims is a product of the 1947 Partition, as well as external
Islamic influences of the 1970s. See footnote 31 for citation.
859
Embree, Prospects for Peace in South Asia, 174.
860
Hansen, The Saffron Wave, 187.
861
Ibid.
858

172

activists all over the country, it has been unable to articulate a societal vision beyond
the fuzzy rhetoric of social harmony (between upper and lower caste Hindus) even to
this day. This has translated into the lack of an alternative party vision of what
political practice should entail.862 Hindutva’s endorsement of both social conservatism
and economic progressivism won the BJP the support of Hindu elites. The promise of
economic opportunity also endeared those seeking upward mobility.863 The problem,
however, is that Hindutva’s proximity to social hierarchies has rendered it difficult for
the Sangh Parivar to articulate a socio-economic agenda that would mobilize the
nation as a whole. Issues like land reform, education, and gender equality lie outside
the overarching objectives of Hindutva.864
It is precisely due to the absence of a concrete agenda that the BJP has drifted,
time and time again, towards matters pertaining to faith.865 By undermining social
hierarchies and providing a sense of unity during times of communal strife, religious
issues have, until recently, sustained the party’s power. In essence, the RSS and its
frontal organizations have no sustainable model of mass mobilization other than the
use of Hindu-specific themes, such as the myth of Rama and the ideal of a caste-free
Hindu society. As the next section reveals, the temptation to use these themes is
becoming more powerful in the face of the BJP’s defeat.866
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The Way Forward
The current Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government has
repeatedly declared that it cannot intervene in either the 1992 Ayodhya dispute or the
conflict over POTA’s misuse after the 2002 Gujarat carnage.867 Several reasons have
contributed to this stance. First, the sympathies of significant elements in Gujarat and
Uttar Pradesh868 lie not with Muslim victims, but rather with the instigators of
communal violence. The UPA does not want to lose this section of votes at the
polls.869 Second, the Congress relies on the BJP’s support in pressing forward with
India’s “bourgeoisie reform agenda.”870 Third, were the Congress to dig into the BJP’s
role in the Gujarat and Ayodhya riots, the latter would assuredly clamor for an inquiry
into the Congress Party’s culpability in the 1984 anti-Sikh massacre.871
It is indeed worrisome that the two principal parties in the world’s most
populous democracy have secretly pledged to bury each other’s communal crimes.
The UPA government’s inability to act notwithstanding, the elections of 2004 and
2009 have underscored that India’s electorate seems vary of “coalition building” that
rests on a pre-determined elitist base.872 Alluding to this development in his essay, The
Muslim Factor, Asghar Ali Engineer states:
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The BJP is playing a complex game with the full knowledge and approval of
the RSS. BJP leaders know that [their] overture to Muslims will not elicit a big
response from the community. Some have suggested that the speech by [Party
President Laxman] was not so much aimed at Muslims as liberal Hindus. This
may or may not be true. But in this era of coalition politics, the BJP wants to
clear the decks for its coalition partners.873
After having spent over two decades using the twin ideologies of economic
liberalism and religio-ethnic nationalism to augment an elitist base, the realization that
Indian institutions remain essentially pluralistic has predictably caused disappointment
in the BJP. Of particular concern today is the future course that the party will adopt.874
In an ideal scenario, Hindu nationalists would redefine “Hindutva” to better represent
India’s secular spirit. The fear is that the BJP’s recent engagement with the RSS, to
devise an agenda in the aftermath of its 2009 defeat, may result in an intensification of
the pattern of cultural nationalism witnessed in the past.875 The RSS’s militant posture
has hitherto stifled moderate voices in the BJP. The communalization of not just party
ranks, but also the administrative machinery of an entire state is well illustrated in the
2002 violence under Gujarati Chief Minister Narenda Modi.876
As it stands, the BJP’s electoral following is limited to twenty-five percent of
the popular vote.877 The issue today is not so much the “conversion” of India’s
moderate electorate as it is the potency of anti-minoritism within the pre-established
voter base of the BJP. The party’s decline878 has not impacted grassroots supporters in
its traditional constituencies in the north. Though it lost seats in states like Uttar
873

Ibid.
Hansen, The Saffron Wave, 235.
875
Sahi, “Cleaning out the Augean Stables,” Tehelka, 34-35.
876
Ibid.
877
Hansen, The Saffron Wave, 235.
878
Its voter base has reduced from 37.06 percent in 1999 to 24.6 percent in 2004. See table 3 in
appendix.
874

175

Pradesh and Bihar in both 2004 and 2009,879 its presence in the states is by no means
eliminated. Moreover, evidence of activism and force in the party’s rallies has actually
increased.880 While Hindutva remains an essentially north Indian phenomenon, the
aforementioned patterns of activism are equally evident in the BJP’s southern
constituencies. Since 2003, the state of Kerala has recorded an average of two annual
BJP-led rallies. Karnataka recorded twenty-two instances of communal conflict in
2003, and Tamil Nadu witnessed three mobilization rallies following the BJP’s defeat
in 2004.881 While the aforementioned trends indicate, on the surface, a decline in the
BJP’s electoral strength (the party secured 24.6 percent of the national vote in 2009 as
compared to 33.3 percent in 2004), they also indicate that the party’s following is far
from diminished.882 A smaller, concentrated, and disciplined voter base may actually
prove beneficial to the BJP’s activist agenda.
The defeat in 2009 has provided the BJP’s cadres with an opportunity to
evaluate the relevance of Hindu nationalism as an electoral pillar. To expand its
national standing, it is imperative for the BJP to relinquish the extremities embodied in
Hindutva. Should the party’s pendulum fail to swing in this direction, its economic
reform agenda will continue to sustain its traditional elitist base. Chapter three reveals
that it is possible for the BJP to use its current mobilization strategies—notably its use
of the Rama myth—to endear low caste Hindus. It follows that irrespective of whether
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the party wins new supporters, it will be able to retain those already in its fold.883 In so
doing, the BJP’s leadership will likely strengthen its existing pattern of caste-based
communal activism.
Regardless of which course the BJP adopts in the long-term, it is clear that the
party will not forfeit Hindutva in the near future. On the eve of the BJP’s defeat in
2009, Party President Rajnath Singh maintained that there would be no compromise
on ideology. He added that the party did not regret raising issues like religious quotas
during campaigning, “as [such issues] are in the country’s welfare.”884 He also
claimed that the BJP’s commitment to building a Rama temple in Ayodhya is
reiterated in the party’s manifesto. With regards to the BJP’s larger agenda he stated,
“Perhaps we need to present our views in a better and more contemporary context. For
this, it is necessary that we strengthen our organizational structure, campaign and
strategy.”885 On one hand, Singh’s comments underscore that the “contemporary
context” demands plurality; i.e. the Indian electorate favors moderate institutions. On
the other hand, they reveal the BJP’s unwillingness to adapt Hindutva.
The BJP’s insistence on maintaining pre-ordained political underpinnings
despite the odds at hand is doubtlessly the most instructive aspect of this analysis. It
proves that unless the party disassociates itself from the militant activism and rhetoric
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inscribed in its core ideology, communal skirmishes and Islamic conservatism will
continue to pervade the Indian political scene.
The findings in this thesis underscore the manner in which the Bharatiya Janata
Party has emerged as the political face of Hindu ethno-cultural nationalism. They
demonstrate the inter-linkages between the BJP and its parent organizations, and
indicate how the “cultural” aims of the latter have confined the political leeway of
those within the party. The BJP was born in 1980, when the Hindu right began
promoting a brand of revivalism that was embedded in the anti-minority ideas of the
pre-Partition era. Since the party came into being at a juncture when Hindu
conversions to Islam were at the forefront of the political scene, its members were able
to extend the Hindutva platform. Ayodhya and Gujarat demonstrate how the BJP
successfully used its Hindutva lineage in contemporary situations.
In delineating the multiple facets of the BJP’s political agenda, this thesis
confirms many overarching views in the scholarship of Chetan Bhatt, Deepa Reddy,
Thomas Blom Hansen, Ram Puniyani, and Badri Narayan; all of whom highlight how
the party projects itself as an inclusive organization despite its allegiance to an elitist
voter base. The findings in this analysis reflect existing concerns over the costs that
militant activism may impose on India’s social and political realms. While the thesis
describes the pluralism in Indian society, it simultaneously reveals Hindutva’s ability
to employ and adapt militant strategies on a decidedly smaller-scale. This explains
why the BJP’s defeat has not prompted either its leadership or its grassroots supporters
to shed the Hindutva plank. Equally significant is the persistence of an anti-minority
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sentiment in India’s executive, judicial, and legislative branches after the BJP’s recent
defeat. The case studies on Gujarat and the Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act
(POTA) bear testimony to this legacy. For these reasons, and many others, Hindutva
in its current or alternative form is likely to remain a crucial variable within the BJP’s
operations and in Indian politics.
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APPENDIX

Table 1: Religious Composition of India
Religious Composition

Population

Percentage

Hindus
Muslims
Christians
Sikhs
Buddhists
Jains
Other persuasions
Religions not stated
Total

827,578,868
138,188,240
24,080,016
19,215,730
7,955,207
4,225,053
6,639,626
727,588
1,028,610,328

80.5
13.4
2.3
1.9
0.8
0.4
0.6
0.1
100

Source: Census of India, 2001. Available: http://censusindia.gov.in/. [April 10, 2010].

Table 2: National Parties in India
Party

Indian National
Congress/ Congress
Bharatiya Janata
Party
Bahujan Samajwadi
Party
Communist Party of
India (Marxist)
Nationalist
Congress Party
Communist Party of
India

Year
Seats in (Lok
Founded Sabha) Lower
House of Parliament
(out of 552)
1885
206

Seats in (Rajya Sabha)
Upper House of
Parliament (out of 250)
72

1980

116

55

1984

21

11

1964

16

15

1999

9

4

1920

9

5

Note: Parties are arranged by rank in descending order.
Source: Election Commission of India, 2009. Available: http://eci.nic.in/eci_main
/index.as. [April 10, 2010].
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Table 3: Comparative Holdings: BJP vs. Congress

Year
Seats
1991
1999
2004
2009

120
270
181
159

BJP
Votes (in
percent)
20.1
37.06
33.3
24.63

Seats
232
156
218
262

Congress
Votes (in
percent)
36.5
28.3
35.4
37.22

Source: Election Commission of India, 2009. Available: http://eci.nic.in/eci_main
/index.as. [April 10, 2010].

Graph 1: Decline in BJP seats in Parliament
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Note: Figures are listed in table 3.
Source: Election Commission of India, 2009. Available: http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/
index.as. [April 10, 2010].
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Graph 2: Decline in BJP votes
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index.as. [April 10, 2010].
Note: Figures are listed in table 3.

Pie-Chart 1: Religious Composition of India

Key: Orange: Hinduism (80.5%), Green: Islam (13.4%), Purple: Christianity (2.3%),
Red: Red: Sikhism (1.9%), Blue: Others (0.19%)
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Map 1: BJP and Congress Constituencies in the 2009 State Elections

Source: Election Commission of India, 2009. Available: http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/
index.asp. [April 9, 2010].
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Map 2: Regional Distribution of India’s Muslim Population

Source: Election Commission of India, 2002. Available: http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/
index.asp. [April 9, 2010].
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Map 3: 1990 Chariot Procession (Rath Yatra) Locations and Death Toll

Source: Mushirul Hasan, Legacy of A Divided Nation, 330.
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GLOSSARY
Several terms listed below have multiple meanings. They are defined here in
accordance with the context in which they appear in this analysis.
Ahimsa—non-violence
Akhand Bharat—undivided India
Akhara—wrestling ground
Ashrama— (1) the four stages of life: student, celibate, householder, ascetic; (2) an
institutional structure that may be used as a place of learning, or as a site for religious
reflection
Atman—soul
Bhagwa dhwaj—saffron flag
Bhakti—devotional form of Hinduism; arose in the medieval period
Bharatmata—Mother India; feminization of Indian territory
Bhoudik—spiritual and ideological training
Brahamin—Hindu priest
Brahaminism—a form of elitist Hindu worship; stressed caste hierarchies to seclude
lower castes
Brahman—universe; universal essence
Dalit—untouchable
Dharma—religion, duty, righteousness, the way of life
Garibi hatao—remove poverty; Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s slogan
Gaumata—Mother cow
Goonda—muscleman
Guru—religious teacher/ guide
Hindu rashtra—Hindu nation
Jati—caste group
Jawan—soldier; term used to denote youth
Kar sevak—RSS volunteer
Mandir—Hindu temple
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Manusmriti—ancient Indian law book compiled between 200 CE and 200 AD.
Masjid—mosque
Namaz—Muslim prayer recited five times a day
Panchayat—local governing and adjudicating council
Pehelwan—professional wrestler/ strongman
Pitrubhoomi—Sarvarkar’s term for Fatherland and Holyland
Pracharak—full-time RSS organizer
Puja—Hindu form of prayer
Pundit—learned Hindu scholar
Purdah—veil used by Hindu and Muslim women
Ramrajya—rule by Rama
Ramjanmabhoomi—the birthplace of Rama; a movement to replace the Babri mosque
in Ayodhya with a Ram temple.
Ratha—chariot used in a religious procession
Rashtrasevika—female equivalent of a swayamsevak; member of the Rashtra
Swayamsevak Sangh’s (RSS) female wing, the Rashtirya Swayamsevika Sangh
(RSS*)
Samskar—virtues, moral teachings
Sangathan—organization of Hindus
Sangh Parivar—the RSS family of organizations
Sarsanghchalak—president of an organization
Sarvodaya—welfare for all
Sati—immolation of widows upon the death of their husbands; arose in medieval
times
Satyagraha—passive resistance
Shakha—an RSS organizational unit where young men meet and conduct daily
prayers, exercise, and discussions
Shakti—creative power, latent or potential force
Shuddhi—purification or reconversion to Hinduism
Swadeshi— economic self-sustenance; indigenous production
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Swayamsevak—RSS volunteer
Swaraj—self-rule, independence
Trishul—trident; emblem of Lord Shiva
Ulama—Muslim religious council
Varna—Vedic four-fold social ranking system consisting of brahamins or priests;
kshatriyas or warriors; vaisyas or traders; and shudras or untouchables
Varnashramadharma—a system which combines caste rankings (varna), social stages
in life (ashrama), and duties appropriate to both caste and stage
Yatra—pilgrimage, religious procession
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